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Abstract 
The point of this dissertation is to revisit the most ambiguous and perhaps most 
controversial aspect of Karl Polanyi's embeddedness thesis, namely the implication 
that socially disembedded economic action (i.e. action guided by a purely 
calculative disposition, ontologically separate from considerations of socia~ity) is 
"always embedded" (Block, 2003: 294) nonetheless. I aim, that is, to trouble and 
interrogate what it means to say that economic action is either embedded or 
disembedded. Yet what follows is less a re-evaluation of these ideas than a 
'reboot,' given that Polanyi is rarely mentioned herein- less still Mark 
Granovetter, embeddedness' more recent champion. I call instead upon an 
altogether different set of protagonists: Daniel Miller and Michel Callon, who in 
2002 and -5 squared off in a fruitful debate on the nature of economy. The 
analysis here adopts their terminology - entanglement versus disentanglement -
as well as Miller's ethnographic sensibility, specifically of car purchases. 
Via semi-structured interviews with car buyers (N=39), I have sought to 
ascertain the determinants of the car-buying calculus and in doing so, to lay bare 
the socio-technical dynamics of automobile transactions. Putatively disentangled 
decision-making and -taking is entangled, I argue, with market/power, a neo-
Foucauldian neologism emphasizing ways by which the buyer's sense of 
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inferiority acts a focal point of market experience and subjectivity. Becoming 
economic in the context of an automobile acquisition (or any other major life 
purchase for that matter) is hence less a matter of optimally formatting one's 
calculative competencies than of reasonably justifying one's inferiority; of 
learning, that is, the crucial injunction to stop calculating. Another way of 
putting it, the market asymmetry that counts most is not the one between the 
buyer and seller, but rather the buyer and herself. 
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Chapter One 
A Pandora's Box on Four Wheels 
'Another Year' of Automobility 
AUTOMOBILES ARE AN ADMITIEDLY ATYPICAL OBJECT of sociological analysis. 
Because of this I feel it necessary to begin this dissertation, a phenomenology of 
car purchases, by justifying the relevance of cars. Serendipitously enough, it was 
my eldest daughter, an avid story listener, who showed me how to do this. 
Aged four at the time, she became engrossed in a recording of La Bolte de 
Pandore, the well known Greek myth about humanity's loss of innocence. For 
those foggy on the story, Pandora is entrusted by the gods with a deceptively 
ordinary jar which under no circumstances is she to open. Tender voices inside 
beseech her to set them free and when she does, Pandora unwittingly unleashes 
evils hitherto unknown. Hatred, pestilence and a host of other hardships infect 
the world with gleeful recklessness as the narrator croaks with bitter staccato, "Le 
monde merveilleux semblait etre devenu laid, horrible et mechant" (The wondrous 
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world appeared to become ugly, horrible and mean). Listening repeatedly to the 
story - on the road no less - it dawned on me the narrator could well be 
describing the car, an altogether larger box engendering similar disenchantment 
nonetheless. 
Seriocomic filmmaker Mike Leigh perfectly captured this predicament in 
Another Year (2010). One of the main characters is Mary (Lesley Manville), a 
patently spent human being. Once idealistic, vivacious and beautiful, 50:-plus-
year-old Mary now stumbles through life in self-medicated stupor, suffocating 
under the weight of loneliness, futility and unfulfillment. In a bid to break from 
this rut she invests in a used, fire-red hatchback. In the following scene she visits 
long-time friend and colleague Gerri and her husband, Tom. Mary enters their 
house with great fanfare and a broad smile, pleasantly surprised to find their son 
Joe in attendance, whose past flirtatiousness Mary sees as a good romantic omen. 
Her disposition sours, however, when Joe introduces his new girlfriend, Katie. 
Mary stands stunned by the entrance of the kitchen. 
GERRI: How was your journey? 
MARY: It was alright. 
GERRI: Good. 
MARY: Oh no, it wasn't actually. 
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TOM: You didn't get lost again, did you? 
MARY: Oh no. The journey was alright, it's the car. 
TOM & GERRI: Is it OK? What happened? 
MARY: It wouldn't start. 
TOM: Ohno! 
MARY: Yeah, and it got broken into last night. [GERRI, 
TOM, JOE and KATIE wince in sympathy.] 
JOE: Oh sorry to hear that. 
MARY: Yeah, I did my big weekly supermarket shop 
yesterday and uh - which is great because I couldn't 
do that before I had the car - and uh, I went nice and 
early so it wouldn't be too dark when I got back. 
And I brought three bags in, but I must have left the 
fourth one on the front seat. And I got in, I thought, 
'That's great, that's done, I can chill out now and 
have a nice little glass of wine.' And I had a really 
nice evening, actually. Um, but then this morning, 
I'm in the bathroom and I'm sitting on the- 'cause 
it's the toilet roll that I've left in the car. So I rush 
out; my window's been smashed. There's glass 
everywhere and all my toilet roles have been stolen. 
[TOM sighs.] 
JOE: It was probably kids. 
MARY: Yeah, I think you're right Joe. 
KATIE: You insured Mary? 
MARY: [She pauses and scowls, insulted KA TIE is 
addressing her.] Yeah of course I'm insured. 
KATIE: Well that's something, isn't it? 
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MARY: [Continuing to scowl, pondering the apparent 
nonsense ofKATIE's comment.] You can't drive without 
insurance, can you? It's illegal. 
KATIE: No, but what I'm saying is, at least you'll be 
able to claim for your window, won't you? 
MARY: I know! Anyway, I-I-I'm sick of it, I just left it. 
It's just a car, what does it matter? [JOE glances at 
KA TIE reassuringly.] 
GERRI: Sit yourself down Mary.· Put the kettle on Tom. 
[TOM does.] 
MARY: .. .It's given me a lot of stress Tom. 
TOM: This car's been a catalogue of disaster, hasn't it? 
Maybe you should cut your losses and get rid of it. 
MARY: Yeah, but I've spent so much on it Tom. I can't 
just sell it now. 
TOM: Yeah but if you keep it, it's just going to get 
worse, isn't it? 
GERRI: [Disapprovingly.] Well you know what I think 
Mary. 
MARY: Yeah, yeah. I'm fed up with it to be honest 
Tom. l've'd three punctures. 
TOM: Three ... ? [He turns to GERRI wko roles her eyes.] 
MARY: Yeah. My exhaust's fallen off; I've had to get a 
new one. My carburettor went-
TOM: You can't take it back to the guys you got it 
from, can you? 
MARY: No! They'd said they'd guarantee the labour 
for three months but not the parts - bastards! 
4 
TOM: The other way around probably, isn't it; the 
parts for three months, but not the labour? 
MARY: No! [She pauses, confused.] Oh yeah, that's right. 
Oh I dunno! Anyway, my windscreen wiper got rip-
ped off. I got three points for speeding at £60 each, 
so I've got nine points on my driving licence, haven't 
I? 
GERRI: Yes. 
MARY: It keeps making funny noises. I got towed 
away and I wasn't even parked on a double yellow 
line. I got seven parking tickets - no! Nine parking 
tickets, and then, [Swallowing.] I broke down on the 
motorway on the way to Brighton. And I got towed 
to Crawley, which is the last place I wanna go 
because I grew up there and I hate it! So I had to get 
the train home and then the train back to Crawley 
the next day and the guy kept trying to touch me up 
and it cost me nearly £500, and I never even got my 
weekend in Brighton, and that was supposed to be 
my summer holiday, wasn't it Gerri? 
GERRI: Yes. 
MARY: It's not fair, is it? 
TOM: No. 
GERRI: Well, never mind! 
JOE: Come and sit down, relax. 
MARY: Yeah thanks. 
KATIE: At least you're here now, eh? 
MARY: [Squinting in contempt as she takes a seat.] 
Wha'd'you say your name was? 
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KATIE: Katie. [MARY grunts softly in acknowledgment.] 
Like the unassuming voices of Pandora's gift, the hatchback promised so much -
self-renewal, freedom, utility- but merely delivered more anguish. A sense of 
impotent rage washes over Mary as the realization Joe will remain forever out of 
reach becomes indelibly linked to the failure of her motoring experience. 
To liken the car to a Pandora's Box is therefore to highlight its 
contradictory nature, a theme that finds resonance in much contemporary 
sociological thinking. John Urry's take on automobilihj, for instance, is predicated 
on the duality of freedom and coercion: cars allow for unprecedented flexibility 
in travel, but at the necessary cost of fixing one's mobility within a complex of 
asphalt, regulation and mechanics (Urry, 2000: 59-60; 2004: 27-9). Automobility 
thus signifies a system, a "hybrid" or "interlocking" .of "social and technical" 
elements (2000: 57), which becomes autopoeitic in that it" generates the 
preconditions for its own self-expansion" (2004: 27). The most exasperating 
example of this is when road expansion in the name of decongestion has the 
opposite effect, revealing the perversely positive correlation between road 
capacity and demand. 
The consequences of this vicious cycle cannot be underestimated. "The 
car's significance," Urry (2000: 59; emphasis added) argues, "is that it 
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reconfigures civil society involving distinct ways of dwelling, travelling and 
socialising in, and through an automobilised time-space. Civil societies of the west 
are societies of automobility." Social science can no longer treat the car as a neutral 
tool wielded for better or worse. It must explicitly problematize the 
indispensability of private vehicular travel the globe over. 
The automobility school (e.g. Bohm, 2006; Conley & McLaren, 2009; 
Theory, Culture & Society, 2004; Urry, 2007) is part of a larger material turn in 
sociology- 'material' here referring not to materialism as such (i.e. the historical 
centrality of concrete, institutionalized relations), but an appreciation for the 
sociality of material objects. Like other theorists of this turn - Donna Haraway 
(1991), Ulrich Beck (1992) and Bruno Latour (2005) are iconic, if disparate 
exemplars - Urry' s (2000: 77-8) ~im is to interrogate the agency of material 
objects, and in the process to decentre social causation from sentient humans, in 
effect dissolving age-old dichotomies like society-nature, agency-structure and 
subjectivity-objectivity. In what sense then are things' agent-ful,' capable of 
instigating social action? This is the question underlying all sociologies of 
materiality. 
Latour, who serves as Urry' s (2000: 77-8) point of conceptual departure 
and comparison, offers a comprehensive answer. "Action," he writes (2005: 44), 
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"is not done under the full control of consciousness; action should rather be felt 
as a node, a knot, and a conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies." 
There are two points to be gleaned here. Firstly, because action is not necessarily 
synonymous with intentionality, researchers must remain open to attributing 
action to "any thing that ... modif[ies] a state of affairs by making a difference ... " 
(Latour, 2005: 71; italics in original). An actor may thus be a person or group, but 
equally an idea, statistic, object or technology. Does not, asks Latour rhetorically 
(2005: 71), the assignment of verbs to objects (e.g. "kettles 'boil' water, knives 
'cut' meat. .. ") designate a propensity for modification? 
. Identification of novel agencies is, however, only half the story. 
Researchers need also to provide accounts of figurations of action by specifying 
linkages and limits by which an agency makes another do, behave or be (Latour, 
2005: 52-4). This is termed agencement, the ability to translate, dislocate or 
distribute agency through a system of interfaces across time and space. The 
figuration's interfacing parts - sentient or not - are called actants, while the 
figuration itself is alternately an actor-network, assemblage, or apparatus. Latour 
(2005: 132) himself prefers work-net, a neologism emphasizing the deliberate 
effort required to sustain agency. 
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Take a hypothetical nineteen-year-old who lovingly pours his passions 
and parent's money into an older-model Honda Civic. Among other 
modifications, he retunes the engine to deliver more torque sooner, drops the 
suspension and dresses the racing rims with tires of seemingly paper-thin profile. 
He does all this, only to wreck the Civic on a deserted arterial at night, killing 
himself and critically injuring two passengers. What caused this tragedy? Was it 
a culture of masculine bravado, lax parenting, lax laws, a neurochemical 
predisposition for thrill seeking, the car itself, a network of mechanics willing 
and eager to perform illegal alterations, or simply peer pressure? The answer 
could be any of these, if not all, and perhaps others not mentioned. The onus is 
on the researcher not simply to posit, but to demonstrate the connections by 
which it can be known that these factors delivered this fate. In the event our 
protagonist's death sparks outcry on the perils of street racing, the web of 
causation continues to proliferate. Analysis of causation, in short, is not an 
exercise in the revelation of latent forces, but the tracing of visible linkages 
among actants, consisting in this case of people, ideas, machines, magazines, 
music, marketing, news, law, law enforcement, coroner's inquests and popular 
and scholarly debates. 
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Urry similarly speaks of systems of automobility as machinic complexes 
(2000: 60) or car-driver hybrids (2004: 26): the car may be an extension of the 
driver's agency, but the opposite is also true, since it brings to bear on the 
driver's senses a plethora of influences both tangible and intangible.1 This 
suggests that cars are integral to the constitution of perceptions, identities, 
relationships and more generally, "the cultural environment within which we see 
ourselves as human" (Miller, 2001: 2). It is for this reason the automotive 
experience, in all its (in-) tangibility, stands out as a timely and critical object of 
study. 
Economization of the Automobile 
About the same time Urry was shifting his gaze onto cars, so was Daniel Miller. 
His approach, known as the humanity of the car, is complementary to Urry's, the 
difference being one of emphasis rather than substance. Like Urry, Miller (2001: 
24) focuses on the consequentiality of the car-driver bond or the "highly visceral 
relationship between the bodies of people and bodies of cars." But unlike Urry, 
whose inclinations are largely systemic, Miller (2001: 17) strives for a balance of 
systemic and ethnographic sensibilities: "The problem for the study of car 
i I draw here a rather facile connection between Latour and Urry but the parallels go only so far. 
Urry (2000: 78) ultimately dismisses Latour's understanding of hybridity as "somewhat vacuous" 
because Latour fails to recognize "the sensuous constitution of ... hybrids." 
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cultures .. .is to retain the link between the micro-history of ethnography of 
experience and an appreciation of the way these are shot through with ... acts of 
commerce and the state." The balance is crucial for without it, any critique runs 
the risk of being unduly two-dimensional, resembling "a fetishized history ... 
abstract and distant from the humanity in which it is involved" (2001: 9). 
Gender is a good example. One may well castigate the car for its 
masculinist bias, given its associations with violence and power. Yet one can 
scarcely afford to ignore "the centrality of the car to the mundane tasks of 
women" (2001: 12), which chiefly amounts to, as Betty Friedan ([1963] 2001: 299) 
noted decades ago, "buy[ing] more things for the house" (also cf. Maxwell, 2001: 
213, 215-7). Focusing our interrogations on dualities like destruction-
reproduction allows us to build a critical foundation on the polyvalence that lies 
at the heart of all things social. After all, did not Pandora also find hope - that 
most quintessential and slippery of human traits - buried underneath all those 
duplicitous voices? 
The present study focuses on the economic dimension of the car's 
humanity, something I call the economization of the automobile. Allow me to 
begin unpacking this term by acknowledging that economic themes are hardly 
foreign to automobility scholars. One of the more prominent strands in the 
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literature, particularly from a policy perspective, concerns the identification of 
motoring's externalities or hidden costs. This is basically an attempt to provide a 
more thorough accounting of private vehicle use, incorporating publicly borne 
costs to infrastructure, environment, healthcare, productivity and so on (cf. 
Porter, 1999). Todd Litman has more recently taken the method in a distinctly 
socioeconomic direction by quantifying the car's impact as an object of status or 
prestige. He concludes (2009: 214) the car is an "economic trap ... tend[ing] to 
favour more costly, faster, resource-intensive modes [of travel] .... " The literature 
equally boasts less quantitative ways of broaching the economic: Herbert 
Moorhouse's (1991: 39) oft-cited history of postwar hot-rodding points to 
"burgeoning economic interests" as a factor in the sport's organization and 
acceptance, while Catharine Genovese's (2009: 22) corresponding study argues 
that the sport's legitimation afforded "opportunities for some members to 
capitalize economically." 
Despite their differences, both the externality and social-historical 
approaches interpret the economic similarly, namely as something existing 
positively, independent of lived experience. In the former, economy provides a 
set of metrologies allowing us to apprehend reality more objectively, while in the 
latter an institutional realm of roles, relationships and interests. I, however, want 
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to put aside the economic's a priori solidity, proceeding from the premise that 
economy emerges through experience. This is what economization and the title, 
Becoming Economic, are meant to invoke. 
Towards that end I treat economy in the sense of reason or rationality: it is 
a means-ends relationship, a way of inferring an optimal or balanced course of 
action, as epitomized in the Ford ad slogan (see figure one below), "the ... 
combination of minimal input and maximum output." Toyota too relies on the 
theme of balance to sell its cars: their Camry, a mid-sized sedan in the same 
competitive league as the Fusion, has been christened a "New ERA" car, boasting 
both emotional and rational appeal (Kenzie, 201 lb). Economization then is all 
about learning balance with respect to one's market encounters, turning on the 
question - or process, rather - of justification of balance: being economic not only 
involves perceiving, but also articulating an optimal resolution to contradictory 
priorities. Such an understanding may appear to read as if it were ripped from 
an economics textbook, but the analytical spirit of what follows is anything but. 
In economics rationality serves in "the investigation of causal processes" (Hayek, 
1948: 35), representing the problematic par excellence by which to interrogate 
social facts. What I intend is quite the opposite: I mean to interrogate reason and 
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the calculus of balance leading to it by way of problematical social facts. Reason, 
in short, does not (re-) construct social reality, but is itself a social construct. 
A brief illustration is in order here: sweeping changes in the automotive 
industry over the past two decades, dubbed 'lean' or 'just-in-time' (JIT) 
production, have sought not only to economize the processing of cars, but the 
processors as well- i.e. the workers - by decentring a number of decision-
making functions (e.g. work scheduling). Such re-organization naturally serves 
political ends as well, rendering union representation superfluous with respect to 
day-to-day operations. What are the lived consequences of treating workers like 
entrepreneurs? Examining the situation at a union-free subsidiary of auto-parts 
giant Magna International, Wayne Lewchuk and Don Wells (2006: 656) argue, 
The result has been the creation of work-group and 
plant-level identities that are strongly congruent with 
management productivity objectives and inconsistent 
with union adversarialism .... Worker cooperation is 
understood as a 'common sense' condition of mutual 
economic survival rather than as an antagonistic, 
mutable power relation. 
On paper then, entrepreneuralization represents a win-win solution: workers 
gain a measure of calculative autonomy in exchange for claims to collective 
advocacy. Experientially though, because "[w]orkloads remain heavy and health 
and safety problems affect a large percentage of the workforce" (Yates, Lewchuk 
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and Stewart, 2001: 523), there is no appreciable difference between the new and 
old regimes except one: workers must now take individual responsibility for or 
to internalize any sense of precariousness on the shop floor. 
This example reminds us of the two basic parameters by which to conduct 
an analysis of economization. Economization is first and foremost a structural 
property. Organizational by design (and hence implicit in shifting struggles over 
labour representation), it plays a seminal role in what we might call the 
automobile's history of production: economy in this ongoing narrative renders 
patterns of relationships concrete, not simply with respect to roles (i.e. the 
contractual obligations of workers to managers and vice-versa) but also those 
roles and their material mediators, specifically the machinic in- and outputs 
through and on which people perform economy. Secondly, although 
economization concerns the art and science of balance, we should not be so quick 
to equate it with empowerment; ambiguity, anxiety and anguish can and do form 
part of that balance. Another way of looking at it, the study of balance requires 
consummate sensitivity to the variability by which social structures are 
internalized, or how structural dynamics represent, paraphrasing Michel 
Foucault ([1983] 2010: 3), contestable "focal point[s] of experience." 
Economization unfolds, we might say, at the articulation of histories of structures 
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on the one hand (viz. chains of influence stretching across people and things) and 
subjectivities on the other (viz. modes of knowing, experiencing or simply 'being' 
in these structures). 
Alas on the structural side of the equation, this dissertation leaves aside 
the labour-car-management nexus in favour of one containing buyers, cars and 
sellers. I focus on a history of consumption, not production, for the principal 
reason that the act of acquisition yields, I think, a more robust understanding of 
economization: it forces us to explicate the role of the market in a way that is less 
abstract compared to production. Or rather, buying a car helps us trace an 
experientially immediate link between subjectivities (e.g. an attitude of frugality) 
and the objective structures in which they are immersed. My argument is 
basically this: car acquisitions confirm to the buyer the consequentiality of the 
market due to the scale of the commitment undertaken, pecuniary and otherwise. 
A form of pseudo-pedagogy by necessity, economization brings the buyer's sense 
of self in line with the gravity of her acquisition, helping her make retrospective 
sense of her actions vis-a-vis the seller and vehicle. What makes a car purchase, 
in other words, such an effective vehicle of economization is that it obliges the 
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buyer to feel the full weight of balance: no longer abstract, economy becomes 
associated with a tangible sensation, be it fear, humiliation or initiation.2 
Such a contention, I am all too aware, raises an obvious methodological 
concern. If the power of car acquisitions derives from its status as a major life 
purchase, is not acquiring a house an even better instance of economization? It 
probably is, but a real estate transaction is also more complicated, with agents, 
lawyers, inspectors and all manner of consultants clogging the transactional 
apparatus. The empirical virtue of the car buying relationship is that it is direct, 
bringing into sharper relief the strategy, anxiety and unpredictability of market 
action. Besides, the economizing effects of house hunting and ownership have 
been well documented - by Pierre Bourdieu (2005) no less - while as far as I can 
tell, the present study is the first of its kind, filling a hole Miller himself (2002: 
225) has recognized. 
Michel, Daniel & Sophie 
There is another reason to study car purchases: despite the paucity of research, a 
contentious debate has already flared on the subject which fortuitously cut to the 
2 I suppose the ideal study of economization would link histories of production to consumption, 
as opposed to focusing on one or the other. The question would then become- and I thank Mark 
Thomas for making me see this - how do production regimes impact consumer subjectivities? While 
such a research program would doubtlessly allow us to say something about contemporary 
capitalism, it would be exceedingly difficult to undertake since much of the necessary marketing 
data is proprietary (see Chapter Two below, footnote 3 especially). 
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heart of economic sociology, featuring opposing conceptions of market action. I 
want to pause on this debate for the remainder of this chapter, since it offers an 
especially rewarding angle of conceptual attack on economization. 
The debate was occasioned by the introduction to The Laws of the Market 
(LotM) by Latour collaborator Michel Callon (1998a). This was the first attempt 
to articulate an actor-network theory of economy, remaining to this day the 
classic statement on the matter. Callon's (1998a: 3) basic premise is, "a market 
implies a peculiar anthropology, one ... assum[ing] ... 'calculative agencies,"' from 
which three corollaries follow. Firstly, calculative agencies are compatible with 
mainstream economic notions of formal rationality; the difference being, whereas 
economics takes rationality for granted, Callon places emphasis on "the 
conditions in which rational action can emerge" (1998a: 52n8). Secondly, these 
conditions have to do with "possible states of the world," or more precisely shifts 
- potential and/or actual- in the distribution of goods, resources or knowledge in 
one's market 'vicinity' (1998a: 4). And because the possibilities in question are 
necessarily calculations, market-worlds are ontologically a fusion of actors and 
the calculative devices binding them: "Agents," Callon (1998a: 8) advises, "are 
actor-worlds." Lastly, calculative agencies are compatible with methodological 
19 
individualism, in that market participants "enter and leave the exchange like 
strangers. Once the transaction has been concluded [they] are quits" (1998a: 3). 
The second and third corollaries present us with an intriguing tension: the 
latter assumes a homo clausus closed in on himself (1998a: 8), the former a homo 
apertus (1998a: 11), "entangled in a web of relations and connections" (1998a: 8). 
The goal of Callon's program, very simply put, is to specify processes that 
reconcile openness with imperviousness, or phrased as a question, "How is it 
possible to become homo clausus when survival requires one to be homo apertus" 
(1998a: 25)? The operation Callon highlights, in the concluding chapter especially 
(1998b), is framing, "the tracing of a boundary between relationships and events 
which are internalized and included in a decision or, by contrast, externalized 
and excluded from it" (1998a: 15). This is in effect a suspension of the condition 
of entanglement - a form of investment in disentangling people and things from 
their contexts- allowing one "to make relations visible and calculable in the 
network" (1998a: 17). Framing thus presupposes the double movement of 
entanglement and disentanglement, without which calculation is impossible 
(1998a: 19; 2005: 6; cf. Barry & Slater, 2002: 293). 
Callon illustrates this with a hypothetical automobile transaction. Because 
the passage is brief, Callon is uncharacteristically elusive with respect to the 
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devices involved, apart from passing references to property rights (1998a: 18) and 
"professionals of embedding" (2005: 7), presumably marketers. Specifics 
notwithstanding, car transactions reveal a key upshot of the entanglement-
framing-disentanglement nexus, namely the creation of alienable, marketable 
commodities: 
[T]o transform something into a commodity, and two 
agents into a seller and a consumer, it is necessary to 
cut the ties between the thing and the other objects or 
human beings one by one. It must be 
decontextualized, dissociated and detached. For the 
car to go from the producer-seller to the customer-
buyer, it has to be disentangled (Callon, 1998a: 19). 
The moment of disentanglement, in other words, furthers the "life" or "career" of 
the car, disembedding it from the design, engineering and marketing networks of 
the manufacturer-dealer, only to re-embed it in the occupational, familial and 
ideational lifeworlds of the consumer (Callon et al, 2002: 197-8). Of course, 
vehicle warranties and recalls belie the absoluteness of the transfer - a residual 
Callon calls overflowing (cf. 1998b) - but in principle, the sine non qua of the 
market experience is the cutting of ties among transactors and commodities. 
With respect to theoretical questions about the nature of economy, Callon 
(1998a: 4-6) positions himself between the extremes of cognition a la Herbert 
Simon and institution a la Karl Polanyi. This is to say, his focus on framing and 
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alienability as deliberate accomplishments are meant to demonstrate that homo 
economicus' calculations are neither "bounded by [the] complexity ... of 
computational effort" (Simon, 1972: 164), nor "submerged in his social 
relationships" (Polanyi, [1944] 2001: 48). Rather, he is mobilized and configured, 
"formatted, framed and equipped with prostheses which help him in his 
calculations ... " (Callon, 1998a: 51, 22). This has more generally come to be 
known as the performativity thesis, the contention that economics at large (i.e. 
academic economics alongside accounting, marketing and the like) does not 
observe the functioning of economy so much as provide conceptual and metrical 
tools to create it (1998a: 2, also 23-32). "[E]conomy," Callon provocatively 
declares (1998a: 30), "is embedded not in society but in economics." In the 
intervening years, a flurry of ANT-inspired research has developed the argument 
further (e.g. Callon et al, 2007; MacKenzie, 2006; MacKenzie et al, 2007). 
By 2002, interest in Callon' s program was such that Economy and Society 
devoted a special issue to it. The editors so happened to approach Daniel Miller 
"to write a live response" (Miller, 2005: 3) principally because in the same year as 
LotM' s publication, Miller (1998) too penned a theory about economics, 
virtualism. Virtualism also speaks of performativity, but in a decidedly 
destructive sense: economics boasts the ideological "authority to transform the 
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world into its own image [and] ... to eliminate the particularities of the world" 
(Miller, 1998: 196). As Petter Holm (2007: 225) later sized it up, this difference 
amounts to 11 a classical confrontation: between two books; between two authors; 
between two different interpretations of the same phenomenon." 
Because Miller had just published Car Cultures (2001), the thrust of his 
critique fell on the car example. Miller begins (2002: 224) by taking Callon to task 
for underspecifying the frame of the transaction: because Callon ignores the 
"huge literature on the externalities of the car" (framing is, after all, the 
sociological act of creating externalities [Callon, 1998b: 248-9]), one is left with a 
poor sense of what lies in and out of the frame. Moreover, can we really say 
framing suspends entanglement, insulating actants in a state of pure calculation? 
Miller elaborates his answer - an emphatic no - by way of a psychosocial 
evaluation of Sophie, imaginary buyer of a Renault (2002: 225-7; 2005: 6). 
Recently divorced, Sophie lost use of the familial BMW, a vehicle that in any event 
came to epitomize for her everything she despised about her ex-husband. Her 
motives for buying the smaller, less powerful Renault are mixed to say the least, 
in equal parts recognition of lean financial days ahead, affirmation of 
environmental responsibility and identification with a design language 
commensurate with youthful optimism, new beginnings and 11 a new Sophie" 
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(2005: 6). As for the sales dimension of Sophie's choice, Miller (2002: 226-7) shows 
it too contains, 
all the entanglements of an octopus at the moment 
when the prey is about to give up the struggle. . .. If 
Sophie buys this car it is in large measure because 
commerce has spent years forging the tentacles that 
would make this already in some sense 'Sophie's' car. 
Sophie's sole disentangling moment was her divorce. The purchase, on 
the contrary, was a moment of aesthetic totalization, a term borrowed from Sartre, 
in which everything about Sophie - past, present and possible - was brought to 
bear, forcing her to balance a veritable "constellation of values" (2002: 226). In 
short, "no disentanglement is required in order for a decision to be made" (2005: 
6), for price is ultimately an intensely qualitative - not quantitative -
consideration. "Human beings," contends Miller (2002: 231), "are capable of 
quite effective assessments of value, the true basis for transaction, [but] ... Callon 
confuses the simplification of calculation to numbers with the practice of 
calculation." 
Miller and Callon hence espouse polar positions with respect to what lies 
within and -out the calculative frame. For Callon, disentangled quantification is 
inside, entanglement outside. For Miller, entanglement is in, while 'objective,' 
quantifiable assessments of entailments (i.e. externalities) are out. Considered 
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economistically, Miller's conclusion is unorthodox to say the least: exchange for 
him is a symbolk, ritualized encounter bearing little resemblance to economists' 
rarefied logic. Indeed, "the problem for the contemporary capitalist economy is 
that ... actual economic agents are trying to keep the market as an externality, 
outside the frame of the transaction" (2002: 231). "Callon's emphasis on 
calculation and disentanglement," in which case, "ends up as an attempt to 
rescue more conventional notions of the market, for no particularly good reason" 
(2005: 5). 
If this all sounds familiar, it should. It amounts a re-run of the 
substantivism-formalism debate of decades past, a similarity lost neither on 
Miller (2002: 221-2) nor E&S co-editor Don Slater (2002: 235). 
From Entanglement to Disentanglement 
Although polemically opposed, Callon and Miller's positions are not, as Miller 
(2005: 3, 11) himself concedes, completely irreducible. Indeed, the beneficial 
legacy of the debate is that it has generated reflection on two key questions, what 
exactly is disentanglement and what is its relationship to the condition of entanglement 
from which it stems? Slater (2002: 242), for one, sees relevance in disentanglement, 
not as the delimitation of entanglement, but the calculating or reading of 
another's entanglements. "Sophie and her salesman," he remarks (2002: 240), 
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"are certainly entangled in complex social worlds; they just are not the same 
worlds, and each wants to get the most out of the other's." For Patrik Aspers 
(2005: 36), the veracity of disentanglement is predicated on market structures 
wherein roles are multiple or exchangeable (viz. an actor buys a commodity 
which she later sells). He argues that Miller, whose critique implies fixed market 
roles, does not repudiate disentanglement as much as demonstrate its conceptual 
limits. 
My intent is likewise not to take Callon's or Miller's side, but to stake 
fertile ethnographic ground between them. What this concretely means, the data 
here lend no support for Callon' s claim that car-buying represents an archetypal 
site of disentangled calculation. Something like framing does occur, but the 
frame is so thoroughly permeated by extra-calculative factors that calculative 
refinement, as Miller (2005: 6) correctly surmised, is typically not the outcome. If 
Callon thus be faulted for anything, it is that he presumes the generalizability of 
disentanglement perhaps too much.3 Yet the absence of disentanglement in the 
first instance does not mean the absence of formal economic reason in the last, for 
3 Car sales are not the substantive illustration of framing or disentanglement; as mentioned 
earlier, their appearance in LotM is too cursory for that. Callon instead marshals a different proof: 
the construction of a strawberry market in the Loire in the 1980s (1998a: 19-23), the research for 
which (cf. Garcia-Parpet, [1986] 2007) was, by Callon's admission (2007: 335), formative to his 
conceptualization of performativity. Be that as it may, neither Callon's (2005) nor Helm's (2007) 
responses to Miller address the possibility that car sales may be inappropriate to their argument. 
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my respondents are more than capable of accounting for their experiences with 
concepts like cost-benefit analysis and long-term time horizons. So while it is 
possible to identify a disentangling moment a la Callon, this is neither a socio-
technical operation nor act of conditioning relationships for calculative purposes. 
Quite the opposite, disentanglement signals the end of calculation or a necessary 
detachment of a secondary order: the elevation of entangled decision-making 
and-taking to a higher, justificatory plane of veridiction. The "economy of 
economic practices" as Bourdieu (2005: 8) calls it, is indeed more complicated 
than Callon lets on. 
In which case, what I mean by economization differs from the ANT 
understanding. For Callon and his colleagues (cf. Muniesa, Millo & Callon, 2007: 
3-4), economization is embodied in the variability of performativity; that is, in the 
contingency, path-dependency and disputability of "instruments for the 
calculation of prices, or rules that organize competition, or of accounting 
methods that identify and allocate profits" (Muniesa et al, 2007: 4; also cf. Callon, 
1998a: 32). It is on the basis of these ongoing tensions and torsions in framing, so 
the ANT narrative goes, that we may analytically trace the path to becoming 
economic. No doubt such calculative jousting and jostling- 'framing on the fly,' 
we might call it- is important, especially in the context of automobiles, where 
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information is continually accumulated and evaluated. Yet I ultimately want to 
impress in these pages that economizing a major life purchase is associated with 
rather hard limits on calculativeness having less to do _with uncertainty than 
'enlightened' surrender. Or perhaps a better way of putting it, what I am after in 
this dissertation is a specific, seemingly contradictory trajectory of 
economization: an actor whose market experiences are hotly beholden to all sorts 
of extra-market factors, yet who by force of necessity adopts a cold, formalizing 
logic to interpret these experiences. 
To understand economization and its attendant necessities, I submit we 
need to approach car purchases as an instance of power. There is nothing novel 
about this move, since popular culture already takes an exceptionally dim view 
of the automotive business: car salesmen are by default thought of as pushy and 
aggressive, if not downright deceitful. Phenomenologically speaking however, 
this presumption of sales power is only half-correct: those I interviewed did 
report a nagging sense of inferiority vis-a-vis their sellers, but never was the 
relationship considered coercive. Thus by 'power,' I mean asymmetry but not 
outright domination, for which reason I rely conceptually on Foucault, a running 
theme for whom concerned subjectivation (i.e. "the constitution of the subject's 
mode of being" [2010: 4]) under asymmetrical conditions. Rather than seeing 
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modern-day apparatuses of power as repressive, he argued they constitute an 
entire "technology of the 'soul"' whose chief effect is the individual ([1975] 1977: 
30; [1976] 2003: 30). 
Economization is entangled in this-' creative' sense of power, the buyer 
adopting a disentangled disposition to account for the demeaning 
complicatedness of the acquisition. To become economic thus requires a self-
flagellation of sorts, the inculcation of a quasi-formal sensibility whose purpose is 
to justify the buyer's inferiority to herself, helping her grasp the magnitude of 
consequentiality of her choice. Economics, broadly understood, is what remains 
after the buyer has received a crash course on the worth of things, learning first-
hand the meaning of that deceptively banal of maxims, what the market will bear. 
The vehicle itself plays a decisive role here, alternately a budgetary 
disciplinarian, embodiment of pecuniary agency and validation of one's technico-
financial gamble. As a dispositif, the car not only performs economy, as Callon 
reminds us, but also' governs mentality,' paraphrasing Foucault. It is both an 
eco- and anthroponomic device. 
Elaborating this argument will require weaving theory with evidence over 
the following six chapters. In the next chapter I discuss my underlying 
methodological choices and compromises. In Chapters Three and Four I build 
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the case against Callon' s double movement postulate, demonstrating that car-
buying calculativity remains an always entangled affair, formatted by dynamics 
that are decidedly extra-market and extra-calculative. The former of these 
chapters examines the importance of sociality- the 'fact' of human 
interrelatedness - as opposed to emotion or intellect, while the latter focuses on 
the gendering of calculation. The subsequent three chapters are devoted to 
moving us conceptually from entanglement to disentanglement via power, a 
move representing, I believe, a different way of bridging the age-old distinction 
between substantive and formal reason, to use Max Weber ([1922] 1978: 85-6) and 
Polanyi's (1957: 246-50) terms. The first step in the fifth chapter is to build a 
foundation on the existing, but phenomenologically limited microeconomic 
concept, market power, which is then reshaped in Chapter Six on a neo-
Foucauldian anvil, giving way to a "new,' more experientially relevant concept, 
market/power. Car-buying relations, to wit, are re-specified as pseudo-
pedagogical relations of government, educative and asymmetrical in equal 
measure, underpinned by devices of measurement, calculation and competition. 
The seventh chapter catalogues the disentangling effects of market/power, which 
ironically amount not to an exhortation to calculation, but to responsibilization 
and acceptance of one's calculative handicaps. In the Conclusion, I consider the 
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potential effects of these effects, if you will: I pose the possibility that 
disentangled agencies are actually antithetical to haggling and negotiation. 
The automobile, in sum, is a sociological Pandora's Box, containing an 
array of tropes central to the discipline and spanning the entirety of the micro-
macro continuum: alienation, modernity, system, agency, materiality, economy, 
market, reason and power. And while economization is the name I christen this 
tropic box, what the box actually reveals remains an open question. I would like 
to think it is capitalism. Just maybe, to paraphrase Bourdieu (2005: 186, 6 
respectively), knowing how car buyers become economic- how "they discover 
the rigours of economic necessity" in other words - "enables us to form a rough 
idea of what happened during the origins of capitalism," when its dispositions 
were being forged concurrently with its structures. Whatever its epistemological 
potential, economization reminds us- something E.P. Thompson (1967) 
understood well - that appreciating economic processes necessitates a granular 
analysis pitched at that ambiguous place where external constraints are 
internalized into the recesses of psyche and self; where patterned market 
relationships are patterned into more or less coherent meanings of market. As 
ambivalent or precarious as this may sound, one would expect no less from a 
Pandora's Box. 
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Chapter Two 
Problematics of Method 
THE GOAL OF THIS CHAPTER IS TO PRESENT something more than a description of 
the data gathering process. Such an accounting would undoubtedly read as 
perfunctory or tedious worse still, tempting one ultimately to skip to the next 
chapter. What I instead have in mind makes hopefully for more rewarding 
reading: a discussion establishing limits around the main argument, troubling it 
before it is even elaborated. While this may sound self-defeating, my intention is 
to contextualize what I did by considering what I could have and ideally should 
have done. This amounts to no less than an alternate introductory chapter, one 
that couches the subject matter not in theory, literature or debates, but 
practicalities, setbacks and compromises. The title of this chapter is thus meant 
to capture 'problematic' in a double sense: not only was the conception and 
execution of the project difficult, but more generally, being methodologically 
pragmatic is fraught with epistemological tension. 
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Buyer's Bias 
The most peculiar aspect of this project is the privilege accorded to buyers -
buyer's bias I am calling it. A buyer is anyone who acquires a car, new or used, 
but whose livelihood does not primarily depend on re-selling it (i.e. she is not 
continuously immersed in car markets). I make no distinction among buyers 
who lease, finance or pay outright for their vehicles, since the basic buyer-seller 
dynamic remains constant across them all (i.e. I treat 'purchase' as synonymous 
with all forms of acquisition). 'Bias' refers to the postulate that car markets are 
constituted neither by classes of vehicles,1 relative strengths of manufacturers,2 
nor machinations of sales professionals. 3 They come into being via buyers' 
1 Although a common market metric, there is little consensus with respect to the definition of 
classes. In Europe, passenger cars typically fall in size categories A to D. North American cars 
range from sub-compacts (e.g. Honda Fit, Ford Fiesta) to full size sedans (e.g. Chrysler 300, 
Nissan Maxima). The former corresponds to European B-class; the latter is non-existent in 
European automotive taxonomy. Matters become more complicated when sport-utility and 
luxury vehicles are given separate classes, the boundaries of which are hardly cut and dry. The 
Canadian Black Book (2012), this country's authority on used car values, currently recognizes no 
fewer than 17 classes. 
2 This too is a common way of knowing the industry, taking the form of a monthly statistical 
comparison of manufacturers. Strength is determined not so much by units sold, but percentage-
change in sales compared to the same month the year previously. So while the approach is 
externally competitive, competition is posited as a function of internal performance. That is, 
manufacturers do not statistically compete against each other, but year-old images of themselves. 
3 Adopting this definition would take economization in a different, albeit fruitful direction: the 
framing of automotive desire, which presupposes a different structure of relations - no more a 
seller-car-buyer nexus, but a marketer-car-consumer one. The analysis would focus, in part, on 
understanding the marketing frame: how do marketers create categories of consumer choice, and 
how is the process influenced or mediated by the overall production process? The other part 
would examine the concrete effects of marketing: how well do real consumers conform to their 
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uncertainties, frustrations and perceptions of outcomes. Through semi-
structured interviews, I have sought to follow buyers retrospectively into the 
rabbit hole of their transactions, discovering the wonders of the market as they 
themselves discovered them. Of course, such a bias implies a corresponding 
'sales deficit,' an admission of ethnographic injustice to the market, which by 
definition requires a buyer and seller. This is a sticky predicament to be sure, but 
not fatal. As I show below, remaining parochial has lent this project a degree of 
epistemological flexibility which enriches the final analysis. None of this was 
planned however; these pluses and minuses are - or appear to be - quasi-
accidents of the project's uneven history. 
Originally this dissertation was to be an outlet for my lifelong fascination 
with the hyper-inflationary evisceration of Yugoslavia in the 1980s, prologue to 
its violent dismembering. The angle I settled upon was how the Yugoslavs, 
darlings of international banking, negotiated loans during the petrol-dollar 
frenzy of the 1970s. I envisaged a social history of financial clientelism focusing 
on an asymmetrical triangle of creditors, supplicants and the American state. 
Could these relations shed light on political outcomes in the 1990s, virulent not 
marketing images? What aspects of themselves do consumers see reflected in their vehicles? To 
what degree is this a case of commodity fetishism? I am unfortunately not convinced, based on my 
methodological experiences recounted below, that such a project is feasible. 
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only in the context of other state-socialist regimes, but the developing world too? 
I believed I had stumbled upon a rich, under-examined topic. 
After a period of due diligence, I unfortunately faced a dead-end: many of 
the parties involved have either died or are now untraceable; historians 
knowledgeable about my topic ignored requests to brainstorm; banking officials 
scoffed at the suggestion of researching deals long past. Moving forward, I chose 
to retain the basic question - how do actors negotiate from positions of inferiority and 
to what effect? - but searched for an alternate market relation, one more amenable 
to observation. Enter, eventually, automobile acquisitions. 
Transposing the question to the theatre of car sales nevertheless begets a 
host of other questions. Notably, international financial negotiations are of 
explicitly geopolitical significance, whereas car negotiations are of an altogether 
mundane order of business. What, under such phenomenological circumstances, 
does the political look like? And even if the reader is willing to accept my 
answer - economization - just how important is this pseudo-pedagogical process 
in the grand scheme of things? The real pitfall here is therefore not the elision of 
sellers' points of view, but the potential for overstating the political, generalizing 
all consumer behaviour as an effect of power. Relying on buyer's bias as an 
episto-methodic lens, put otherwise, runs the risk of unduly seeing power 
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everywhere. I like to think I have taken care to avoid this, portraying buyers as 
beholden to the transaction, but not dupes. Only the reader can judge how well I 
tread this line. 
Such thorny questions notwithstanding, the prerogative to follow buyers 
most closely resembles the tradition of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), in 
that I arrived at economization only after months of assembling, deconstructing 
and writing about the data, much like a sprawling topography that becomes 
more definite as one draws nearer. An open approach was really the only viable 
method, given I had no way initially of anticipating what people would disclose, 
or how their words could be interpreted politically. Rather than asking pointed 
questions about perceptions of power or economy, I learned to glean as much 
context as possible about informants' experiences, querying, among other 
aspects, their decision-making and -taking, when and with whom they shopped, 
and the tenor of conversations with salespeople. Out of this richness of data, in 
unexpected narrative corners, economization reared its conceptual head. 
Yet this project is not a study in pure induction, as I relied always on 
theories and ideas to guide my interpretations: Callon' s and Miller's obviously, 
but also those of Foucault and, to a lesser extent, Bourdieu, Polanyi and Weber. 
These are by no means obvious or even compatible perspectives by which to 
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interpret the buyer's lifeworld: Miller (2005: 3, 7, 11-2), for instance, may concede 
points to Callon, but apparently never to Foucault (cf. Miller, 1998: 205; 2002: 
223). It is again up to the reader to decide whether this juxtaposition is playfully 
brilliant or a brilliant mess. Whichever the case, grounded theory, as I see it, is 
not an injunction against abstract theory, but carries rather a double theoretical 
obligation: one's concepts must be grounded in empirical realities, but one's 
sensitivity to reality must correspondingly be grounded in theory. If and when 
research begins to veer in unwelcome directions, an ecumenical commitment to 
theory- a nimbleness or facility with ideas- becomes indispensable to making 
the data 'sing' differently. 
What I hope to have accomplished through buyer's bias is therefore 
neither deduction nor induction, neither theory-testing nor -building. It is 
something closer to exegesis: the excavation of an idea by way of faithful 
representation of empirical evidence, all the while remaining cognizant that ideas 
and evidence are seldom faithfully related. Or phrased in Foucauldian terms 
([1978] 2000a: 241), what is contained in these pages is no less than a 
phenomenology predicated on "a maximum of intensity [of experience] and a 
maximum of impossibility at the same time." The underlying question is not, 
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how does the subject found and account for her experiences? but the opposite: how do 
experiences wrench the subject from herself? 
The Car Buying Project 
"Oh you're doing car purchases!" an acquaintance enthused at the outset of 
interviewing in January 2011, "You're not going to have any problems finding 
people to talk to." I hoped she would be right; that the topic would strike a 
chord in people, yielding a geyser of respondents. At the end of the day I am 
satisfied with how things unfolded, even if I never did hit a rich vein of 
interviewees. I see now my biggest mistake, undoubtedly attributable to 
inexperience, was the inability to foresee how much effort it would take to net 
participants. Promoting the project turned into six months of constant work, a 
cumbersome distraction at a time when the interviewing learning-curve was 
steep. 
The recruitment plan I envisioned was two-forked. I would firstly tap into 
my network of family, friends and acquaintances, gradually snowballing the 
sample. Secondly and concurrently, I would advertise more formally and 
widely, which I saw as a necessary route to securing the participation of 
strangers, preferably jilted buyers whose stories of frustration would lend verve 
to the analysis. Making these avenues effective would require, I figured, 
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entrepreneurial flair, a comprehensive yet light-hearted approach I branded The 
Car Buying Project. Its centrepiece was a blog used previously in conjunction with 
teaching, re-commandeered and re-christened Sociotic. There I placed the call for 
participation (CFP) along with project musings and updates, phrased succinctly, 
eschewing jargon. Lastly, lest the blog become too focused on cars, I commented 
tongue-in-cheek on broader issues and current happenings - the more attention 
to the site and CFP, the better. The blog's built-in metrics were helpful but 
stressful in that regard: they allowed me to gauge the ebb and flow of my efforts 
- what was and not generating hits - but at the price of becoming obsessed by 
them. 
I worked next on devising 'tokens' to feed eyeballs back to the blog. I 
mentioned the research profusely in face-to-face and Facebook interactions, the 
latter now serving an instrumental purpose. I 'plugged' the project on car web-
forums, sales sites (e.g. Craig's List and Kijiji), and whenever a news item or 
editorial appeared about car buying. I printed fliers, posting them around the 
city of Toronto (see figure two below), on message boards in supermarkets and 
near displays for Auto Trader, a free weekly used auto classified (I sometimes 
stuffed flyers into individual magazines). I even approached dealerships 
explaining the project and asking to-leave a handful of flyers at the welcome desk 
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Fig. 2: Recruitment Flyer 
THE CArl aUVINGi ?rlOJECT 
I'm a PhD student at York University researching 
automobile transactions. I'm seeking participants to 
discuss experiences and perceptions of their latest 
vehicle acquisition, whether new or used. 
Interviews can be conducted in person, over the phone 
or Skype. This is an independent, university-regulated 
research project. Anonymity and confidentiality are 
fully guaranteed. 
For more information, go to: 
soc io..ti~.,J?.!.9.g?..P.9..t· com. 
To participate, contact Milos Vasic: 
~.?.i~.~f.y..Qrku.ca. 
or customer lounge. Never was I denied 
save once, though I could never be sure if 
the flyers were actually being perused by 
patrons or trashed as soon as I left. 
The last plank in the campaign 
was to attract the attention of a major 
automobile publication. After months of 
fruitless solicitation, I finally won the 
opportunity from Toronto Star Wheels to 
submit an 800-word draft about the project. I can only assume the editor did not 
appreciate it, silence being the loudest form of rejection. 
For all of these troubles reaching a wider audience, I was rewarded with 
zero interviews. By July 2011, I conceded defeat, abandoning the blog, stats, 
flyers, promotional pieces and social media. Giving up on the dream of an 
embarrassment of interview riches was a godsend in hindsight, for it afforded me 
the time to concentrate on the far more important task of data interpretation. 
In the meantime, the strategy of recruiting through acquaintances was 
generating decent results, even if the snowball never did gain momentum: only 
nine of the 39 informants come from outside my circle of direct contacts; of these, 
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seven are separated from me by one degree, the remaining two by two. 
Eventually I adopted another recruitment strategy, basically paying close 
attention to my surroundings. Each time I noticed someone with a new vehicle, 
such as a neighbour or parent at my daughter's school, I would strike up a 
conversation about the car, introduce the project and ask if they might consider 
participating. This proved effective though not foolproof: prospective 
interviewees often needed gentle reminders, but only so many before I 
understood their pledges would likely go unfulfilled. Because no interview was 
guaranteed, I considered every N a jewel. 
My original hypothesis was that power in a car transaction looks 
something like cynicism, effecting in buyers sensations of futility mixed with dull 
rage (sensations I experienced, curiously enough, trying to entice participants!). 
The initial batch of questions, accordingly, erred towards themes of financial 
uncertainty, buyer's remorse and sellers' reticence, which I quickly realized were 
inappropriate, given that most respondents had far more prosaic tales to tell; a 
number of them even wondered openly whether their experiences would be of 
use. Thus began the task - at times fumbling - of recalibrating my questions and 
sensitivities to better capture these experiences. I found that a more spontaneous, 
conversational style of interviewing returned the richest results, especially since 
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most of the informants were known to me in one capacity or another. I allowed 
them the latitude of recalling their experiences as best as they could, while I 
allowed myself the latitude to interject sympathetically in their narratives, to be 
humorous and make exaggerated gestures of empathy. I went to pains, in short, 
to present a sense of openness; a sense that I understood and shared their 
viewpoints. Representing myself this way meant, on the one hand, I needed to 
shy away from overtly intrusive questions (e.g. how much did you pay?). On the 
other hand, it enabled me to elicit more candour and contradiction than 
otherwise, and it loosened informants up for the all-important question I 
reserved for the end: who benefited from the transaction (see Chapter Five)? There 
were a handful of times when it was obvious my friendliness was off-putting; in 
general though, the effects of this style, once I became comfortable with it, were 
beneficial: the questions declined in number, there was less exposition on my 
part and, most importantly, the average length of interviews more than doubled 
from 20 to 45 minutes (see Appendix for the schedule of questions). 
So what is the profile of my sample of 39 souls? Really only one of the 
breakdowns is even: 20 new car buyers and 19 used. In terms of gender, the 
sample leans towards masculine, with 23 men and 16 women. In all other salient 
aspects, the sample is quite skewed. For instance, 26 reside in the city of Toronto, 
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versus four in Toronto's ring of suburbs, four in other cities in Ontario (one 
apiece in Hamilton and Ottawa, another two in Kitchener-Waterloo), three in 
rural Ontario and two in Vancouver, British Columbia. All but two are 
Caucasian. Also overrepresented are the perceptions of 30- and 40-somethings: 
at the time of interviewing, 19 were between the ages 30 and 39, 14 in their 40s, 
the remaining six 50-plus. Lastly, the interviewees are a relatively well educated 
and remunerated lot: all but three completed a post-secondary degree; 15 are 
professionals of some kind or holders of a graduate degree. None live in 
particularly precarious financial circumstances, with only two - both unattached 
- reporting annual household income less than $40,000. 
Given this socioeconomic skew, one would expect overrepresentation of 
vehicles typically favoured by the upwardly mobile, crossovers4 and luxury 
vehicles, but these accounted for only 15 and 21 % of the sample's acquisitions 
respectively. The former, in particular, pales in comparison to the nearly 30% of 
Canadians who opt for such vehicles (Cain, 2011). More interesting still, nearly 
4 Crossovers, the fastest growing segment of new auto sales in Canada, are next generation sport-
utility vehicles (SUVs). Essentially a SUV on a car platform, the idea is to reap the best of both 
vehicle types: higher driving position and all-wheel capability coupled with better fuel 
consumption. Alternately called compact utility vehicles (CUVs) or 'cute-utes,' they are a 
notoriously amorphous category of vehicle: typically resembling "tall wagons" (Leblanc, 2011) a 
la Honda CR-V, Ford Escape or Subaru Forester, in practice all manner of vehicles boasting 
features above and beyond regular cars are marketed as crossovers, from the Toyota Matrix 
(really a Corolla hatchback), to Kia Rondo (a short minivan) and Volvo XC90 (a large minivan 
substitute). 
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82% of the sample acquired a passenger car, of which 44% were compacts (e.g. 
Hyundai Elantra, Toyota Corolla). Percentages in the Canadian new-car-buyer 
population at large are traditionally 50 and 25 (Cain, 2011; Chrysler Group, 2012). 
So while the cohort is socioeconomically above average, their choices are 
exceedingly average. A random sample this is not. 
There are two possibilities to explain such atypicality, not the least of 
which includes questioning the validity of sales figures to establish a baseline of 
normal consumer choice. That is to say, published stats measure new 
acquisitions only, whereas the sample here consists of new and used buyers, 
which correspond to different market situations. The latter is overwhelmingly 
larger in terms of volume: fully two-thirds of Canada's 4.45 million vehicle 
transactions in 2010 involved pre-owned cars (Romeo, 2012g; Toljagic, 201 lc), a 
two-to-one margin. Breakdowns of this total are difficult to come by,5 but it 
stands to reason compacts capture more than a quarter of the combined market 
since their relative abundance and affordability spurs more frequent tum-over. 
In other words, the sample's choices are perhaps more representative of the 
general population than at first glance, but probably not by much: a one-half 
market-share for compacts strikes me as excessive. On the other hand, sales data 
s More detailed metrics tend to be proprietary, requiring costly subscriptions to data services such 
as DesRosiers Automotive Consultants. 
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aggregate nationally, whereas my respondents are ma.lnly residents of central 
Toronto, in what is commonly called the 'former' or 'old' city. Urbanites 
undoubtedly do drive smaller cars in numbers greater than suburban or rural 
Canadians, but again, likely not to the degree suggested by the sample. In short, 
interrogating the validity of statistics takes us only so far. I may not have the 
relevant data needed to pass judgement on the normality of the sample, but were 
they available, the sample would likely remain atypical. 
I believe the sample's characteristics are ultimately a function of too 
narrow a recruitment process, such that I ended up mining a stratum of buyers 
who chose sub-compacts and suvs in equal measure. These are, for all intents 
and purposes, young urban professionals and their arts-oriented, centre-leftist 
brethren, 'hipsters.' While I did not set out to attract so similar a group of 
respondents, their relative distinctiveness has proven analytically useful. Seen 
from the perspective of Bourdieu, one could say they constitute a class in the 
objective sense, a "set of agents ... in homogeneous conditions of existence 
imposing homogeneous conditionings and producing homogeneous systems of 
dispositions ... " (Bourdieu, [1979] 1984: 101). By extension, because classes differ 
in their experiences of market immersion, one could argue economization is a 
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socially contingent disposition, a class habitus or "socialized subjectivity" (2005: 
211) with respect to major purchases. 
As much as I am convinced this is so, I unfortunately cannot claim it in 
good conscience: because I did not intend to assemble such a homogeneous 
cohort, I have not gathered nearly enough data needed to justify their homology. 
In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu and his colleagues probed participants' lifestyles 
in excruciating detail, generating a range of data from political opinions and 
affiliations to mealtime habits. Bourdieu furthermore does not simply posit 
dispositional differences qualitatively, he plots them quantitatively via 
correspondence analysis, a technique assuming an isomorphic, one-to-one relation 
between "distinctive systems of dispositions ... [and their] social conditions of 
production" (1984: 261). The result is a map of constellations of dispositions 
fixed along axes corresponding to structures of capital (e.g. 1984: 262). Whatever 
the pros and cons of the approach, homologies are necessarily plural: one can 
only know a group's homogeneity in juxtaposition to others. Since I am, of 
course, in no position to carry out such a proof, having nothing to compare 
against, the habitus argument must remain speculative at best. As much as this 
project is inspired by Bourdieu in general and Social Structures in particular, I am 
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afraid I must relegate him from conceptual spotlight until such time when a truly 
comparative study is possible. 
In short, when I began researching I made the methodological 'choice' to 
favour buyers over sellers, which was something of a path-dependence carried 
over from previous incarnations of the project. But as things unfolded, it soon 
became apparent that another bias was also at play, for better and worse: 
namely, the pursuit of" a specific ... trajectory of economization," as I called it in 
the opening chapter (i.e. disentangled dispositions from entangled experiences), 
which came about as a pragmatic, but unintended consequence of favouring a 
specific type of buyer. Do other types or classes of buyers experience different 
trajectories of economization? This is a question over which, for the time being, I 
can only salivate! 
Seller's Deficit 
The decision to leave perceptions of salespeople aside is justified on the grounds 
my focus is on the extra-occupational emergence of economy: the agents I am 
tracking deduce economy without recourse to constant market immersion, in 
contrast to professionals whose calculative capacities are conditioned in the 
crucible of continuous competition. Yet forsaking the world of sales altogether is 
not a good idea either, for an important, early lesson in the buyer's education is 
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sussing cultural and fiscal logics to which she is not privy (e.g. how much wiggle 
room really is there in price, and why does the salesman always have to consult 
with the manager?). Understanding the buyer's burgeoning sense of economy, in 
other words, demands at least some elucidation of the socio-cultural terrain she 
interlopes. Of course, doing this right requires input from industry insiders, a 
quixotic chore atthe best of time: as Mitchel Abolafia (1998: 77) reminds us, 
"Ethnographic research on the production and reproduction of market culture is 
inherently difficult." I endeavoured all the same. 
I first approached a Mazda salesman with whom I transacted in 2010. I 
explained the project, emphasizing my aim was not to vilify the sales profession. 
Pensively he responded, "What you're doing is very important," and asked me to 
contact him the following week as his immediate schedule was in flux. That was 
the last I heard from him. Fortunately a promising lead presented itself shortly 
after at a GM dealership: while dropping off flyers, an eager salesman offered to 
be interviewed without prompting. Overjoyed but unprepared, I soon followed 
up, which, again, went nowhere. Requests for interviews likewise met with 
silence from the President and public face of TADA (Trillium Automotive Dealers 
Association), the provincial lobby for new car dealers. 
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Eventually an acquaintance working in an administrative capacity at Ford 
explained the probable cause for all this. In declining to be interviewed, she said 
the terms of her employment expressly forbid outside discussion of her job or the 
company's day-to-day operations. She and her colleagues are apparently 
regularly reminded of this prohibition. I can only presume similar policies exist 
across the industry; whether and with what force they extend to franchisees and 
their employees, however, is an open question. Fortunately in early 2012 I scored 
an interview with a recently departed saleswoman for a European luxury brand. 
Her insights appear sporadically throughout the chapters. 
A sample of one is laughable however, for which reason the task of filling 
the deficit of cultural knowledge about car markets falls to a textual analysis of 
automotive journalism. By no means does the car press yield a treasure trove of 
accounts of actual economic behaviours, but reading between the lines reveals 
something perhaps more important: pronouncements of a normative nature, 
namely advice and descriptions of 'smart' buying. Better still, every so often 
excerpts of proprietary research are released, shedding valuable light on how car 
companies apprehend the buying population, divvying it up into progressively 
nuanced, actionable categories. When juxtaposed against informants' 
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experiences, these reveal an analytically intriguing tension between 'theory' and 
practice. 
Since textual analysis represents the dissertation's secondary method after 
ethnography, I beg the reader's pardon for not having comprehensively 
canvassed the automotive mediascape. For reasons of economy of time and 
effort, I concentrated on Toronto Star Wheels, which bills itself as Canada's largest 
automotive publication (on what basis I cannot say). Appearing as a double 
section in the newspaper's Saturday edition, it comprises usually 40 pages of 
journalistic content, classifieds and paid advertising. An on-line version also 
exists (wheels.ca), providing content above and beyond the print edition. The 
nice thing about Wheels, in contrast to smaller or more focused sites and 
publications, is that it goes beyond simply pre- and reviewing cars. It delves also 
into themes of automobility, albeit with the critical sensibility of a car enthusiast. 
Pretty much all the chapters that follow are enhanced in some way or 
another by Wheels-oriented analysis or critique; Chapters Three and Six however, 
stand out. In Chapter Three I examine how car-journalists, mainly through their 
reviews, perform - in the ANT sense - car-buying and car markets. In Chapter Six 
I interpret a general sales orientation to the buying public by way of 'Dealer's 
Voice,' an outlet for the aforementioned dealers association, TADA. Authorship at 
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the time of writing is held by President Frank Romeo, who succeeded Sandy 
Liguori (presidency changes annually). 'Dealer's Voice' does not definitively 
convey the culture of car sales, but they do provide serviceable, at times brutally 
frank, approximations of it. 
Much more could be written about the methodological quandaries 
outlined in this chapter - a problematic is, by definition, open ended - but I 
believe the discussion can be safely brought to a close. In general, doing this 
project has instilled in me the importance of nimbleness, playfulness and 
angularity - virtues I hope are reflected in the analysis to come. Such a spirit of 
resourcefulness comes, however, with a maddening limitation: I can point to the 
class-contingent nature of economization, but I cannot interrogate it. 
Surmounting this limitation, it goes without saying, will require working out the 
methodological kinks in subsequent rounds of research. Given the labour-
intensity of recruitment, my goal would be to delineate a single, clearly 
contrasting class of buyers to the yuppies and hipsters - 'yippsters' - assembled 
here. I dare say construction workers, contractors and other established skilled-
trade workers would represent the perfect foil. Demographically in Toronto at 
least, they are dissimilar to those I interviewed, tending to come from the ranks 
of Canadian newcomers. Moreover, unlike yippsters, I suspect they conform to 
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more typically American buying practices, acquiring bigger (categories of) 
vehicles as their credit lines and wallets expand. The car for them, we might 
hypothesize, occupies unique mental space, simultaneously an ambulatory work 
tool, a status symbol, passport to outdoor leisure and over-glorified cod piece 
(quite a few respondents, by contrast, professed an almost disdainful, "point-A to 
point-B" indifference to cars). If a diametrically different dynamic in the buyer-
car-seller nexus is to be discerned, I would hope to find it in the experiences of 
these prototypically 'manly men.' 
Until then, let us begin to understand what it took for our cohort to 
become economic. The first step is to elaborate a certain economic reality: the 
reality, as Polanyi first coined it, of embeddedness. 
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Chapter Three 
An Entangling Frame: Sociality 
THE CALLON-MILLER DEBATE FROM CHAPTER ONE IS, at its core, an argument over 
the conceptual relevance of homo economicus. For Miller it is without 
anthropological merit, and in those rare instances where or when something 
approximating pure, disentangled action is the order of the day, enormous 
political investments have likely been undertaken to make it so (e.g. IMF 
structural adjustments [cf. 1998: 195-9]). These amount to no less than "the 
power to actualise the model of the market" (2005: 11). Callon (1998a: 19; 2007: 
343), on the other hand, sees disentanglement as entanglement's necessary other: 
disentanglement represents a momentary bridging of entangled but otherwise 
incompatible actor-worlds, giving rise to the condition of movement or circulation 
upon which economies are sustained. Disentanglement is therefore to 
entanglement as the synapse to the neuron or, to use an automotive simile, the 
clutch to the gear. Our job as social scientists is to understand the ways this 
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moment is formatted, or rather the conditions by which homo economicus is 
made empirically possible. 
The purpose of this and the next chapter is to transpose this debate from 
the conceptual to ethnographic level. The interview data strongly support 
Miller's 'exclusively entanglement' thesis, which is to say purely technico-
financial calculation is rare during the. transaction (what happens afterwards is 
another matter [see Chapter Seven]). This does not mean the transaction goes 
unframed. Framing does occur, but the frame, rather than cleansing the 
calculative 'space' of non-technico-financial concerns, is primarily composed of 
them. And while these putatively extraneous factors vary greatly, I want to focus 
on two: in the following chapter I examine the specifically gendered nature of 
car sales, while presently I consider the importance of the buyer's sociality more 
generally. By this I mean the logic of her extra-market relationships - her 
connectedness to others and all that this entails. 
Emptor Automobilicus? 
Before debunking disentanglement however, I first want to devote attention to 
assessing what disentanglement concretely means in context of car sales, or what 
a 'suitably' framed car consumer looks like. Because Callon himself has never 
attempted this- car sales, to reiterate, have never been his primary focus - it is 
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up to us to flesh out emptor automobilicus. Fortunately Callon does provide us 
with a point of departure: consumption, he observes, is framed primarily via 
consumerist associations and magazines, which serve the vital function of 
simulating an object's use, and in some cases even destroying it to set its limits. 
Such testing is not merely descriptive but prescriptive, "inform[ing] as well as 
forming the consumer-reader" (Muniesa & Callon, 2007: 177). Moreover, were 
Callon to revisit this topic today, he would presumably mention the migration of 
such publications online, which has precipitated a veritable explosion in lay- or 
user-generated feedback that rivals in importance the 'learned' opinions of expert 
reviewers. Fully 84% of American consumers say they are influenced by such 
evaluations (Romeo, 2012£). 
By extension then, automotive journalism plays a central role in 
disentangling the complexity of the automobile and hence making the buyer 
economic. Car reviews offer prospective buyers a wealth of independent 
analysis, ranging from lists of options and price-points to assessments of what 
the car does well and badly. More important though is how this information is 
presented. Almost never are specifications merely laid out; they are compared 
and qualified against those of rival manufacturers. Case in point: Costa 
Mouzouris (2012) introduces the 2013 Hyundai ElanlTa Coupe - a sportier, two-
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door variant of the Elantra compact sedan - as "a new addition to Hyundai's 
lineup [whose] crosshairs are aimed squarely at the Honda Civic Coupe." Does 
the basic, GLS model of the Coupe represent a good buy? Apparently so. "For 
comparable equipment," Mouzouris reckons, 
you'd have to opt for the Civic Coupe EX, which costs 
$290 more than the Elantra GLS but lacks the 
Hyundai's heated front seats and power sunroof . 
. . . But you can't forget the Kia Forte Koup, which is 
remarkably well-equipped at $18,995 in the base EX 
trim [versus $19,949 for the Elantra]. Add an 
automatic transmission and the power sunroof, 
however, and the price jumps to $21,095. And the 
Hyundai still has more passenger and cargo space 
than either of those cars. 
Elsewhere in the review, the Elantra' s road noise - essentially rumble discernible 
inside - is assessed against the Buick Verano, which, Mouzouris believes, 
provides the "benchmark for cabin calmness in affordably priced cars." To know 
and evaluate a car, in short, is to contextualize it competitively. 
The "compare," as it is called, is the cornerstone of automotive journalistic 
objectivity, so much so a reviewer may go out of his way to justify his 
comparative acumen. Why, for instance, is Peter Bleakney' s (2012) preview of 
the Cadillac ATS, a sports luxury sedan meant to outperform its German rivals, 
especially authoritative? "Having almost literally stepped off a plane after 
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driving a couple of BMW 3s in Germany," he explains, "my derriere was in tune 
for a reasonably accurate comparo (4,000 kilometres and jet-lag 
notwithstanding)." The comparative moment of a review either makes or breaks 
it, for which reason the reviewer's comparative imagination is arguably his most 
decisive attribute. 
With respect to economy, which boils down to a vehicle's value 
proposition or, as Mark Toljagic (201 la) uncomplicatedly puts it, "high bang-for-
the-buck quotient," this too is a function of comparison. Nothing is spared from 
the objectivizing gaze of a well-seasoned comparativist, not even the ecological 
virtues of hybrid and electric vehicles (EVs). Indeed for the value-obsessed 
reviewer, the mere suggestion of virtue is risible: Jim Kenzie's (2011c) review of 
the 2012 Toyota Prius V, a larger version of the popular Prius hybrid, begins with 
the quip, "If you ... want to show your neighbours how 'green' you are, you might 
just as well wear a sign around your neck reading, 'I'd vote to David Suzuki if he 
ever ran for anything."' "As for value," Kenzie laments, 
Prius V runs some $5,000-to-$10,000 more than [a] 
comparably equipped Mazda5, Kia Rondo, Hyundai 
Tucson, or gasoline vw Golf Wagon, to name but a 
few, and roughly equal to the Golf TDI Wagon [i.e. 
VW's efficient diesel burner.]. All of the competition 
vehicles are better performers, the VW TDI is 
comparable in fuel consumption and the others start 
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with several thousand litres of free gasoline in a 
theoretical storage tank in your garage. . .. [I]n most 
cases, you will be driving your Prius V for a long, long 
time before the fuel savings start to make up for the 
price differential. And all that time, it will still be slow 
and noisy. Here-let me help you with that David 
Suzuki sign. 
The chief benefit of comparing, as Kenzie illustrates, is that it provides the reader 
with a new conceptual toolkit - the image of /1 a theoretical storage tank" is 
particularly useful- allowing her to cut through preconceptions and marketing 
rhetoric to reveal the economic essence of an automobile. The art of comparing 
would seem to be guided then by a single axiom, namely, value is the only virtue. 
Yet Kenzie' s review equally reveals that comparing is seldom black-and-
white. Indeed, based on size, fuel consumption and price-point, the Prius Vis 
thanklessly tricky to match on paper. Kenzie is right to emphasize the Golf diesel 
wagon, which comes closest on all three counts, but his other alternatives raise 
eyebrows: most glaringly, because of the Prius V's /1 crossover-ish body" (i.e. it 
rides higher than a hatchback, but lower than a cuv), he identifies six cuvs, 1 
which are inappropriate for two reasons. First off, unlike the Prius V, they are 
aggressively priced (i.e. they are decidedly non-premium vehicles). Secondly, I 
1 There are 10 comparables in all. The six CUVs are: the Chevrolet Equinox, Ford Escape, Honda 
CR-V, Hyundai Tucson, Kia Sportage and Nissan Rogue. The non-CUV alternatives include the 
Kia Rondo, Mazda5 and VW Golf Wagon, gasoline and diesel versions. 
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doubt anyone considering a Prius V would seriously entertain a crossover; 
despite advances in fuel economy, they are still suvs at the end of the day and 
look every bit like one. Perhaps Kenzie felt compelled to include crossovers for 
better or worse, feeling there could be no meaningful comparison without them. 
Yet, the Mercedes B-class hatchback has been available in Canada for quite some 
time and resembles the Prius V far more than any cuv. The similarly priced 
Mercedes is also "crossover-ish," and volume-wise it sits somewhere between the 
regular Prius and Prius V. Furthermore, one has to wonder why green vehicles 
did not make Kenzie' s list of alternatives. Would not the prospective Prius V 
buyer, likely a deep-pocketed and ideologically motivated soul, cross-shop these? 
I in fact suspect Toyota's target audience here includes existing and potential 
'Prius-ers,' but Kenzie does not directly address the question whether the V 
warrants the upgrade. 
The point here is that different comparables can and do lead to different 
conclusions. For instance, in light of the Mercedes' requirement for premium 
gasoline, which it consumes in not-so-frugal quantities, the Prius V's lack of ride 
refinement may just look like an acceptable trade-off. On the other hand, 
analytically speaking, there are good reasons to preclude the B-class and Prius: 
the Prius V is neither in the same league of luxury as the Mercedes, nor size 
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segment as the Prius. All of this is to say how one compares is arguably as 
important as the comparison itself, if not more. 
But let us not assume methodological quandaries such as these go 
unnoticed in the literature. Wheels recently published a letter from a reader 
chastising Kenzie (2012a} and his colleagues for fixating on drive-train and 
transmission options at the expense of "real useful info on new cars." The reader 
contends that to be economically meaningful, reviews need to address things like 
maintenance costs and real-world fuel consumption, since Natural Resource 
Canada's official figures of the latter are unrealistic. Kenzie counters by noting 
both maintenance and fuel are "relatively unimportant" compared with 
depreciation, the single largest expense of car ownership, and even this is not 
worth scrutinizing since used car prices - depreciation's residual - are difficult to 
forecast. When all is said and done, Transport Canada numbers "may not be 
accurate, but they are at least comparable, vehicle to vehicle." The aim of a 
review, he goes on to say, is to help ascertain "whether ... the car should or should 
not be on the 'shopping list' for prospects in its segment" (emphasis added). 
In other words - and here we arrive at the heart of the matter - a reviewer 
does not compare automobiles so much as conjure a segment of automobiles, 
defining its boundaries and technico-financial topography. Technical specs, 
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bewildering as they may be, are the stock-in-trade of reviews because they are 
tangible and eminently comparable. They open up the segment cognitively, 
rendering it actionable insofar as allowing the reader to deploy what Friedrich 
Hayek (1948: 35, 46-7, 84-5, 93) called "Pure Logic of Choice:" that is to say, 
technico-financial comparison makes possible a truly objective assignment of 
value, based not on the intrinsic properties of a car per se, but a car's "significance 
in view of the whole means-end structure" in her mind (1948: 85). 
Seen from an ANT perspective, it is only on the basis of meticulous, value-
oriented identification of - and with - market segments that the buyer is able to 
disentangle the complexity of the automobile. The review invites the reader to 
distil her driving needs, thereby situating and simulating herself in the 
marketplace. She imagines herself a "hyperequipped consumer, an autonomous 
and independent consumer, wh[ o] faces objects whose qualities are 
hyperexplicit" (Muniesa & Callon, 2007: 177). There is a double qualification at 
play here, that of the automobile and reader. The latter comes to embrace or 
disavow the automotive qualities in question, and in the process to know herself 
as a consumer, rendering her future decisions less risky. In ANT parlance, the 
review is a market device or economic agencement: as it renders things comparable 
and calculable, "[t]he same is done to persons (physical or moral), to their 
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reciprocal duties and to their relations to things" (Muniesa, Millo & Callon, 2007: 
4). 
Agencement here does not imply that a Pure Logic of Choice is cold, 
resembling some robotic ranking of preference. Indeed how could it? "Perhaps 
the most important thing to remember" Kenzie (2011a) observes, "is that you're 
buying with your heart, not your head." An optimal choice, he implies, is 
achievable by tempering the heart with head, a sort of calibration of "what you 
need, what you actually want, and what you can afford." The calculus of car 
buying is, in truly economic rhetorical fashion, a balancing act, simultaneously 
hot and cold, visceral and factual, full of both emotion and rigour. It would 
appear then that Callon and Kenzie, stand-ins for ANT and automotive 
journalism, speak similarly about market immersion, frames being analogous to 
segments. Moreover, both presuppose rationality as a process of technical 
immersion: consumers are rationable, willing to pierce through the technicality of 
the things in real time, so to speak, to uncover their particular means-end 
structure. 
How well does this portrait of consumer as evolving comparativist 
correspond to ethnographic reality? To what degree does automotive journalism 
perform the actions of flesh-and-blood buyers? The answer is not promising: 
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only one person, DG (interviewees are identified by initials), approximated the 
ideal of a disciplined comparativist well-versed in the intricacies of his chosen 
segment - compact sedans. By this I mean he not only understood how hotly 
contested the segment is ("[in] the category that we're buying," he explains, 
"because gas is going through the roof, they' re all hitting [quality] like crazy"), he 
could also justify the superiority of his choice, the Elantra, in comparative terms: 
It became pretty apparent that it was easily the best 
one. It was the best price, best financing, best rated -
it just won car-of-the-year. It won safety awards, uh, 
it's huge: it's got more space inside then - in fact, the 
government doesn't ... categorize it as a compact 
because it's so big.2 ••• But the reason it's fuel efficient 
is that it doesn't weigh anything. The thing's light, 
light! 
DG' s comparative prowess is, in any event, atypical in that he self-identifies -
jokingly but equally proudly- as a "research guy" who would not even "buy a 
DVD player without researching it." For the task at hand, he read and test-drove 
scrupulously if not obsessively, and when it came time to commit, he showed up 
at the dealership armed with 20 reviews on the Elantra and its competition. 
2 One often reads about the Elantra's comparative bigness (cf. Edmunds Inc., 2011; Flammang, 
2011). Where this comes from, for fuel economy purposes the US EPA classifies cars based on 
cabin volume, according to which the Elantra is considered mid-sized. Yet the 'upgrade' is 
hollow, since even the sub-compact Chevrolet Sonic hatchback qualifies as mid-sized (DOE & 
EPA, 2012). 
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No one else was as 'segmentally' literate, though BE (initials of women 
respondents are italicized), did come close in terms of the explicitness of her 
decision-making frame. She rather ingenuously applied to her search for a new 
Subaru Impreza hatchback the ethical standards of her profession, engineering, 
with respect to bid tendering. She solicited quotes from three local Subaru 
dealers, expressly promising to each not to use the lowest to bludgeon another 
into a lower offer. The point of the tactic was to simplify the nerve-racking 
negotiations - "I was trying to keep my emotions of it" she says - which it did 
financially, but not relationally: one of the losing 'bidders' felt betrayed when he 
learned she had taken her business elsewhere, a sentiment he punctuated by 
hanging up on her. 
Enter "Vroom Hilda" 
That DG and BE were the lone informants to formalize their frames - to impose, 
that is, an explicit principle to their decision-making and -taking - does not 
privilege their calculative capacities by any stretch, for not all frames are formal. 
BE' s case reveals in fact a multiplicity of interacting frames: obscured by her 
more formal, financial frame lay an informal, relational one which could not 
totally mitigate misunderstandings. Variations on this theme of relational 
ambivalence are so ubiquitous in the interviews one can comfortably posit an 
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inverse ordering of frames, the relational ones constituting primary points of 
reference. Most of these relational frames are informed by some notion of 
sociality, which I take to mean an amalgam of prior micro-relationships and 
identities that flow from them. More specifically, I want to emphasize in the 
remainder of this chapter that the determination of value, in the first instance at 
least, is fundamentally a problem of social, not technical immersion, a sort of 
internal negotiation with respect to one's face-to-face relationships and identities. 
It is this relational logic which provides the justificatory matrix of value. 
There are two ways of tracing this logic. The first, which I would like to 
illustrate in some detail, requires digging- a la Polanyi- through the formal 
irrationality of a course of action to reveal the substantive reason animating it. 
Take CD, purchaser of a new Kia RioS sub-compact hatchback, whose pool of 
potentials confounded sub-compacts with compacts: "I was looking at the 
[Nissan] Versa, I was looking at the Honda Fit, I was looking at the Rabbit [i.e. the 
fifth generation vw Golf.], uh, what else - Mazda3. I guess all the usual sub-
compacts at the time." Formally speaking, CD had given herself a sizeable 
analytical handicap: compacts (i.e. the Rabbit and Mazda3) cannot compete with 
subs at the level of price while, conversely, subs typically cannot compete when it 
comes to room, features, performance or finish. Substantively however, she had 
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positioned herself within the frame of 'entry-level hatchback,' which from a lay 
perspective makes reasonable visual sense, particularly in North America where 
sedans and trucks have been the norm historically. Indeed, that CD never 
contemplated sedan versions of the Rio, Mazda3, etc., which are invariably 
priced less than hatchbacks, suggests that for some people, the distinction 
between hatchback and sedan is more decisive than sub- versus compact. It 
seems then to me that the more important question here is not, how do buyers 
frame their choices? -which in CD's case invariably returns an unhelpfully 
unfavourable answer - but rather, on what grounds do they perceive frames in the 
first place? Only by posing this question can we begin to discern the sociality that 
underlies all automotive decision making- and taking. 
I unfortunately did not pursue this line of questioning with CD, but did 
with others, notably WB (married, father of two), whose partner, an up-and-
coming real estate agent, had recently touched a healthy batch of commissions. 
They decided to apply the 'winnings' towards refreshing the familial fleet with 
used, but luxury vehicles: she ended up swapping her vw Jetta for a BMW 3-
series wagon, while WB's failing Ford Explorer gave way to a Volvo XC90. As 
much as WB relished the prospect of a bigger, 'badder,' better crossover, he 
simply could not give himself licence to accept it at first: 
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I sort of felt like, 'Who the hell do we think we are 
buying two really nice cars within such a short period 
of time?' [He clears his throat.] I'm - like, I'm still used 
to going to my parents' house to help me pay for rent-
money, you know? I'm still living in that world; I can't 
believe I'm married and I have children now and I live 
in a house that I own. So, the whole [Pause.] - that, 
that's - that's really weird. In my mind, I was like, 
'What are my friends going to say?' Right? The fact 
that we're ... yeah- [like], 'This feels really strange to 
be throwing this kmd of money around.' 
WB is hinting at something here that PP (married, father of one) demonstrates 
more fully. Basically, how one construes one's choices is rooted in what we 
might call social sight, in the sense both of' seeing' (i.e. we identify with the 
choices of our family, friends and acquaintances) and 'being seen' (i.e. our 
choices are meant to project or say something about ourselves): 
PP: We already knew that we were very interested in 
the Honda Fit. And we knew there were a couple 
other models of cars that we thought would be 
similar, like the Mazda3. Those were the two ones 
we went in primarily thinking we would investigate. 
MV (author): And ... why those two specifically? 
PP: Yeah sure. The Honda Fit is a sexy little 
hatchback. It looks cool. We have a couple of 
friends who have one. We had a chance to see it 
inside and out and it's a very popular car in 
Vancouver right now so they' re everywhere. And, 
uh, I think, you know, it's very - because it's catchy 
and a sexy little hatchback .. .it's easy to want one. So 
that's why the Honda Fit. 
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MV: OK. 
PP: And the Mazda3 because we also have a friend 
who has a Mazda3 ... and we borrowed their car for a 
week, so we knew a bit about it. ... [T]hat was why 
we included it on our list. We knew it was a bit 
more expensive but we had sort of toyed with the 
idea of even getting a Mazda5 [i.e. the van variant of 
the -3.]. Are we going to have more kids? Probably, 
hopefully, and so then we-so that was why Mazda 
ended up in our conversation. 
As with CD, choosing among the Fit, Mazda3 and -5 makes little, if any formal 
sense. Yet intuitively, they do hang together, each car appealing to a different 
dimension or possibility of self: the Fit to PP' s aesthetic sensibilities, the Mazda5 
to his desire for more children, the -3 a stepping stone to that realization. 
In the ANT/car-journalistic portrayal of events, precision in comparison 
demands that such symbolic factors be suspended temporarily, disentangled or, 
as I have paraphrased Kenzie, 'calibrated with the head.' CD and PP' s 
experiences, however, suggest the inverse: moments of comparison and 
calculation - culminating in the all-important question, what can I afford? - must 
never invalidate symbolic prerogatives. Put otherwise, it is sociality in the form 
of relationally contingent perceptions of self- potentialities of self projected and 
reflected in our immediate relationships - which ratifies market values, not the 
act of comparison. The outcome of PP's story bears this out: budgetary 
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constraints steered him to a used, but low-kilometre Nissan Versa hatchback, an 
incredible find representing something like a 30% discount over a comparable 
Honda Fit. Despite the savings, PP still had to convince himself he was making a 
good choice: 
PP: [The seller] sent us a long e-mail ... saying, 'You 
know, 10-5 [i.e. $10,500.] is really firm .... ' AN [PP's 
partner.] and I just looked at each other and were 
like, 'You know what, we like this car and 10-5 is a 
fair price for it.' It's got nothing on it; it's got no 
kilometres on it, scr 
MV: Yeah, what did it have again? 
PP: In the end, I looked - 16-2 [i.e. 16,200 km.]. 
MV: [Incredulous.] That's it? 
PP: That' S it. 
MV: And what year is it? 
PP: 2010. 
MV: [As if disappointed.] Oh 2010. OK, yeah it's new. 
PP: It was new. So then also, the other thing is, 
reading on the way down, the 2010 standard, base-
model Nissan Versa got a major upgrade from the 
older models. It actually came with a whole bunch 
of things standard, like ABS brakes and heated seats 
and power mirrors and power doors and air 
conditioning. So the base-model Nissan has a lot 
more than the base-model Honda, in terms of the 
bells and whistles. And so, that also appealed to me 
and I was like, 'You know, it's not a sexy car, not as 
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popular right now, but for a very decent price, 
you're getting way more. OK, it's not the Fit, but it's 
still a good hatchback.' ... For a couple days there .. .I 
was like, 'Oh wouldn't it be great to get a colourful 
Honda Fit - zippy little Honda Fit and zip around in 
that Fit!' 
MV: [Laughing.] 
PP: But reading the review on edmunds.com [A 
respected us car website.] .. .it said, 'The Versa is a 
practical car. And, you know, it's not - if you want 
something a little sportier, then turn to the Fit or its 
equivalents. But, uh, the Versa is perfectly 
acceptable as a little hatchback and so on.' And like, 
well, that's really what we want. That's really who 
we are. This is what we're in it for. And so, I felt 
really at ease with the decision at that point, because 
it was like, 'Yeah, we' re being true to ourselves. This 
is what we want it for: we wanted to have a car, to 
be able to drive around, to be comfortable. We 
wanted it to be a hatchback. We wanted it to be 
manual, we wanted it to have air conditioning, and 
it's the right deal for us.' So at that point, that -
that's kind of like when I was ready to do it. 
The calculative device, the Edmunds review, played an important role here, 
though not in the formative sense of helping PP navigate the acquisition process. 
It instead helped him bring a satisfactory sense of closure to an experience which 
sapped large amounts of time, attention and effort, and exposed his initial lack of 
savoir-Jaire. It provided him a means of reconciling what he had to do with what 
he wanted to do, and in the process to glimpse another dimension of himself in 
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the Versa·- a practical, sensible and reasonable self. The review did not refine the 
formal accuracy of his calculus, but rather increased its justifiability, facilitating 
its communication to himself and others. 
For a great many buyers then, the act of framing is perfectly 
commensurable with substantively-oriented (i.e. extra-technical and extra-
pecuniary) decision-making and -taking. Moreover, the absence of formal 
calculation does not vitiate the possibility of strategic calculation. This was 
particularly true for MP (married, father of two). In the following transcript he 
recounts how he felt after acquiring a used VW Jetta. Considered formally, his 
decision is an abomination: there is little here to suggest he thought about the 
implications, nor hint he undertook a reasonable assessment of his family's 
motoring needs. His explanations instead resemble a beautifully honest 
cacophony, alternately remorseful, comical, contradictory and sentimental. Yes, 
the Jetta is baffling, but it is also joyous: 
MP: We got in it and we were just tickled pink. We 
were so excited because, you know, this was a quiet, 
smooth, safe, beautiful car. And we don't have 
many nice things - certainly not luxurious things -
and to us this was like luxury. And you know, I still 
didn't really know in detail what I had bought. It 
wasn't until quite a while later that l realized I had 
alloy wheels, which look slick, but I don't actually 
like them because it's a much sportier ride-
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MV: It is, it is, y-, y-, yeah-
MP: It's not a smooth, quiet ride; it's a hard ride. It's 
nice on the highway, but anywhere else it's kind of 
noisy in the city. And then realizing it was turbo, 
which I didn't really take in what 1.8T meant [i.e. a 
1.8-litre turbo engine.]. You know, so it uses more gas, 
which is nice on the highway, but I'm not a highway 
driver-
MV: And as well, did they tell you premium for that 
one, premium gas? 
MP: Oh yes, so I've got to use the most expensive gas, 
so now it's $67 to fill up - the last time I filled up. 
Luckily I work at home, so we only fill up once a 
month. Not like the [neighbours] next to us-
they've got their two kids, they live in Ajax [30 km 
from central Toronto.], they commute. They put in $70 
to fill up twice a week-twice a week! You know, 
that's six-grand a year in gasoline, a little bit more, 
I'm sure! 
MV: Yeah, that's another story. Anyway, so, um-
MP: So in that respect, I'd have to say, overall, you 
know, at that point you forget about the money-
MV: [Excitedly.] You forget about it! Yeah, yeah, it's 
true, it's true--
MP: You' re so happy, and I felt so safe, and I have to 
tell you something silly, but we also felt-well 
mostly me - that, you know, Gerard [The family cat.] 
had died the month previous, and we felt this was a 
last, some kind of love from Gerard that this car just 
came. I mean, I believe things come when they' re 
needed anyway, but this car just came before the farm 
trip, at the right time. Even driving out to get the car 
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in the Golf [MP's previous car.], we all thought we 
were sad we were losing the [Golf], we'd hit a bump 
and I'd say, 'You see, this is why we need a new car!' 
It's costing 800-bucks, 9-, 1,000-bucks to do the 
shocks on the car. The body's falling apart, so, you 
know, it was tough. 
MV: Did you name the car Gerard? 
MP: No, we named it Vroom Hilda! 
MP' s strategic 'sins' are numerous at first glance. He admits he had a poor 
understanding of the car's technical and mechanical performance, followed by 
the unpardonable choice to "forget about the money" at the final stage of 
negotiation. More troubling still, his description is contradictory: he starts off 
extolling the Jetta's "quiet, smooth" ride, but then complains about its "noisy" 
and "hard" low-profile tires. Vroom Hilda is ultimately presented as a slippery 
object of purchase whose characteristics are not a function of the car itself, but 
MP' s meandering narrative. Summarily put, MP' s choice was formally irrational, 
if by that we mean the inability to satisfy clearly delineated needs for the lowest 
possible cost. 
But in a broader sense, Vroom Hilda is thoroughly justifiable and 
justifactory. What I mean by the latter, it makes little difference that the 1.8T is a 
notoriously thirsty engine, since MP' s fuel costs still compare favourably to those 
of his neighbours' grown children. He treats fuel consumption, in other words, 
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not as a characteristic in itself, but a means to valorize his life choices and 
situation (viz. an urbanite whose work and family require little commuting). 
And then of course, there is the animus MP purports the car to possess: its 
spiritual link to a recently departed pet; its providential intervention in the life of 
the family; its anthropomorphic engagement with the children. These benefits 
are quite literally priceless to the family's well-being. 
Exigencies of family are indeed an often inescapable component of one's 
calculus. I am not referring to those banal, but complicated deliberations over 
what vehicle best accommodates x people -or x plus yin the case of growing 
families, or whether y warrants thinking about another type of car. Rather- and 
here we arrive at the second method of tracing the sociality of the transaction- I 
am saying we need to remain sensitive to all those relationships that get dragged 
into the choice in very consequential ways, such that the transaction becomes 
much more than an exchange of money for 1,800-odd kilos of metal, glass, 
plastics and rubber. Relations of family, friendship and work hang too in that 
balance. 
No one exemplifies this predicament better than TK, who faced the delicate 
task of negotiating a used Honda Element crossover and her father's authority. 
On the one hand, her father's presence was indispensable, since he is quite 
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mechanically knowledgeable. But TK also found him a liability, chiefly because 
"he always thinks people are out to get him." Over the course of a day, they 
drove around Toronto to test three different Elements. Of these, TK preferred the 
second, her father the first: 
TI<: The first vehicle, my dad was going, 'Just get it.' It 
was a good price, but I was like, 'No!' I didn't like 
the way it sounded when it cornered, and the guy 
who was driving it, he was like, 'Yeah, I'm just using 
it right now for my own purposes.' Um, and it was 
dirty and it looked a little bit, like, abused - a little 
bit abused. And it didn't sound great, and there was 
rust and stuff on parts of the body, so I was like, 'I 
don't think so.' ... The second one was looking fine, 
very polished and buffed. [Laughing.] I was a bit 
suckered in by that I think! And then the third 
vehicle ... had some major transmission problems or 
something .... And then I was kind of like, 'Shit, I 
need a vehicle, I'm going to get [the second] one.' 
My dad was like, 'OK, I don't know.' 
MV: OK, I'm hearing your father wasn't particularly 
enamoured by that second one, right? Or was he? 
TK: Well, he wondered about - there was kind of a low 
vibration in the first gear that he wasn't sure about, 
and also, we couldn't get it up to speed, so he 
couldn't do a real test test. Um, maybe also a little bit 
because the guy who was selling it was more 
'salesman-ey' type-I don't know. 
The final decision, including how much to pay, was TK' s. This was agreed upon 
beforehand. So when they arrived back at the second seller's office, n< s father 
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excused himself, leaving her to conclude the deal. Yet he may as well have 
stayed, for, as TK alludes below, his misgivings could never be separated from her 
choice. I asked how this made her feel: 
MV: Is it a bit like anxiety, or not? 
TK: Um, [Pause.] yes, but only in the sense of, like, you 
just don't know what the outcome will be, and you 
don't want to make a big mistake with big money. 
MV: ... And if I can ask, was it too - was part of the 
anxiety because, [Hesitantly.] it was your-
TK: Dad?-
MV: Your family's money?-
TK: No, because it's ultimately mine. 
MV: OK, so that's the way you worked it out. 
TI<: Yeah, yeah, totally. But um, no, I just didn't want 
to have, like - I personally didn't want to regret it. 
And yeah, I guess I didn't want, you know, my dad 
sort of saying, 'Well, I kind of told you, if only you 
had a good feeling about that.' And I'm like, 'Well, 
I've got to trust myself.' You know, it's got to be -
it's my money, it's my choice. I was hoping he 
would give me a bit of guidance, and in the end, it 
was totally my choice. So I kind of went against 
him. 
MV: [Chuckling.] But did that make you happy, to go 
against him? ... Or not happy, but-
TK: Not happy, but yeah, like, it was good for me. I 
think it was good for me for, like, breaking away 
from, you know, the sort of like, the dependence-
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MV: Sure, sure, yeah, yeah .... 
TK' s attempt to finish my second question is revealing: whereas I was wrongly 
supposing her anxiety stemmed from financial dependency, in fact it was a sense 
of moral dependency, a perception of filial obligation not to contradict his 
opinion. In the moment of purchase, the car, her money, her choice and his 
disapproval become fused, as Miller would say, in an aesthetic total. Regardless 
of whether TK experienced the outcome as positive - liberating even - this was 
not a harmonious totality: indispensable as he was, TK' s father unwittingly 
infused it with tension and agonism. TK may have made the right choice, but it 
was not guilt-free. Ties of blood, so the cliche goes, are indeed thick. 
ss' calculus is not burdened by familial considerations, but burdened it is 
nonetheless. Every four years he acquires his colleague's off-lease Acura luxury 
sedan. On the expiry date of the lease, the two make the trip to the dealership 
where SS assumes ownership and his colleague obtains a new model. They have 
repeated this cycle three times now. SS likes the arrangement because it 
eliminates much of the time and guess-work that go into car hunting. There 
remains, however, an important residual unknown, namely their collegial 
relations: 
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MV: What would you say is the greatest obstacle or 
concern with respect to making this arrangement -
like, what's the biggest unknown, I guess? I know a 
lot of the unknowns - and that's why you like this 
arrangement - a lot of the unknowns have been 
taken care of. 
SS: Right. 
MV: But is there still some-
ss: Oh yeah, I think there are still some unknowns 
that-you know, [Chuckling.] whenever you're doing 
business with family or friends, it could be 
dangerous. [Mv laughs.] ... [N]ow fortunately, you 
know, the cars have been reliable and so forth, but I 
still think [of] that kind of unknown - you know, is 
this going to jeopardize our friendship? That kind of 
thing. 
MV: Sure. 
ss: Um, so that, you know, at the end is it going to 
blow, or is it going to throw a rod or something like 
that... [Y]ou don't know that with [any] car you 
purchase used, but uh, then I'll have to look at him 
every day .... 
MV: Yeah, of course. So, but knock on wood, with 
these last three [cars]-
ss: Yeah. . .. And the other thing too is, like, after he -
you know ... he's in his seventies. Pretty soon he's 
not going to be driving or get~g additional 
vehicles, what am I going to end up having to do for 
[Trails off, chuckling.]? 
MV: [Laughing.] Convince him to keep getting them! 
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ss: Yeah, 'Keep driving,' exactly! I don't want to pay 
SO-thousand for a car. 
MV: I guess I should have asked this before: do you -
have you done anything that, [Pause.] you know, to-
ss: Influence him? ... Well, I tell him I like the Acura! 
... Sometimes he's thinking, 'Well, maybe this time 
it'll be a Lexus and a - or Infiniti,' then he always 
comes back to Acura .... But uh, he's pretty much his 
own man, so he'll go his own way. 
The arrangement has worked flawlessly thus far; SS certainly harbours no regrets. 
Yet he and his colleague make for curious trading partners: the fact ss cannot 
completely rid himself of the fear of a lemon - it bobs like a naval mine 
somewhere on the ocean of their friendship - indicates they can never really be 
quits of each other. Nor are they necessarily equal partners: SS has in a sense 
become dependent on the arrangement, evinced by how irksome he finds the 
prospect of acquiring a car independently. For the foreseeable future then, he has 
left himself little choice but to trust that the arrangement will continue as always, 
Acuras delivered in impeccable condition like clockwork. But as a consequence, 
their camaraderie is bound in the car come what may, as if held in cosmic escrow. 
By now I hope the message is unmistakable. Rarely do acts of framing 
come across as a cold calculus, a purely objective exercise in frugally matching a 
design or engineering spec to a preconceived need or desire. Neither is this a 
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primarily emotionally driven process. It is instead governed by the buyer's 
sociality: her calculus must, at some level, address the all-too-malleable 'pretzel 
logic' of face-to-face relations and contingent identities. At the same time, it must 
reflect the desire to communicate, as PP so aptly pointed out, the right- or 
truthfulness of the choice. To believe any of this is peripheral or can be framed 
out of consideration is a myth. Relational dynamics lurk always in the buyer's 
thoughts, if not as explicitly as the examples above, then implicitly in her fear of 
unknowns: fear of being proven technical illiterate, of not choosing sensibly 
enough or of being 'played;' all of which amount, should they come to pass, to a 
shameful inability to justify the choice to the audience that matters most: herself. 
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Chapter Four 
An Entangling Frame: Femininity 
A White Man's Game? 
I WANT TO p AUSE FURTHER ON THIS IDEA of an I always entangled' market 
encounter, for it represents the central tenet of a good many economic 
sociologies. Entanglement - or embeddedness, to use the neo-Polanyian term -
reminds us that it makes little sense to treat the economic as an ontologically 
distinct realm. As illustrated in the previous chapter, one cannot point to purely 
economic dispositions or dispositives, since in practice nearly anything in one's 
life can be mobilized in the service of economic calculation. The problem with 
this argument, empirically at least, is that it risks descending into tautology, for 
what constitutes an economic 'bed' can be amorphous. I dare say the previous 
chapter runs afoul of this: I go to pains to demonstrate the calculative 
importance of face-to-face relations and identities in contrast to impulse or 
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objectivity, which quickly balloons to include everything from lifestyle to 
symbolism and familial to collegial negotiation. 
To make amends for lack of precision, I focus in this chapter on an 
especially decisive instance of sociality: femininity. This is not simply to make 
the pedestrian observatio:r:t that women have particular motoring preferences, 
patterns or demands. My aim instead is to specify the social construction - the 
relationally contingent nature, that is - of feminine calculus (and unlike in the 
prior chapter, the emphasis here falls squarely on the buyer-seller interaction). 
Simply put, because women experience distinct impositions of uncertainty, they 
make distinct calculations and justifications of balance. 
As important a factor is femininity, specifying it ethnographically is tricky 
because its other - masculinity - is difficult to trace: men cannot really speak to 
gender experientially, seeing as we are generally accorded the privilege of gender 
blindness. Granted, some of the pressure for men to get the acquisition right 
conceivably stems from perceived masculinist exigencies, but no one I 
interviewed admitted as much, and I chose in any event not to pursue the topic 
for fear of alienation. On the other hand, of the 16 women respondents, only six 
flagged the issues of gender unprompted, and even then not without 
ambivalence. For the remaining ten, depending on the tenor of the interview, I 
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broached the subject myself, asking if she felt treated differently because her sex, 
which yielded two more fruitful conversations. All of this is to say the pool from 
which to draw inferences is not particularly large, such that this chapter is not of 
an analysis of gender per se (i.e. a comparison of men and women's experiences}, 
but an indication of a context of perception, fear and constraint largely foreign to 
men. 
Much of what I have to say here is framed by and responds to Ian Ayres' 
(1991, 1995) research on gender and race discrimination in car negotiations, 
which, some 20 years on, remains a popular touchstone on the subject (cf. 
Archuleta, 2012; Goldman, 2012). Ayres did not specifically examine buyers, but 
attempted to model salespeople's behaviours via standardized field simulations 
of negotiations. His perspective is squarely quantitative-game-theoretic, which 
provides an instructive counterpoint to the qualitative-ethnographic approach 
here. 
In his first round of research (1991), he assembled a team of six buyer-
testers divided into three groups. Each dyad paired a white man with, 
respectively, a white woman, a black man and a black woman. Each dyad was 
then randomly assigned new car dealerships in and around Chicago, which they 
visited separately, often on the same day, to negotiate a new car. Testers were 
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trained beforehand to conform to a rigid bargaining script (cf. 1991: 822-4). 
Basically they were instructed to avoid 'chit-chat,' divulge as little information 
about themselves as necessary (viz. [s-] he would personally arrange financing), 
and proceed to ascertain the dealer's best price on the car they were shown with 
the lowest sticker price. This was when the test officially began. Whatever the 
salesperson's initial offer, testers countered with an estimate of the marginal or 
dealer's cost; that is, the price at which the dealership covers costs to the 
manufacturer, but makes zero profit.1 From then on, testers utilized a 'split the 
difference' strategy: if the salesperson responded with a counteroffer of, let us 
say, $2000 above margin, testers next offered $1000 above margin. The test 
continued until either the salesperson accepted the tester's offer or refused to 
haggle further. If the former occurred, testers politely excused themselves before 
signing any paperwork ("Thanks," they were taught to say, "but I need to think 
about this before I make up my mind" [1995: 115n26]). If the latter, the 
salesperson's offer just prior to the break in negotiation was recorded as the final 
price (1991: 827n33). 
1 To give some context, my sales informant explained that MSRPs at her brand are typically 
pegged at 7% above margin. That mark-up pays for everything from overhead costs to sales 
commissions. 
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Over a sample of 165 negotiations at approximately 90 dealerships, the 
results (1991: 827-9) are sobering to say the least. The white men fared the best 
by far, negotiating final offers that on average included $362 of dealer profit. 
Next was the white woman at $504, followed by the black man at $783 and black 
woman at $1237. The black woman, in other words, was asked to pay over three 
times the mark-up as white men. Race and gender, statistical regression 
revealed, accounted for 37% of the variation in profits (1991: 838-40), which in the 
context of social science represents a decent measure of robustness. 
What is going on, Ayres (1991: 844-5, 847-50) surmises, is revenue-based 
discrimination. Sellers "are using race and gender as the basis from which to draw 
inferences about willingness to pay and [about] the amount of potential or actual 
dealer competition for black[ s] and females." Salespeople treat non-white-men, 
put differently, as a captive clientele on the assumption they are less 
knowledgeable about automobiles or have higher search and negotiation costs 
(i.e. they cannot afford to devote too much time to car hunting) (1991: 849-50). 
Such circumstances create "a virtual monopoly" (1991: 845): the salesman 
strategically supposes the price a non-white-man is willing to pay at his dealership 
is tantalizingly close to her maximum reservation price (1995: 127; also cf. 1991: 
844). 
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Explained less economistically, because profits in car sales are 
concentrated in relatively few transactions, salespeople are keenly attentive to 
buyers beholden to high mark-ups for whatever reason.2 Selling cars cannot help 
but resemble then, in the initial moment of contact at least, a "search for suckers" 
(1991: 854; 1995: 127). The salesperson may understand not all black women are 
ripe for overcharging, just as a pedestrian understands not all yoling drivers are 
reckless; yet because a certain proportion of black women paid more in the past, 
the practice of fishing for reservation prices becomes perversely strategic (1991: 
855). Ayers (1991: 872) backs this up with an anecdote: "My cousin," one dealer 
explains, 
owns a dealership in a black neighbourhood. He 
doesn't sell nearly as many [cars], but he hits an awful 
lot of home runs. You know, sometimes it seems like 
the people that can least afford it have to pay the most. 
If there is a research design weakness here, it is, Ayres (1991: 826) openly 
concedes, that the effects of race and gender are being inferred on the basis of a 
single tester per target group. To mitigate this, Ayres took extra pains to 
guarantee uniformity among testers, not simply with respect to bargaining script, 
but also appearance, demeanour, tone of voice, even how they entered 
2 Car buying advisor James Bragg (2004: xv, 56) calls this "the 80/20 Rule of Life," by which 20% 
of transactions account for 80% of dealer profits. 
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dealerships (1991: 825-6). Correct training can, however, do only so much. 
Indeed the training may have worked too well: testers became well versed in the 
racial and gender problematics underlying the project, which itself carries the 
possibility of scuttling the reliability of results (1991: 824-5n27; 1995: 114n22). 
For these reasons a follow-up study was conducted (1995), this time with 
19 teams of testers consisting of five black men, seven black women and eight 
white women, and involving 404 tests at 242 dealerships (1995: 109, 113).3 Ayers 
neither disclosed the nature of research to testers - saying only it had to do with 
how dealers negotiate- nor the fact they were being paired (1995: 114, 114n22). 
He also added another style of bargaining- a 'fixed concession' strategy that saw 
testers raise offers by 20% of the margin in each round- to test whether splitting 
the difference exacerbates price disparity (i.e. if dealers' initial offers to non-
white-men are systematically higher, then successively splitting the difference 
can only entrench the gap, if not widen it) (1991: 830-1, 831n42; 1995: 115, 
119n35). 
The results were as expected by and large, with price discrimination once 
again confirmed, stunningly so: "without any negotiating at all, 43% of the white 
men obtained a better offer than their counterparts achieved after bargaining for 
3 Scheduling glitches saw 98 tests go unpaired. Elsewhere (Ayers & Siegelman, 1995) Ayers re-
ran the regression on the remaining 306 tests, which returned similar results. 
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an average of forty-five minutes" (1995: 119-20; italics added). Likewise as 
expected, bargaining style proved statistically insignificant, as did a number of 
other control variables (1995: 118-9). So compelling were these findings, they 
were discussed in mainstream American media, by Oprah no less (1995: 
143n108)! 
A Bifurcated Calculus 
The reader can probably anticipate where my argument is heading, something 
along these lines: women buyers cannot hope to approximate the ANT ideal of a 
suitably framed agent because systemic price discrimination impedes accurate 
calculation. That is to say, women can never orient strictly to the technico-
comparative task at hand because unlike men, they must also attend to and 
reconcile the price distortion they face. They are ultimately forced to develop 
sorts of market competencies scarcely acknowledged by Callon et al, namely 
rationalities under duress. Ayers himself hints at such rationalities in the proviso 
(1991: 854n109) that 'suckers' need not be irrational; paying higher mark-ups may 
be rational given prohibitively high search costs or an aversion to haggling. 
I do not adopt this argument however, not exactly at least, for I am not 
convinced Ayers has demonstrated gender price discrimination (I am, of course, 
in no position to make claims about race). I say this because differences in results 
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between the studies cast some doubt. The ordering of discrimination altered for 
starters, with black men faring worse than black women: the former negotiated 
final offers $1132 above those of white men on average, versus $446 for the later 
(this confirmed Ayers' suspicion of bias of his initial black-man-tester, who was a 
former car salesman turned law student [1991: 828n36; 1995: 117n29]). Secondly, 
disparity for white women - $216 above white men - was not statistically 
significant (1995: 116-8), which, taken with the revised ordering, contradicts a 
core argument in the first article, namely, the effects of race and gender 
discrimination are "synergistic or 'superadditive"' (1991: 829). The second study 
suggests attenuation of the gender effect, but Ayers has nothing to say about this. 
I am not the first to wonder about Ayers' certainty with respect to price 
discrimination. Richard Epstein (1992: 53) notes that whereas Ayers calculated 
price on the basis of accepted and refused bids, standard metrological practice is 
to exclude the latter. What proportion of Ayers' sample consisted of refused 
offers? At over 70%, it is not insubstantial (in the second study 25.6% of offers 
from white men were accepted versus 14.9% for non-white-men [Ayers & 
Siegelman, 1995: 312]). Ayers is confident these low levels of acceptance did not 
compromise the conclusions (Ayers & Siegelman, 1995: 312), but at a minimum 
they commit him to the rather awkward assumption that car hagglers eventually 
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acquiesce to sellers - after 45 minutes to be precise. Because, as Epstein remarks, 
there is no reason to believe acquiescence is inevitable, it is possible Ayers' tests 
overstate the degree of actual price discrimination (for Ayers' counterpoint, cf. 
1994: 82). On the other hand Ayers may not be too far off the mark: he (1991: 
856) presents potentially corroborating data from the Consumer Federation of 
America indicating that many buyers do not realize new car prices are negotiable 
-61% among blacks in fact. Yet one can equally interpret this statistic against 
Ayers: if most blacks and white women do not haggle in the first place, the 
testers then comprised an unrepresentatively aggressive sample of buyers, which 
conceivably and ironically means Ayers is understating the prevalence of price 
discrimination (Ayers [1994: 83; 1995: 312] acknowledges a similar possibility). 
All of this is to say that after two rounds of incontestably path-breaking research 
in which dealer intransigence to social research was soundly circumvented, 
Ayers may have cracked the riddle of reliability, but validity remains an open 
question.4 
4 There may actually be greater concerns, namely counterfactuals: Wheels contributor Lorraine 
Sommerfeld (2011) summarized a study by market-research-behemoth J.D. Power and Associates 
indicating the gender profit gap in Canada is $20, although there is still a difference in trade-in 
values of $2,500 across all car classes ($870 for compacts), due to men's preferences for pricier 
vehicles and a tendency to trade them sooner. Since I can find no other mention of this study 
anywhere - not even a press release - these results must be read extremely cautiously. 
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My sense is that the tests faltered because, as already mentioned, they 
were predicated on tester detachment. This was largely ethically mandated: 
because of the deception involved, steps needed to be taken to limit how much of 
sellers' time was wasted (1991: 822-3n18). Negotiations were scripted to last 10-
15 minutes, with testers remaining 'in the field' for no longer than an hour (1991: 
822nl8; though in actuality most tests clocked in at around 35 minutes [: 833]). If 
and when sellers tried ensnaring buyers in banter, the latter were supposed to 
reply, "I don't mean to be rude, but I'm kind of pressed for time, and would 
rather just talk [about] buying a car" (1991: 826n29). Test drives, as such, were 
apparently not in the offing, which is a shame since they represent a decisive 
milestone in the history of a transaction: according to my sales informant, if after 
a test drive a customer was still in tow, "80% of the time or so they would end up 
buying." Among my respondents, it was not uncommon to be left 
unaccompanied on test drives - PH was handed the keys to a GMC Acadia for the 
better part of a day - suggesting many salespeople do not seriously engage 
customers until after a demonstration. The unwillingness of Ayers' testers to 
submit to tests likely ended the proceedings before they began, accounting, I 
imagine, for all the refusals. 
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So while the price discrimination argument may not be as watertight as 
one would hope, there is an alternate explanation, one perhaps not quite as 
headline-grabbing, that I believe is more analytically fruitful: "The relatively 
brief ... time spent with black [women]," muses Ayers (1991: 832n46), "may 
indicate that salespeople were not bargaining seriously with them." This is to 
say, under general conditions of seller indifference, sellers are more indifferent to 
offers from women than men (Ayers [1991: 843n69], for the record, dismisses this 
argument on the grounds all testers offered to pay outright, a piece of 
information no liquidity-hungry dealer can afford to ignore). A seller, in other 
words, rejects terms from a woman not because he presumes to fish her reserve 
price with impunity, but because term-setting as such is not in the order of 
things; it contradicts what he knows about the nature of feminine calculativeness. 
I want to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter the consequentiality of 
this observation, or more to the point its performativity: in experiential terms, 
gender discrimination is real not because women pay more, but by virtue that 
their calculations are informed in one way or another by the perception they are 
being managed. This 'fact' of management constitutes the proper frame of the 
sales encounter. 
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What does it mean for a woman to be managed? To begin with, OI 
implies, it entails coming to grips with her own perceptions. Is she certain the 
seller is being condescending, or is it all in her imagination? 
MV: Now, something you said actually just reminded 
me, did you ever feel that you were-that [the 
salesman] was treating you like a woman? 
OI: Ah, you know what? I think I always feel that a 
little bit. [Chuckles.] And I think that's always my 
perception, but I don't know if that's because I'm 
sensitive or if it's really happening or not. But I often 
will get little comments, like, 'Oh well maybe you 
ask your husband about "blah, blah, blah."' So I 
don't know if-I mean, the answer's yes, but I don't 
know that's coming within me or if it's really 
happening. You'd need an objective observer to tell. 
[Laughs.] 
MV: Well, this isn't about objectivity. This is about 
your perception. 
01: [Pensively.] Yeah. I guess a little bit- a little bit, 
but [Pause.] it's probably just coming from within 
me. 
Even when a woman is certain she is being condescended to, it still may be 
unclear, as SN makes clear, what exactly about his behaviour is condescending: 
MV: Did you feel. .. that the guy was sort of treating 
you as a woman buyer? Did you get that sense? 
SN: Oh for sure. Yeah. I was a woman buyer, why 
would he treat me any other way? 
MV: No, but was it - did you feel he was patronizing? 
93 
SN: There's a way people treat women buyers. It's a, 
um - [Long pause.] how can I characterize it? Ah, 
[Pauses again.] it's not obviously patronizing-it's 
very friendly. So it's more cozy than you would find 
a man being with a man. Ah, more accommodating; 
just a, you know, 'Let-me-take-care-of-you' kind of 
approach. 
Such ambiguity accords with recent findings from us market research (cf. 
Ipsos Public Affairs, 2011; Business Wire, 2011). When queried about their latest 
automobile acquisition, 26% of women claimed it as a hassle (viz. it was neither 
quick nor easy nor effortless). Yet- and this is the interesting part- rates of 
dissatisfaction drop when the focus shifts to individual elements of the 
transaction: only one-in-seven took umbrage with price, trade-in values or 
trustworthiness of sales staff; only one-in-eight expressed doubt over financing; 
and, most strikingly, only one-in-33 felt disrespected. In other words, for a 
number of women little is tangibly amiss with the encounter, yet something 
intangibly off-putting remains. They appear to be making difficult 
reconciliations between what is happening and what could be happening, 
suggesting in tum a bifurcation of evaluative capacities: an orientation not 
simply to questions of price, but subtleties of word and deed that potentially 
mask something exploitative about the situation. Technico-pecuniary arbitration 
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thus includes a myriad of other arbitrations, forcing women to attend to aspects 
of the transaction that may be ancillary, but in no way inconsequential. 
Which calculation is more taxing - a car's value proposition or a 
salesman's motives - is difficult to say, but the latter, AN explains, is 
incontestably the more vexing. AN is PP' s partner, whose dilemma over a Honda 
Fit versus Nissan Versa was previously recounted. At one point, frustrated by 
their lack of progress finding decently priced used specimens, they tried to end 
the ordeal by buying a new Fit. AN took the lead here, but it did not go well. She 
was expecting a hard sell but got instead a hard apathy every bit as 
discombobulating: 
AN: I was desperate for a car so I was like ready to 
just, you know, spend more than what we had 
budgeted for and just get one. So [I go to] this 
Honda dealership, um, and I found that the car 
salesman was just like not, like anything I had 
expected because you always hear about the pushy, 
pervasive - not quite pervasive - um, pushy, what's 
the word?-
MV: Pushy' s good, aggressive? 
AN: Aggressive, yeah ... not that he was-
MV: OK, well hold on. Take it back. So you walk 
through the door, what happens? 
AN: ... When he met me ... he was very just blase, and 
he was like, 'Oh, we don't have any of those. We 
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don't have any Honda Fits .... ' It was just sort of like, 
'OK, case closed, bye!' And I was like, 'That's so 
weird, aren't you going to try to sell me a car?' 
... But you know, he just made me feel like-I just 
found the whole thing intimidating because I felt it 
was kind of like going into a hardware store or 
something, you know, being a woman? I really 
didn't know anything about cars, and I felt like he 
just knew that - just his tone made me feel kind of, 
you know, just naive and stupid. So anyway, he was 
just kind of matter of fact. And I really wanted a car 
so I was like, just lingering around, kind of going, 
'Come on, give me some hope! Like what's going 
on?' ... And it was me who was like, ' ... Are there 
any used ones around?' 
MV: So he really didn't want to talk to you it seemed? 
AN: [Excitedly.] Not really, like, I don't know, which is 
quite stupid because I was ready to buy a car. Like, I 
don't know if he thought that I was just, you know, 
one of those people who was wasting his time. But 
like I wasn't! Right? We were ready to buy a car! 
[Laughs.] So I found that weird .... But then he was -
which I didn't understand, because then he was like, 
'Well, you know, go to this Nissan dealership here.' 
And then, so he listed me a bunch of other - like 
Mazda and Nissan. And then I was thinking, 'Well 
he must work for all of them, because why would he 
be sending me to other places to buy a car?' 
MV: [Chuckling.] 
AN: Just [in general], I was like, 'Forget it.' I'm not 
going anywhere this guy suggests because he just 
left a bad taste in my mouth .... I'm not going to let 
him get any kind of commission off me. 
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AN' s inability to read the salesman's demeanour (does he or his employer, as she 
suspects, work more than one side of the competitive fence, or does he simply 
think so little of her business?) seemingly confirmed to her the truth that car 
sales, like a hardware store, are antithetical to women's sensibilities. 
Yet there is perhaps more to it than that. Specifically, I am willing to 
wager the unavailability of Fits was fallout from the Japanese earthquake of 2011, 
which severely cut export capacity (in late December of that year, right around 
the time our protagonists began car hunting, Honda announced steps to remedy 
the shortfall by switching production of Canada-bound Fits from Japan to China 
[Bunkley & Austin, 2011]). Had the salesman bothered explaining this to AN, 
rather than writing her off from the get-go, he may have caught the crucial cue 
she was a willingly captive buyer. Perhaps he is supremely inept; not every 
seller, after all, can read his mark like a book. Perhaps, to the contrary, he is 
supremely conniving: his dismissiveness, given conditions of genuine scarcity, 
may have been a ploy to spot the truly 'deserving' (read: desperate) buyer whose 
largesse will fatten his commission. Or perhaps- and this is where I place the 
bulk of my bet - he assumes that without available product, he cannot hope to 
manage her choice. That is to say, he may believe women are primarily tactile, 
not comparative decision-makers, for whom value is predicated not on 
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calculating features received for dollars spent, but considerations of comfort and 
ease-of-mind. AN' s calculative dilemma, he probably reckoned, was not, what 
'density' of features can I afford? but the more specific question, with what trim level 
of Fit am I most comfortable? Under the circumstances, he immediately realized he 
was in no position to 'help her help herself.' 
Whatever the cause of this salesman's phlegmatism, the notion that 
women possess a gender-specific mode of automotive calculation, one predicated 
on risk- and anxiety-aversion, increasingly underlies the sales orientation to 
women. Academia and industry alike have taken a keen interest in this calculus, 
attempting to discover and quantify its essence. Women, so we now know, will 
pay twice the premium as men, $1,353 versus $666, to avoid haggling (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2003: 115-6) and are 40% more likely to accept.a dealer's first offer 
(Bragg, 2004: 10). As a further consequence of finding negotiating distasteful, 
women make up only 36% of automobile registrants in the US, preferring cars on 
the lower end of the price spectrum (Hirch, 2010; TmeCar, 2010; Tuttle, 2010). 
Yet on the flip side, women are quite diligent purchasers, tending to ask more 
questions about safety, history and functionality than men (North, 2012; Tuttle, 
2012). A number of dealers have come to embrace and even cultivate this 
knowledge, all in the name of extracting competitive advantage by branding 
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themselves 'woman-certified.' Debbie Sguigna, manager at a Kia dealer outside 
Toronto, provided a rare glimpse of what this entails on Dave's Garage (2010), a 
radio phone-in program hosted by Dave Redinger and Alan Gelman: 
ALAN: Alright, we have with us Debbie Sguigna from-
DAVE: And Mr. Seoul! [A salesperson at the dealership.] 
ALAN: And Mr. Soeul. But we're going to talk about 
the [Slight pause for effect.] female side of things right 
now. Ah you know, when a lot of women walk into 
dealerships with their husbands for example, and 
maybe looking at a car - they, they don't feel good 
about it. They feel intimidated, but I understand 
there's a process now to make the women feel better 
when they walk into your dealership. 
DEBBIE: Yeah, absolutely there is. All of the 
dealerships part of Car Nation5 have become 
woman-certified .... 
ALAN: Woman-certified means what? 
DEBBIE: Just exactly like you said. To make sure that 
when a woman comes into either our service 
department or sales department, that they feel very 
comfortable. Um, you'd never want them to feel 
intimidated, pressured. A woman is going to make a 
purchase decision based on completely different 
information than a man typically. 
DAVE: Yeah! 
5 Car Nation Canada currently owns eight dealerships representing four separate manufacturers, 
including Nissan, Hyundai-Kia, Ford-Lincoln and Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep. 
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DEBBIE: And you want to make sure that she feels 
good- that she knows that she's becoming part of a 
family-
ALAN: Right, and she's going to be respected of 
course-
DEBBIE: That' S it-
ALAN: And you' re going to answer any questions that 
they possibly have. [Attempting to segue to a caller.] 
OK, well, that's great-
DEBBIE: A lot of times when a husband and wife come 
in, you know, a lot of dealerships focus all the 
attention on the man, and they're not realizing that 
the woman needs to know just as much-
DAVE: Yes-
DEBBIE: And ask just as many questions. 
DAVE: [Attempting too to segue.] Fascinating stuff-
ALAN: Now question: it's not just women who are 
woman-certified, correct? 
DEBBIE: No .... Seoul just went through the training a 
few weeks ago. 
DA VE: So there's actually a course you take? 
SEOUL: Yeah, just a one day course. But it's actually 
pointing out the important stuff.... Especially, let's 
say, if the man cares about horsepower or the power, 
the woman cares about safety. So you have to cover 
both.... Talking about eye contact ... talking about, 
like, how much attention to feel important and feel 
involved, [that's] very important for the purchase-
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DAVE: Fascinating stuff. OK, now we're going 
to ... talk to Patrick who's been hanging on for a 
second .... 
As presented then, woman-certification represents an engineered, albeit 
empathetic shift in structural dynamics, a win-win scenario eschewing the hard 
for the soft sell. The sales community now regards a woman's calculus, by way 
of analogy, as a fire in danger of snuffing, its logs needing rearranging to 
optimize the supply of oxygen. In contrast then to the blatantly patronizing 
attitudes of yesteryear, the new sales paradigm, guided by 'evidence-based' 
research, is a quintessentially Callonesque manifestation of framing aimed at 
assuring the conditions by which a woman can (re-) focus on what counts most-
figuring out which car best suits her needs. How effective is this new 
orientation? If CD's testimony is any gauge, not very. CD, who so happened to 
buy a Kia (but not at Car Nation), ironically found her salesman's empathy as 
obfuscating as AN found the apathy of her' s: 
CD: I went out alone, [Pauses.] which I was concerned 
about because .. .! had this perception that they're 
sharks. Especially if you're a woman- a single 
woman going into a dealership - I knew I was at risk 
of being the prey .... 
MV: So tell me about that day. So you walk in-
CD: I walk in approached by the salesman. . . .I was on 
guard because I know that I was waiting to be 
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pounced on ... .I'm very sensitive about how he 
approached me and [Clears throat.] because I was on 
guard- like I said- he kind of approached it 
delicately, kind of stand-off-ish, like, 'Let me know if 
you have any questions.' And I'm, 'OK.' So I go to 
him and I'm like, 'Yeah, I'm interested in test-driving 
that.' And he's like, [Mocking earnestness.] 'Oh great!' 
So then we jump in the car, uh - it felt good. It's 
what I expected. It was comfortable and-
MV: What, what - do you remember what kind of 
stuff was he telling you during the test drive? 
CD: He was pretty quiet during the test drive, I guess 
because [She chuckles.] they're kind of like wary 
when they get into a car with a woman! 
MV: Maybe. 
CD: I think so. I got that impression. Then, he made it 
a point to compliment me on my driving-
MV: Really! [Laughs in disbelief.] 
CD: Yeah, yeah! He's like, you know, in a surprised 
tone, 'You're a good driver!' And I'm like, 'Oh 
thanks!' [Laughs.] He made it a point to do that 
several times! 
MV: [Suppressed wheezing.] Sorry, I shouldn't laugh. 
CD: I know, it was kind of- [Pauses.] it pissed me off a 
little bit [She laughs again.] 
MV: Yeah, it sounds pretty condescending-
CD: Yeah it was! 
MV: But did he take the time during the test drive to 
kind of, to educate you about the car, to tell you 
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about the features? 'Oh, [In an exaggeratedly slick tone 
of voice.] look at the handling!' 
CD: No, he wasn't into tech-talk. I suspect if I was a 
man, he would have been more into that. But he was 
more into pointing out the comfort features. You 
know, the ease of handling and, uh - it was kind of 
condescending. . .. [Afterwards] we sat down at his 
desk and that was when he pulled out the chit-chat. 
And, [Laughs.] it was funny because he was kind of 
distracted at first and I'm like, 'What the hell is this 
guy doing?' He pulls out like a binder; he puts it 
away and he made it a big point to point out this 
binder that he was flipping through, and then he 
told me he was studying for his master's degree. 
[Roaring laughter.] Wait a minute! Let me back up a 
minute, because he asked me, like, what I do for a 
living. 
MV: OK, yeah! That often comes in the conversation. 
CD: .. .I described it and he made it a point to say, 'Oh, 
you know, that's really impressive' or whatever . 
.. . At that point ... he's like, 'You know, I'm studying 
for my master's degree in, like, economics' or 
something like that. But I totally didn't buy it. I 
thought it was an act. It could have possibly have 
been - I guess he was just trying to relate to me. I 
got that impression. 
MV: Yeah, yeah. But it seemed very disingenuous, 
uh? 
CD: It did, it did! ... He didn't want me to assume that 
this was his primary job, and this was how he made 
a living. It was very odd, but he - a lot of our 
discussion was about that and not about the car. So, 
whenitgotdownto-
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MV: Sorry to interrupt. So it's almost as if he tried to 
make a point of, or try to show to you that he was a 
real person beyond just a car salesperson. 
CD: Y-, y-, y- yeah. Like, he was an educated person . 
. . .It seemed like it was his shtick, like he'd used it 
before. That's how it came across to me. But I'm 
like, 'Whatever. I just want to hear about the 
money!' 
This last line belies, ·quite forcefully I would say, faith in disentanglement 
by playing to some essence of feminine reasoning. As much as CD may have 
wanted or tried, she could not "just ... hear about the money" because her 
attentions were dragged into a sideshow of disingenuous empathy. Her 
experience moreover suggests that the entire woman-centric orientation may be 
perversely self-sustaining: by engineering an environment more conducive to 
feminine sensibilities, sellers are actually reinforcing the conditions of 
uncertainty that underlie the problem in the first place, making indispensable yet 
more interventions of empathy. What burdens and ultimately bifurcates a 
woman's calculative energies is therefore not of the age-old elision of feminine 
subjectivities on the showroom floor, but rather the presumption, curiously held 
over from the 'good old days,' that her subjectivities are a special object of sales 
framing. 
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Actual women buyers, as opposed to their statistical avatars who inhabit 
market research, would appear to understand this postulate well. SN gasped 
when I mentioned woman certification: "What do you mean?" she asked 
incredulously, "Their salespeople are certified in sensitivity training and that's 
the way they try to sell the car to people for as much money as they can possibly 
get? God help us!" 
Strategizing Femininity 
So is it at all possible for a woman to refine or un-bifu.rcate her calculus? I can 
think off-hand of two manoeuvres. The simplest would be to avail oneself of one 
of the many internet-based services that mitigate the threat of being 'played.' 
These range from sites like CarCostCanada.com or unhaggle.com which disclose 
marginal costs, to LeaseBusters.com or LeaseTrader.com which facilitate peer-to-
peer lease transfers (i.e. the 'buyer' simply assumes the' seller's' payments - no 
negotiation necessary). Such services are apparently welcome relief to many 
women: according to LeaseTrader.com, 88.3% of their woman clientele expressly 
want to avoid dealership environments (Marketwire, 2009). 
Alternatively, women can, within a dealer context, use femininity 
strategically as a sort of bargaining chip: when DW negotiated for a new Toyota 
Matrix, she successfully held firm on the trade-in value of her previous vehicle on 
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the grounds it was "driven by a woman." Rather than worry about the 
possibility that the salesman perceives women as gentle or non-threatening, DW 
in other words used the perception as justification for a discount. 
A more extreme example comes courtesy of SN and long-time friend WH, 
who along with SN's husband (not interviewed) took the bold but risky step of 
dramatizing the acquisition. When it came time to commit to a used Subaru 
Legacy - SN had previously test-driven it - all three went along, each acting a 
different set of characteristics: SN was the demure wife, WH the abrasive husband 
and SN' s actual husband the dim-witted brother. In a nutshell, they decided to 
orchestrate a clash of gender stereotypes, which served as a "management 
device" to occupy the salesman's attentions and nullify his bargaining position: 
MV: So what gave you the idea to perform it? 
wu: Well basically, when SN said, 'Would you come 
with me, I need to buy a new car?' I said, 'Sure.' 
And uh, I think [sN's husband] wanted to come too, 
so it sort of became, well, 'Who - am I coming as 
your friend?' And I think SN suggested, 'Well why 
don't you come as my husband!' 
MV: [Laughing with SN.] What gave you that idea? 
wu: I can't remember whose idea it was. . .. We were 
just discussing how it is that three of us are walking 
in to buy a car. I mean, who are we? 
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SN: And it was decided that there needed to be 
someone who was going to be the major advisor, and 
usually it's the husband. So, and we figured that 
would be understood by the [sales-] people there . 
... But it was decided that WH would be the most 
effective, because he is the best at bargaining with all 
of his experience in travel and stuff. 
MV: [Addressing wu.] ... But why did you think that 
you playing the husband would, sort of, I don't 
know- that [the salespeople] would accept that 
more as opposed to [if] you were just a friend? 
wu: .. .I'm not exactly sure how it evolved, but .. .I 
remember discussing that [the salespeople], they're 
going to do the usual thing where you have a trade-
in, and you're going to want to bargain. And [the 
salesman will] sort of reluctantly acquiesce, then go 
to the sales manager, and they' re going to come back 
and start squeezing you for money. So I said, 'We 
need some management device of our own here.' 
... So I'm going to be the husband who, [while] not a 
total jerk, just isn't .. .interested in this car. It's not for 
him- there's nothing wrong with the old car. [His 
attitude is,] I'm not really interested in being here, 
and I'm not happy with any of this stuff. [Pauses.] 
And why is your idiot brother with us anyway? 
SN&MV: [Laughing.] 
WH: So I was unpleasant, but not aggressively abusive 
or anything. So during the interaction, I actually 
tried to be pleasant, but my pleasantness itself was 
unpleasant if you know what I mean. . .. So that was 
the vision. I would be that guy; she would be, you 
know, sort of the little women who needed and 
wanted a new car, and that was the bare bones of it. 
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MV: [Addressing SN.] .. .So did you decide before how 
much talking were you going to do? 
SN: It struck me that it would be very easy to play that 
role and I was just going to leave it to WH and ad lib. 
Here is what transpired. SN took the lead nominally: it was she who 
conversed with the salesman, and it was predominantly to her that the salesman 
(re-) pitched the automobile in question. Pretend husband WH played his role 
sullenly at first, excusing himself at one point "to look at this other new model" 
to convey how much he was chafing at the emasculation of his purchasing 
authority. SN' s real husband stayed silent, smiling bemusedly the whole time. 
When SN finally did broach price, the salesman immediately offered a symbolic 
$200 discount (off an asking price of something like $18,000). He assured them 
that while there could be little movement on price, he would give them top-
dollar for SN' s out-going car, also a Subaru. At that point WH became blustery 
and Janus-faced, repeatedly vetoing SN's attempts to acquiesce to the seller, but 
insisting all the while the decision was hers: he kept, as he put it, "trying to turn 
it over to her, but [then] taking it away from her." As if musing aloud, WH next 
flippantly proclaimed, "I wouldn't pay more than [x]," an amount which made 
the negotiation "jump from this little mincing to a different level." This was not 
received well, to which WH lost his temper. He stormed away, lashing out not at 
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the salesman or SN, but - with arguably more gravity-- at the 'idiot brother,' 
snarling at him, "What are you smiling about?" 
So far so good, but if the discount WH proposed was to be won, which it 
ultimately was, it would not be by bravado alone. When all was said and done, 
WH' s inability to stay seated may have persuaded the salesman to conclude the 
deal sooner rather than later, but equally convincing-- or should I say conniving 
- proved SN' s representation of her own meekness: she sighed and rolled her 
eyes subtly when WH railroaded her decisions, and when he finally blurted his 
unconscionable offer, she acted "crestfallen" he would "disrupt the negotiation 
by something that radical." After that, as we discover below, the sales staff 
appeared eager not simply to make the sale, but to do it for her sake: 
Mv: [Addressing SN.] OK, after [WH] left. .. you kept 
talking about-
SN: About ... how I was going to deal with this 
intransigent person-
MV: Oh really-
WH: Oh OK, see I wasn't there for that piece of the 
conversation. Enlisting an ally - very good! 
SN&MV: [Laughter.] 
MV: OK so, how did - what kinds of things were 
discussed then with the seller at that point? 
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SN: Um, just that it didn't- I didn't know, you know, 
how I could possibly convince him ... .I wanted the 
car [but] I wasn't sure ... that I could get it. 
MV: You represented yourself as in between a rock 
and a hard place, I guess. 
SN: Right. So then I was very surprised when at the 
climax, which was that they gave us what we 
wanted- [Addressing wu.] what you wanted. And 
the guy came-I think it was his boss that came with 
him-
WH: It might have been. Somebody came up to get me 
and to bring me back to the negotiation .... And his 
position was continuously explaining how good a 
deal this was and how good the car was. And he 
was starting to - you could see he was trying to 
support it [but] SN didn't have much to say for that. 
MV: [Addressing SN.] Oh so he almost tried to become 
-I guess so-he tried become your advocate. 
SN: mm-hmm .... [Chuckling.] I think he worried 
about me afterwards! 
MV: But at no point did you ... express happiness-
SN: Glee or anything-
MV: Glee that the deal went through? 
SN: I think I said I was pleased. 
MV: But you didn't show it. 
wu: Well she has to show constraint in the face of this 
guy. You know, she doesn't want to set me off 
either. 
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In short, SN and WH brilliantly improvised a stick-and-carrot strategy: WH-
irredeemably capricious - made it clear the sale was precarious while SN -
voiceless and powerless- conveyed incompetence to represent herself. There is, 
of course, a beautiful irony in all this: whereas for many women a 'knight in 
shining armour' routine is likely to induce profound calculative dissonance, 
success here hinged on the calculation the salesman would be patronizing. The 
buyers effectively baited the sellers into a simulation of familial power wherein 
the latter were obliged to save the sale because SN was incapable of doing so. 
Naturally SN has qualms about the deception she carried out, claiming to 
have "liked the poor guy we had bamboozled so terribly." In the grand scheme 
of things however, what she did is justifiable on karmic grounds. She was, as she 
explains, simply repaying a modicum of dishonesty she had suffered in the past: 
The problem is, of course, that this idea of dealing so 
duplicitously with someone is so against my general 
moral beliefs that it was very tricky for me to do it -
and I wouldn't have been able to do it had I not been 
screwed so frequently by car salesmen ... .I tend to be 
someone who tries to deal directly and honestly with 
people - and that's my preferred mode. But I was 
right into it ... because .. .I had figured that car salesmen 
deserved their own circle of hell. So this was, to me -
was not morally reprehensible. 
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Above all, this justification reveals a fundamental link between SN' s experience 
and those of the other women highlighted herein, which is the presumption, 
more or less objectively verifiable, of seller management. What sets SN apart is 
less a matter of guile or gumption, as if she and her co-conspirators are 
sociopaths willing to say or do anything to further their interests. No, unlike the 
others, SN took the presumption of management in another direction: rather than 
simply registering condescension, she acted to co-opt it, making it perform for her. 
The Entangling Frame 
I could have concentrated in this chapter on patently obvious and demeaning 
examples of seller discrimination which are unfortunately all too common. I 
could have cited Ayers' (1991: 846n81) accounts of overtly sexist and racist 
attitudes his testers experienced in the field. I could have talked about LA, who 
when visiting a Toyota dealership with her husband, was awarded a cloth 
shopping bag to impress upon them the importance of their business. I could 
even have recounted the particularly nasty altercation I had the good fortune to 
witness between a salesman and pair of women customers. When I mentioned it 
later to another salesman at the dealership, someone I was hoping to interview, 
he began his dismissive interpretation of events with, "Oh, you mean those two 
dykes?" 
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Yet all of this is unnecessary, because whether women actually are being 
disadvantaged is, in a sense, immaterial; what really counts - what woman are all 
too keenly aware of- is the threat of being disadvantaged. It is this possibility 
that informs a woman's calculus more than anything else. That is to say, a car 
salesman is rarely a superfluous, exogenous factor in a woman's final 
reconciliation; his language, gestures and implicit motives must be constantly 
interpreted and weighed against the suitability of a car and its price. 
That femininity is so difficult to escape speaks to the more general 
contention that decision-making and -taking are neither disentangling nor aspire 
to be; courses of market action can never be justified in the final instance on 
purely formal or quantitative grounds. Something residual- incalculable but 
consequential - always crosses the threshold of transaction. This is, again, not to 
say framing does not occur. The simple architectural fact that many car 
transactions occur in the semi-private confines of an office or cubicle sufficiently 
frames the encounter. This act of framing, however, does little to simplify the 
complexity of the choice. Rather, much like the metal collar a dentist painfully 
fits onto a pathological tooth to facilitate its drilling, framing plunges the buyer 
deeper into that complexity, intensifying the gravity of the encounter and 
rendering the buyer's overall sense of inferiority all the more acute. 
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Chapter Five 
From Market Power ... 
THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IS STACKED against Callon' s argument that 
disentangled calculation is indispensable to automobile transactions. Buyers and 
sellers can obviously count on the sorts of devices he mentions (viz. property 
rights, contract law) to disentangle future obligations (i.e. both parties 
undoubtedly want to be quits so as not to bleed money unnecessarily), but these 
are hardly the most decisive calculative moments involved. Moreover, based on 
the experiences recounted herein, instances of a formalizing calculus - Hayek' s 
(1948: 85) "Pure Logic of Choice" foreshadowed in acts of framing- are not only 
rare, they are reducible to extra-calculative factors: DG' s disciplined approach 
(see Chapter Three and again below) is, by his own admission, a product of 
obsessive-compulsive tendencies, while PH, the only woman to experience an 
acquisition free of both antagonism and gender discrimination ("With buying 
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cars," she reflects stoically, "you never really know if you're getting a lemon or 
not, so I. .. enjoy it as much as I can"), is herself a sales professional. 
Callon' s 'indictment,' however, does little to conclude the matter, for 
simply pronouncing him wrong, tout court, leaves untouched the flood of market 
discourses predicated on disentanglement. Indeed, more than a few 
respondents, entangled as their calculations were, spoke of what they did in 
disentangling or quasi-formal terms. Another way of looking at it, the 
disentangling moment is real or consequential enough, but it does not lie where 
Callon would have us believe: it is not found in devices or even the transaction 
itself, but in justifications; in buyers' attempts, that is, to bring certainty to their 
uncertain experiences of entanglement. In our quest then to specify 
economization - what it means to become economic·- we are only halfway there, 
at a point of inflection: having demonstrated always-entangled practices, we are 
now faced with the conundrum of reconciling these with seemingly always-
disentangling accounts thereof. The varieties of formal economic reasoning will 
be left for Chapter Seven, where they will be detailed, qualified and 
contextualized. My aim here and in the next chapter is to survey the empirical, 
theoretical and discursive grounds by which such reconciliation is possible. 
Making sense of this contradiction, I want to propose, requires us to revise car 
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transactions as relations of power. Power is perhaps the ultimate or most 'effect-
ful' of entanglements, seemingly extinguishing the perception of entanglement 
itself, an effacement Bourdieu (2005: 5) termed "amnesia of genesis." 
Childhood's End 
What is this power that rewrites entanglement as disentanglement? As a first 
step, let us consider what it principally is not by way of a now-infamous episode 
in Canadian motoring history: in late 2009 Madeline Leonard of Orangeville, 
some 75 kilometres northwest of Toronto, approached her local Mazda dealer 
hoping to find new tires for her 2004 Mazda3, but ended up with a top-of-the-line 
2010 Mazda6. The bill of sale indicated a list price of $46,291, a $4,500-protection-
package (against rust and damage to upholstery, paint and windows) and 7.4%-
financing over eight years with a final 'balloon' payment of $7,000. After 
discounting the value of the Mazda3 she traded in, her total obligation, taxes in, 
was just shy of $66,000. The deal did not sit well with her, especially when she 
noticed appreciably lower advertised pricing. She contacted OMVIC, the 
dealership industry's (self-) governing body in the province, which launched an 
investigation. They concluded she should have paid no more than $41,000: not 
only was the MSRP on that trim level $36,695 at the time; not only was the cost of 
package inflated by a factor of three, but to add insult to injury, the car she 
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received was a demonstrator showing 6,000 kilometres on the odometer ( OMVIC, 
2012: 4; Van Alp hen, 2010a)! 
Leonard characterized sales manager Mohammed (Moe) Shaikh as "slick." 
She felt "overwhelmed and confused" by his fast talk (quoted in Van Alp hen, 
2010a), explaining in a TV interview uneasily but bitterly (Seatle, 2010), "I felt 
cheated and lied to and manipulated and conned [She pauses and exhales.] and 
pressured. . .. He started pointing here and saying [Indicating imaginary signature 
lines.], 'Initial this, initial that, initial that, sign here!'" Orangeville Mazda's 
business manager Kien Trung retorted by suggesting Leonard was being spiteful: 
"We didn't do anything wrong in the case of this transaction. We made a little 
bit of money on the deal. I guess she was not happy with it" (quoted in Van 
Alphen, 2010a). 
What is most pertinent here, and on which the whole debacle revolved, is 
Leonard's mental state. She is alternately described as "intellectually disabled" 
(Van Alphen, 2010a) or someone "who suffers from an unnamed mental 
disability" (Siler, 2010). "Leonard has a number of health issues," expanded TV 
reporter Pam Seatle (2010), "including fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis, depression 
and anxiety." Leonard herself admitted to Seatle, "I was on a lot of medication 
[that day] and the side effects are [Bobbing her head exaggeratedly.] confusion [She 
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makes a guttural sound.] - all this stuff." Likewise OMVIC, in suspending Shaikh 
and Trung' s sales licences for a year, noted Leonard "was not reasonably able to 
protect her interests because of her disability, ignorance of the market and her 
inability to understand the transaction." Shaikh and Trung, the judgement went 
on to read, "knowingly and collaboratively exploited a person under disability 
and failed to accept responsibility of their conduct" (O'Keefe, 2012: 4).1 
What we are dealing with here is coercion plain and simple: Leonard did 
not want the car (Seatle, 2010; Van Alp hen, 2010a), but she could neither 
articulate nor impose her will. Leonard embodies, quite literally I would say, the 
deepest fear of every car buyer: the prospect of not simply 'getting fleeced' or 
'taken to the cleaners,' but more humiliatingly, the substitution of one's will for 
that of the seller; the sinking realization that one's ability to recognize right from 
wrong has been dispossessed. On the surface of it, Leonard's ordeal would 
appear to provide an ideal-typical illustration of power - an abuse of it actually -
demonstrating absolute seller power. This is power in its most rudimentary 
1 OMVIC also laid criminal charges against the two as well as the dealership (now defunct -
Mazda terminated the franchise as soon as the story broke [cf. Van Alphen, 2010b]). Principal 
dealer Sunjeet (Sunny) Baines was implicated when he approved the loan even though Leonard is 
unemployed and subsists on disability pensions totalling $1,850 a month. Baines eventually 
pleaded guilty, losing his sales licence, while his dealership (i.e. the business entity) was fined 
$10,000 (Van Alphen, 2012). Trung and Shaikh, in addition to the suspensions, were fined $5,000 
apiece (Tremblay, 2012). As for Leonard, her obligation to Mazda was discharged and as a good 
will gesture, they let her keep the car (Van Alphen, 2010c). 
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conceptual form, something Foucault ([1976] 2003: 29) might have called 
applicative power, which treats "the individual as a sort of elementary nucleus, a 
primitive atom or some multiple, inert matter to which power is applied, 2 or 
which is struck by a power that subordinates or destroys individuals." This is a 
repressive·or negative power: "a power to say no," in effect "render[ing] what it 
dominates incapable of doing anything ... except for what this power allows it to 
do. . .. All modes of domination ... are ultimately reduced to an effect of 
obedience" (Foucault, [1976] 1978: 85). And as Leonard so unpleasantly 
discovered, it is also a highly personalized power inasmuch as it extracted from 
her specifically - her scarce income and dignity - much like a sovereign who 
exercises power in bodily form by claiming the lives of his subjects, whether 
directly through gruesome punitive spectacles (cf. Foucault, [1975] 1977: 3-6), or 
indirectly through conscription (cf. 1978: 135-6). 
Yet with due respect to Leonard, her ordeal is of little use elucidating the 
power of a car transaction, representing, at best, power's outer, arrogant limit. 
There are two reasons this is so. Firstly, no one to whom I spoke reported 
coercion even remotely similar to that endured by Leonard. This is, to be clear, 
neither to assume coercion in car sales is rare, nor to agree with Hayek (1960: 136) 
2 Kate Soper' s prior translation, by way of Italian, does not say "applied," but is equally evocative. 
She writes instead, " ... on which power comes to fasten ... " (Foucault, [1976] 1980a: 98). 
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that, "So long as the services of a particular person are not crucial to my 
existence ... the conditions he exacts for rendering [them] cannot be called 
'coercion."' Indeed, one could argue the deceptive practices of 'curbsiders,' 
unlicensed sellers who pressure unsuspecting buyers into un-roadworthy 
wrecks, constitute a type of coercion (on the perniciousness of curbsiding in 
Toronto, cf. Toljagic, 2012b; Stancu, 2012; Van Alphen, 201 la), but such themes 
unfortunately lie beyond the scope of data here. Secondly, one needs to be weary 
about generalizing from Leonard's experience because of the idiosyncrasy of her 
capacities. Looking at the matter again from a Foucauldian perspective, if we are 
to identify a context of inferiority (minorite) in the buyer-car-seller nexus - and 
the data does warrant this- one cannot deduce it from a condition of, as Foucault 
([1983] 2010: 28-9) put it, "humanity's childhood" or "natural powerlessness." 
The accounts here therefore speak of inferiority, but not manipulation, 
which is to say a framework of power is very much discernible, but it does not 
include coercion. I want, as such, to synthesize an alternate concept of economic 
power, market/ power, from three principle streams. One of these, quite obviously, 
is the interview data; this is the empirical stream. The other two are theoretical, 
the first being the mainstream economic concept market power, with which I deal 
in the remainder of this chapter. The second, as signalled in the foregoing 
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discussion, is a neo-Foucauldian take on power (see Chapter Six). While my 
sympathies lean towards the latter (market/ power is a telling - and perhaps trite 
- play on Foucault's power/knowledge duality}, the spirit of this juxtaposition is not 
critical: a neo-Foucauldian lens may well correct the sociomyopia that is said to 
plague economistic gazes, but I avoid making that claim (mainly for reasons of 
pacing). I instead strive to show the two are curiously complementary: 
economics specifies a set of necessary conceptual components which, when they 
run their empirical usefulness, are extended by a neo-Foucauldian sensibility. 
Put simply, together economics and Foucault illuminate a fair portion of the 
phenomenological 'elephant' under investigation. 
Market Power 
Power is something of a hidden concept in mainstream microeconomics (or 
economism). By this I mean it is of secondary importance, mobilized always in 
conjunction with other concepts, notably market structure, competition and 
monopoly. "The competitiveness of the market," so tells us to an oft-prescribed 
textbook, 
refers to the extent to which individual firms have ... 
power to influence the price or other terms on which 
their product is sold. The less power an individual 
firm has ... the more competitive is that market. The 
extreme form of competitiveness occurs when each 
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firm has zero power because there are so many firms 
that each must accept the price set by the forces of 
market demand and supply. [T]here is no need to 
compete actively since none has any power over the 
market (Lipsey, Purvis & Steiner, 1988: 220). 
Seen from the flip side, David McKenzie and Dwight Lee (2006: 424) define 
monopoly power as "the conceptual opposite of competition. [It] is the ability of a 
firm to raise profitably the market price ... by reducing production and, hence, 
market supply. . . .In very general terms ... a firm with monopoly power is a price 
searcher." That is to say, unlike perfectly competitive actors who cannot tinker 
with prices in the pursuit of maximum profits, monopolists enjoy the latitude to 
manipulate price. 
Two sociological observations are in order here. Firstly these definitions 
are very much rooted in Weber's basic conception of power. Power (Macht), he 
said (1978: 53), is tied to domination (Herrschaft), which boils down to the 
realization of one's will "despite resistance," or more precisely, "the probability 
that a command ... will be obeyed." The less competitive a market, in other 
words, the easier it is for an actor to assert her interests on that market. This 
presupposes for all intents and purposes a zero-sum-like scenario by which, in 
extreme form, monopolist x wields power at the expense of consumer y and 
potential competitor z: the former freely sets prices, quantities and qualities 
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while the latter two, strictly speaking, exert no reciprocal influence. Power is 
thus necessarily differentially distributed, residing in x but not y or z, much like a 
scarce resource or prized property. That much is crystal clear in Lipsey et al's 
definition above: power, the noun, is inextricably coupled with the verb, to have. 
Secondly, power is akin to an articulation or lynchpin between agency and 
structure, denoting an actor's facility to suspend or bend the usual (i.e. 
competitively determined) constraints of the market. Another way of looking at 
it, power is the extraordinary ability of a monopolist to turn the dynamics of an 
entire market into a reflection of her own internal dynamics: "The demand curve 
facing a monopolist," explain McKenzie and Lee (2006: 431), "slopes downward, 
for it is the same as market demand." Lipsey et al (1988: 243; emphasis in 
original) are far blunter: "The monopolist is the industry." Power then is the 
ghost in the market machine, representing the personalization of impersonal 
market forces. Yet rarely is this personalization permanent, as when a 
monopolist's average costs decline in the long run, making it all but impossible 
for entrants to compete. Power instead typically "dissolve[ s ]" (McKenzie and 
Lee, 2006: 427) or "decentralize[s]" (Lipsey et al, 1988: 471) in the absence of state 
protection: substitute goods and services, dissimilar in form but not function, 
eventually appear, chipping away at the monopolist's perceived unassailability. 
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All things being equal then, power is entropic: the consequences of the 
impersonal will to (maximal) profit, to paraphrase Nietzsche, inevitably erode the 
personalized agency upon which market power rests. 
Combining these two observations, market power is nothing less than the 
distribution of agency within a structure of market relations or the differential 
patterning of means to a basic end: profit maximization. Power therefore refers 
both to a 'thing' - a particularly invidious agency- and to a continuum of market 
structures which perform these agencies. Schematically, the continuum looks 
like a pyramid. At the top, agency is concentrated in a single seller or buyer 
(monopoly or -sony respectively); in the middle, it is wielded by a handful of 
sellers, who either act as one or compete via product differentiation (oligopoly and 
monopolistic competition respectively); and at the perfectly competitive bottom, 
agency is held by a de facto infinite number of hands, diluting power to the 
detriment of meaningful competition (cf. Lipsey et al, 1988: 220-1). Car sales 
occupy 'middle-imperfect' ground here: the jockeying of automakers to stand 
out in crowded segments attest to the monopolistically competitive nature of the 
new car business; as for used, though there are vastly more sellers, inherent 
supply limitations and variations mean these markets poorly resemble perfect 
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competition. Whether new or used then, sellers wield a clear, structurally 
enshrined advantage over buyers. 
This thematic interplay between structure and agency is echoed in car-
buying literature: James Bragg (2004: 3) contends that new car sales resemble a 
highly uneven playing field - a structural allusion if there ever was one - not 
simply because of the insuperable gap in knowledge between buyers and sellers, 
but because of the unidirectional patterning of information flows. Buyers, he 
says, 
[a]re operating on unfamiliar turf, in a position of 
weakness, because we do it only once every few years. 
But those salesmen we have to negotiate with are on 
very familiar turf, the car store, and in a position of 
strength, because they do it every day .... We make 
[their] job easier than it should be by giving them lots 
important information they can use. We tell them 
exactly which car we want, and how much we can pay 
per month, and which vehicle we' re trading in. In 
return, they give us no information we can use, such 
as how much that car really cost them, how low they'll 
really go to sell it, and what our trade-in is really 
worth. As a result, a playing field that was uneven 
from the start tips even further toward them. And 
when the transaction is over, most of us don't know 
whether we got a good deal or got taken. 
In other words, the structural bias of the transaction - the slant of the field, Bragg 
might say- is such that sellers exercise agency, but not buyers (since we are not 
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dealing with firm-on-firm competition, agency must be reinterpreted as the 
ability to deploy strategic calculation). Bragg's solution, something not totally 
dissimilar from SN and WH's scheme (see Chapter Four), is to simulate a reversed 
market relation, one in which the buyer treats the seller as a captive client: "You 
will always get a better price on a commodity," he (2004: 49) goes on to remind 
the reader, 
if you make it a competition between suppliers. 
Would a food company talk to just one sugar 
manufacturer? Would Random House contact only 
one paper company? Would an automaker get bids 
from just one tire supplier? Of course not. 
The core of Bragg's method, briefly summarized, is a so-called "fax attack" (cf. 
2004: 144-57)-1 suppose 'e-mail attack' lacks rhyming ring-whereby the buyer 
solicits offers for a single vehicle (preferably a standard trim level with no add-
ons) from as many dealers within a two- to three-hour driving range. He 
recommends sending 15 requests, which should generate seven or eight replies, 
all of them making it clear neighbouring dealers have been contacted. The point 
of the exercise is "to start a dialogue with several dealers" (2004: 150), ideally 
identifying those who, for whatever reason at that moment (e.g. undisclosed 
incentives to dealers) are willing to sell at or below marginal cost. 
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Bragg, in short, keeps in conceptual lock-step with market power: he 
claims buyers can boost their agency - their capacity to make happen the best 
possible deal - by adopting characteristics of a more powerful monop- or 
oligopsonist. This is not a recipe for the creation of agency where there was none 
before, less still a victory of agency over structure. Rather, it is a method for 
reversing or snatching, if only temporarily, an agency that is the natural by-
product of imperfectly competitive market conditions. Such a proposal nicely 
illustrates market power's core problematic: the structural conditions by which 
one can or cannot meaningfully care for one's pecuniary interests.3 
A Phenomenological Fitness Test 
So how well does all this stand up to empirical scrutiny? If truth be told, not too 
badly. When asked, who benefited from the transaction? - a deliberately open-
ended question meant to probe perceptions of utility and accomplishment - five, 
maybe six respondents answered in ways affirming the discrete, structurally 
contingent nature of agency. Most exemplary is FM, a serial lessee of BMWs, who 
3 All of this, interestingly enough, can be read through the prism of the Callon-Miller debate 
insofar as Bragg presents yet another device for disentangling one's calculus. In contrast to car 
journalists' path to disentanglement, predicated on consummate comparison, Bragg's is 
something like an application of Patrik Aspers' (2005: 35; also see Chapter One above) 
observation about market roles. That is to say, Bragg proposes to stimulate disentanglement by 
getting buyers to behave less like, in Aspers' terminology, "fixed role" actors and more "exchange 
role" actors who trade commodities. 
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is downright sanguine concerning his inferiority vis-a-vis BMW dealers. This, he 
makes clear, is a function of his inability to make money on the deal, in stark 
contrast to the role he occupies in his habitual market (putatively identified as 
antique sales): 
FM: The seller always benefits more [He chuckles.] 
MV: Oh you think so? OK. 
FM: Well of course. The seller's out there to make 
money. He's making money-what do I benefit? 
I'm just leasing the car. It's not like buying, 
obviously - uh, you know, it's not that type of deal 
for me. 
MV: OK, OK, alright-
FM: It's not like I'm buying, say [someone's estate] or 
[an antique]. Then I feel the deal's always better for 
. h? me, ng t. 
CG expressed the same sentiment: "Obviously the dealer benefited. The dealer's 
in business and he made a profit. I needed a car, I got a car. I don't class that as a 
benefit - I paid for it." Likewise for DG whom we met in Chapter Three, it is 
difficult to see how buyers can ever benefit, given the relatively high prices for 
cars, used especially. Such agential emasculation, moreover, extends beyond the 
transaction. Reminiscent of an "economic trap" argument (Litman, 2009: 214; see 
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Chapter One above), the car according to DG is a permanent token of inferiority, 
precluding the possibility of ever making prudent financial choices: 
DG: Well, that's an interesting question - like in the 
end- off the top of my head, they [benefited] 
because they' re getting a whole lot of money, and 
even though I think it's a good deal, it's still a crazy 
amount of money. The whole idea of buying a new 
car is a little crazy and I will say we started looking 
very much at a used vehicle - that was my intention. 
MV: Sowhy?-
DG: [The] price of used vehicles is-
MV: Is through the roof-
DG: So high that the spread is like a thousand-
bucks .... 
MV: So getting back to that question, so you think it 
was mainly the dealer that benefited? Do you think 
you got any benefit at all? 
BJ (oc' s partner): Well, we have a new car! 
MV: [Laughing.] O~er than that! 
DG: We really like it. Uh, [Looking over to BJ, shrugging 
his shoulders.] no, no. 
BJ: No. 
DG: ... [T]hey're crazy expense; cars are ridiculous! I 
guess that must have come up in your research. 
MV: [Laughing.] Yeah! 
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DG: Because I calculated it. It's like 10 to 12-grand a 
year to own and operate a vehicle. That's my 
calculation based on - for me, with gas, insurance, 
and repairs and tires and depreciation of the vehicle, 
because I do write it off. So it's a big bloody expense. 
What stands out in these responses is just how antithetical they are to 
notions of coercion. Or rather, FM, CG and DG start off looking like victims of 
coercion inasmuch as they all but claim they are powerless, possessing little to no 
scope to effect financially better outcomes. Yet unlike victims of coercion, there is 
no remorse or agony about acquiescing-it simply is. Nothing personal about it, 
this represents for them a more or less irksome but necessary cost of transacting 
against well-capitalized sales machines. There is in these accounts, briefly put, a 
nonchalant internalization of market inferiority.4 
Such unequivocal espousals of market power (-lessness) were, however, 
the exception among informants, which perhaps raises questions about market 
power's phenomenological fitness. At issue, as I see it, is not that the concept is 
empirically wanting, but rather that to register it in the first place requires 
immersion in economics or a related knowledge, something along the lines of 
what Bourdieu (2005: 200) called "'native theories' of strategic action." Indeed, if 
there is a commonality linking this camp of respondents, it is that they labour in 
4 Never let it be said, as an aside, economism posits only "undersocialized" actors (Granovetter, 
1985: 483). The portrait of power-mediated action is as "oversocialized" as they come. 
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highly economistic actor-worlds: FM is a small business owner, CG a semi-retired 
real estate developer, DG an entrepreneur-cum-bookkeeper, PH a sales manager 
and DB (see conclusion) a stock broker. 
By contrast, interviewees' collective thoughts on who benefited and how 
ran a wide interpretive gamut. Apart from the 'economicists' above, another 
group of four or five believed the benefits were equally split, an answer which, 
when one thinks about it, is disappointing inasmuch as it lets the speaker dismiss 
the oppositional dimension of the encounter. Another eight or nine said they 
benefited hands-down, couched purely in terms of agency or successful 
recalcitrance to the dictates of sellers. KA, for instance, believes he benefited 
because he resisted being talked into leasing a new Mazda3, an option he 
inferred was preferable for the dealership given how keenly the salesman 
insisted upon it. DW likewise benefited "for sure:" in 2008 she acquired a new, 
but out-going 2007 Toyota Matrix, priced at a slight discount compared to the 
2008s. When the salesman ad vised her he could not find one - a ploy to squeeze 
her for more money by forcing her into a 2008 - she put her foot down and 
"made them work" to find the car for which she had signed. Then there is BU, an 
elementary school teacher. If a telos is to be gleaned from her history of buying 
cars, it is, she implies, a gradual capacity to escape from seller constraints: 
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BU: I do think, um, our sense of our own power has 
grown with each experience. Like, our very first car 
we bought - I think we got bamboozled [She 
chuckles.] because I had just finished my master's 
degree and I was heavily in debt with [student] 
loans. And I was starting to supply-teach, and you 
have to have a car for supply-teaching, and I had 
zero money and the banks turned us down for a 
loan. So we went to a dealership that would give us 
a loan, and the interest rate was really high that year 
- I think we took a loan for 11 %-
MV: Ohboy! 
BU: Yeah, and we just took it because it was somebody 
that was saying 'yes' when everyone was saying 'no.' 
... Yeah we bought a Mazda - a used Mazda. And, 
like, the guy who sold it to us was very schmaltzy -
he called me Sally the whole time. [She laughs.] And 
we just sort of went along and agreed because we 
needed the car and they were letting us have the 
loan. 
MV: And what year was this? 
BU: .. .It was 1995 .... But anyway, like at this point I 
would not stick with a dealer who called me Sally 
and, you know, the way he talked down to me and 
everything. . . . [He] was very, sort of, the old, 
stereotypical, patriarchal, schmoozy guy. You know, 
we wouldn't deal with that anymore. 
MV: I want to get back, you said ... you feel that you 
have a greater sense of your own power with each 
transaction. Now what does that mean ... ? 
BU: Yeah, well just, I mean, I am not a nervous little 
student anymore .... You know, I'm 42, I have a 
secure income and I know they need my business. 
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... And also just a sense of people too. Like the 
private transactions, they've all been lovely people, 
so you know - sort of looking for that as well - and if 
somebody isn't nice to deal with, it's like, 'Well, see 
you later!' ... We've got time; we can wait .... 
Amidst this triangle of economicists, 'even-stevens' and 'conscientious 
resistors' like BU lies a 'mushy middle' who struggled with the question of 
benefit, understandably so: how can one, after all, give a black-and-white 
assessment of something shrouded in so much uncertainty, particularly when 
one's sense of self hangs in the balance? SA, for instance, did not know how to 
answer - or perhaps just did not want to - saying simply, "I don't know," with 
an audibly befuddled, embarrassed chortle. First-time buyer HT, who acquired 
an used Escape from a Ford franchisee, tried to articulate a surplus of benefit for 
himself, but there is hesitation and prevarication in his voice, as if he were trying 
to convince himself he really had "scored:" 
I don't know, I guess, I would like to think I 
[benefited], but obviously they wouldn't have sold it 
for 14-thousand-I mean, you know, we heard [from 
sales staff], 'Yeah you' re getting a great deal here, 
man,' [and] 'I love the vehicle; I'd keep it myself if I 
could,' you know, 'but-.' But, but, but, b-, but! ... For 
some reason this [vehicle] [Pause.], I don't know, it 
was, like, the cheapest one around. So no, I mean, at 
the time I felt like I really scored. 
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Ambivalent as they are, such experiences are important - and here I think 
we reach the phenomenological limit of market power - insofar as they challenge 
economistic assumptions of agency in two ways. Firstly, they speak to the 
indiscrete nature of agency: benefit in these accounts is polyvalent and 
endogenous to actors themselves, necessarily meaning different things to buyers 
and sellers. For this reason it makes little sense to understand agency as a 
distributed property possessed more by one than another. OD, for example, 
having purchased a Toyota Echo in a private sale, may have lost out monetarily, 
but not with respect to spiritual well-being or sense of freedom: 
OD: Ah that's a good question. Um, it's a bit tricky ... 
because [Exhales.], you know, I could look at it from 
different angles. One angle, I would say I benefited 
because I had one of my better summers .... I was 
able to take it to visit family; I've never been able to 
do [that] before .... That sense of freedom [Pause.] .. .I 
would see myself attached by - you know, I'd 
adhere to a sense of freedom with a car, but it was 
nice. It was very nice. 
MV: ... Now is there an opposite angle to look at then? 
OD: I would say, given the money I've spent on the 
car, all-in-all I ended up spending about $1000 more 
in repairs and buying new tires and everything. 
So ... in a sheer monetary respect- and I guess a 
consumer, buyer-seller relationship - he probably 
won out. 
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Secondly, flesh-and-blood actors, unlike their abstract counterparts, are 
not nearly as fatalistic about the prospect of agential emasculation. That much 
can, of course, be inferred from the apprehension in SA and HT' s replies, but the 
matter goes deeper than that: people interpret asymmetry in very personal 
terms, which ends up distorting - fascinatingly so - the entire economistic 
narrative of power. Take HD, whose reasoning at first glance is economistic 
through-and-through: he treats seller superiority as a. foregone conclusion, 
noting salespeople come armed with all sorts of knowledge by which to read 
buyers. That he himself negotiated a discount on a used Nissan Altima, 
employing a version of 'splitting the difference' - /1 sawing off at the middle" he 
calls it - was hardly an achievement, as if an act of recalcitrance achieved against 
the odds. To the contrary, it is further evidence of sales cunning: 
MV: Did you ever get the impression that the seller 
was managing you in any way? And you can think 
of 'manage' any way you want. 
HD: Yeah that's a hard one. I don't know! I 
personally think that - now that you ask the question 
- I think these guys are pretty good. The reason I say 
they're good is because they do this for a living. 
That's why the salesman always has the 
advantage .... So in that sense, yeah, of course 
they' re managing [you] .... 
MV: OK that's an abstract notion of being managed. 
But did you feel it at the time? 
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HD: No. 
MV: OK alright. So at any point then, did you feel like 
you were losing control of the negotiation? 
HD: [Long thoughtful pause.] 
MV: Or were things heading in a direction that you-
HD: Yeah, I was surprised at his resistance, I will say 
that. I was -he seemed really firm about what he 
wanted for the car .... 
MV: So ... the simple fact that you got him to budge [on 
price] was an accomplishment. 
HD: In a way, but I'm sure that if his strategy- you 
see, we don't know, like, in a sense ... maybe he knew 
that I just didn't want to walk out of there. Like, 
that's, you know, part of salesmanship - I would 
think - is to know when the customer is going to 
leave .... I mean, because the rule of business is once 
a customer leaves- the rule in business is never let 
the customer walk out the door. 
MV: Sure. 
HD: That's the rule, right? ... [T]he longer you keep 
the customer in the store, the greater your odds. It's 
like exponential. Each five-minute interval, the 
chance of a sale goes up x percentage, right? So I'm 
not sure-I wouldn't underestimate the knowledge 
of salespeople just because they have so many 
interactions on a daily basis. You know,- you could 
say the buyer has interactions, but the buyer's 
interaction's different: the buyer's always dealing 
with a different product, right? So even if you're an 
expert buyer ... today I'm buying shoes, tomorrow 
I'm buying whatever. You're always flailing about, 
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trying to collect information, trying to find a 
baseline ... so you're always struggling .... It's the 
expert versus the dilettante. 
Thus the dynamic of the transaction, the opposition of "the expert versus the 
dilettante" as he puts it, is a function of seller discipline on the one hand and 
buyer indiscipline on the other. Such a structuralist assertion is, to be sure, 
prefigured in the economism of FM and DG' s comments. Yet what sets HD' s 
account apart, as he admits below, is that his inferiority was not wholly 
determined by this dynamic; his own competencies played a crucial role: 
MV: Are you the kind of person who enjoys haggling 
or negotiating in general? 
HD: No I don't enjoy it. 
MV: Really, OK, I thought you would have-
HD: No I don't see it as a game. But what I have 
learned is that if there's an opportunity to do so, over 
the years I've tried to take advantage of it, although 
I'm not- I don't think I'm very good at it. In fact, I 
don't think I'm good at it all, because I'm too quick 
to settle, you know, like? And I don't want to give 
offence either. I'm always, like, giving a number that 
doesn't, you know - so I'm always prefacing things 
by, you know, whatever. But, I mean, I try it. Like I 
try stupid gambits like, 'Well what if I paid cash?' or 
something, you know. 
MV: ... So in the end did you feel like you paid a fair 
price - and whatever fair means? 
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HD: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think it was OK. I mean, 
you know [Pausing with a guttural sound.] .. .if I was a 
real good haggler, I think I might have started at 
4,000 for that car [rather than $4,800]. Like 
retrospectively, because, you know, the car wasn't 
great-
MV: So retrospectively, you think you could have 
started that low?-
HD: Yeah-
MV: Like, you could have lowballed him that much? 
HD: Well, now, that's surprising to you - I mean, it's 
not a question of lowballing, it's a question of what 
is the car really worth, right? 
The buyer, HD is trying to tell us, is a dilettante in a double sense, vis-a-vis both 
the seller and, perhaps more importantly, herself. Put another way, that HD 
understands the transaction was stacked against him - that he was, put 
otherwise, unable to strategize in a manner commensurate with "what the car 
[was] reapy worth" - is not nearly as important as the fact he takes considerable 
responsibility for the lopsidedness of the opposition. It is as if his every step 
were a misstep proving the superiority of his opposite number, much like the 
novice tennis player who underwrites the victory of her opponent by continually 
hitting the net. 
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What emerges then in this and other dispatches from the mushy middle is 
a curious tension between agency and structure to which the market power 
concept is poorly attuned. Market power, as I have sought to demonstrate, infers 
subjective experiences of agency from objective, structural asymmetries; car 
sellers are strategic, it follows, because they occupy privileged roles (viz. 
technical scribe and acquisitional gatekeeper). HD's experience, however, also 
suggests an opposite line of explanation, whereby structural positions are 
inferred from the buyer's self-awareness of tutelage. Such explanatory fluidity 
signals less an empirical dead-end for market power than an opening to another 
avenue of analysis: the possibility that power does not simply describe the 
buyer's agency or cool lack thereof, but that it works on her agency. In which 
case, to continue following the trail of power of the buyer-car-seller nexus, we 
need not a new analytical gaze so much as a recalibration: rather than contenting 
ourselves to trace the circumscription of buyer agency, we need to locate its 
constitution at the point where subjective experiences of capability intersect with 
objective positions of inferiority. 
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Chapter Six 
... to Market/Power 
Why Foucault? 
TO RECAP WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AND WHAT IS TO COME: when it comes to major 
life purchases like cars, disentanglement (viz. more or less deliberate, more or 
less formal calculation) is not meaningfully part of lived experience. This 
however does not mean it is negligible; disentanglement corresponds to an 
exercise in retrospective justification which can only be understood as an instance 
of power. At this point in the analysis, we have just discovered that the market 
power concept is of limited use elucidating this process. Something else is needed 
conceptually. 
The 'something else' I am proposing is, I admit, unorthodox insofar as it is 
neo-Foucauldian. I say this because the dis- /entanglement dichotomy is central 
to many economic sociologies (cf. Krippner, 2001); can we not then dissect it 
within the confines of one or more of these? Why resort to Foucault? The long 
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answer is that economic sociology tends not to have a particularly robust 
appreciation of power. To survey the founding works of new economic sociology 
(NES), for example, one gets the distinct impression its practitioners sought to 
avoid it. For Ronald Burt (1992: 15), what comprises and animates trust, the sine 
non qua of a market relation, is difficult to generalize, but power is not part of the 
mix: 
The matter comes down to a question of interpersonal 
debt. If I do for her, will she for me? There is no 
general answer. The answer lies in the match between 
specific people. If a contact feels that he is somehow 
better than you - a sexist male dealing with a woman, 
a racist while dealing with a black, an old-money 
matron dealing with an upwardly mobile ethnic -
your investment in the relationship will be taken as 
proper obeisance to a superior. No debt is incurred. 
It would appear, in other words, that the NES research agenda is framed by a very 
literal reading of equality (i.e. market actors trust each other because they are 
peers to each other), a postulate which may help to ground NES as a sub-
discipline, but which helps us not one bit. Indeed, as a slew of critics have 
argued (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 114; Brint, 1992: 200-1; Fligstein, 2002: 70-1; 
Krippner, 2001: 795-6; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994: 371; Uzzi, 1997: 63), by 
placing such overwhelming emphasis on interrelational trust, NESers end up 
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underspecifying the 'content' underpinning these relations in the first place (e.g. 
themes of sociality and femininity highlighted earlier). 
ANT likewise leaves something to be desired. Take the debate, unrelated 
to the Callon-Miller exchange, surrounding the first American auction for mobile 
phone frequency licences in 1994, an event that netted the federal government a 
windfall in the billions. The commonplace ANT interpretation (e.g. Guala, 2001; 
Muniesa & Callon, 2007: 182-3) is that the auctions were a successful example of 
performativity: because everything about them had to be written from scratch, 
from the rules to methods of bidding, they provided a rare opportunity for two 
competing camps, game theorists and experimental economists, "to construct the 
sociotechnological agencements that they believe[d were] compatible with their 
own models, statements and assumptions" (Callon, 2007: 341). Philip Mirowski 
and Edward Nik-Khah (2007) take exception, however, to the supposition the 
auctions were a success. The problem, they argue (2007: 203), is that ANTs define 
success exclusively by the criterion of "economic efficiency" - to wit, revenue 
maximization for the state - sidestepping the rather inconvenient fact that the 
auctions failed to meet a single objective stipulated by Congress at the outset. 
Put otherwise, ANTs neglect to see that the auctions were as much a political as 
an economic event, leading them to construe "the economists, telecoms, and 
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government officials as a single undifferentiated team united in pursuit of the 
pragmatic operability of a[n economic] 'machine."' Yet "the telecoms," as 
political actors, "were unequivocally 'more equal' than everyone else" (2007: 
211). 
Latour is unmoved by their critique (2005: 63, 251), as he is in general by 
the political explanations of critical sociologists. "[A ]bstain as much as possible 
from using the notion of power" he warns (2005: 260), which risks unrealistically 
positing invisible forces explaining asymmetries independently of sociotechnical 
networks. Power for him is an explanadum, not an explanans: there can be no 
'powerful explanations' of asymmetries, for it is precisely power (viz. its 
mechanics, figuration and limits) that must be explained (2005: 63-4). Latour' s 
political epistemology thus eschews themes of antagonism and inequity in favour 
of the more prosaic, but equally contestable task of mobilizing and maintaining 
associations; of the process, that is, of "unification of [a] collective into a common 
world acceptable to those who will be unified" (2005: 256). 
While there is much good sense in all this, the injunction to dismiss the 
preoccupations of critical sociology, themes which, again, correspond to the 
content of relations, strikes me as needlessly stifling. Does not the more 
rewarding angle of attack lie between figurations and contents? Femininity in a 
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car transaction, let us remember, concerns both: one cannot fully understand 
how women's calculativities are framed without also taking account, from a sales 
perspective, of preconceptions about the rectitude of the undertaking nor, from 
the buyer's, apprehension over the prospect of being framed. If such dualities 
cannot be accommodated, I see no reason to drop anchor in ANT's 
epistemological waters. 
Bourdieu's (2005) economic sociology, beginning from the premise that 
market relations are power relations, represents a more promising harbour. 
Markets according to him are fields of forces (2005: 199), which is to say they 
involve struggles among actors with differing means or strengths (atouts). An 
actor's position is determined not by any SES category or relation of production, 
but by the volume and composition of her capitals, embodied in a variety of 
objective (e.g. money, equipment) and subjective (e.g. goodwill, know-how) 
forms (cf. 2005: 2, 193-5, 233n2-3, 246n4-5). The uneven distribution of these 
"exert[s] a structural effect ... weigh[ing] ... on all the agents engaged in the field; 
and the worse placed they are within that distribution, the more it restricts the 
space of possibles open to them." Accordingly, "[t]he tendency for the structure 
to reproduce itself is immanent in the very structure of the field" (2005: 195, 196). 
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As much as I welcome his spotlight on power, I find Bourdieu's a poor 
guide to understanding the experiences recounted herein. The drawback is that 
Bourdieu ultimately took the passivity of consumers too much for granted, 
ironically cutting conceptually close to market power. For instance, Bourdieu 
explains the primacy of firms to structure markets by dismissively noting, "As 
for consumers, their behaviour would be entirely reduced to the effect of the field 
if they did not have a certain interaction with it (as a function of their- quite 
minimal - inertia)" (2005: 194). Elsewhere he bluntly posits consumers as 
doubles of their sellers, such that competition is a struggle among sellers for 
access to "clients occupying positions in social space homologous to the positions 
those producers occupy in the field" (2005: 208). What Bourdieu fails to convey 
in these passages is the variability or fragility of power, leaving us with the 
somewhat crude impression - Latour would no doubt agree - that the 
domination of consumers is a fait accompli, a seemingly natural or immutable 
phenomenon permeating the entire field. 
Which brings us to Foucault. The virtue of his understanding of power is 
its versatility: unlike with Latour, asymmetry is retained as power's necessary 
condition, yet unlike with Bourdieu, asymmetry does not restrict, but rather 
creates or "operates on the field of possibilities" (Foucault, [1983] 2000d: 341). 
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That is, he wisely, if controversially disavowed power's link to domination, 
taking instead government as its primary matrix. This latter does not concern the 
State per se, but is analogous to authority, if not to the letter of Weber's definition 
(which "implies a minimum of voluntary compliance [or] an interest ... in 
obedience" [1978: 212]), then very much in its spirit, for freedom, believed 
Foucault, is indispensable to government. "A power relationship" he wrote 
(2000d: 340), "can only be articulated on the basis ... that 'the other' (the one over 
whom power is exercised) is recognized and maintained to the very end as a 
subject who acts." To put a finer distinction on the matter, power is the 
effectuation of dispositions and actions under conditions of largely legitimate 
asymmetry, while government is the specific relation, asymmetrical but free, by 
which this process unfolds: 
The characteristic feature of power is that some men 
can more or less entirely determine other men's 
conduct- butnever exhaustively or coercively. A 
man who is chained up and beaten is subject to 
force ... not power. But if he can be induced to speak, 
when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold 
his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused 
to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been 
subjected to power [and] submitted to government. If 
an individual can remain free, however little his 
freedom may be, power can subject him to 
government. There is no power without potential 
refusal or revolt ([1979] 2000b: 324). 
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At the end of day, it is this emphasis on freedom that makes Foucault's 
take on power so phenomenologically relevant to major life purchases. More 
precisely, the passage above encapsulates perfectly, I think, a fundamental 
tension experienced by all car buyers, namely influence from without and 
freedom from within. There are two ways of interpreting what this means. The 
first, more obvious option would be to say buyers are implicated in their 
inferiority: if, like dopes, they possess the potential to refuse but refuse to 
exercise it, they have no one to blame but themselves for the power over them. 
Or conversely we might say something more subtle is afoot: the governed 
consumer, a sentient being, is free to orient to market government in the manner 
of her choosing, even if that means rebelling against 'the tyranny' of market 
choices. What remains constant however, is her perception of inferiority, an 
inescapable fact for all intents and purposes, to which all her faculties must 
orient. We are hence not talking about an illusory freedom of the sort voiced in 
the critique that consumers may be free to choose, but their choices are 
circumscribed. What is being hinted at is instead a very real, very consequential 
freedom that looks like an open-ended, self-flagellatory dialogue - as we just 
encountered-with inferiority itself. It is the freedom, we shall see, to be one's 
own strict, but loving governor. 
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Appreciating freedom in this way allows us to transition from a 
predominantly structural analysis of automobile acquisitions to one rooted in 
subjectivity; a shift, that is, from market power to market/power. The former 
analytic, as explained earlier, construes power as a permanent, patterning, yet 
variable delimitation on agency rendered observable by degrees of freedom of 
interest-maximizing behaviour. In the latter, power is an accelerator, not a brake 
on agency. Market/power, in other words, begins from the premise that the 
essential character of market relations is (self-) governmental and its effects 
subjectivating. This is not, to be sure, like brainwashing: car buyers almost 
invariably find their inferiority irksome; some even scheme against it, as SN and 
WH successfully did in Chapter Four. But when all is said and signed, the 
experience of inferiority unlocks economic reason; it is the most effective mirror 
in which to see oneself as an economizing subject. The buyer therefore does not 
react to government; she is constituted by it. The disentangling moment, the 
culmination and highest expression of this constitution, does not transcend 
inferiority, it merely rephrases it in quasi-formal terms. 
A Primer on Micro- and Macro-Physics 
But we are perhaps getting ahead of ourselves; until we have a better grasp of the 
parameters of Foucault's analytic, we cannot unlock anything. 
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At its core, Foucault's contribution to power lies not in the implied 
emphasis on authority, less still in any novel reinterpretation thereof, but in his 
focus on its techniques. What is historically distinct about modem power, he 
argued in Discipline and Punish ([1975] 1977, henceforth D&P), is the ubiquity of 
discipline: unlike in pre-modern societies, where subjects tended to observe the 
power of the sovereign only periodically in grand spectacles, disciplinary 
methods strive to exert perpetual effects. They do this by directing the 
physicality of actions. They take the body, in other words, as the primary object, 
treating it not 
en masse, 'wholesale,' as if it were an indissociable 
unity, but ... working it 'retail,' 
individually ... exercising upon it a subtle coercion 
[and] obtaining holds upon it at the level of the 
mechanism itself- movements, gestures, attitudes, 
rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body 
(1977: 137). 
This consummate attention to the minutiae of action represents a micro-physics of 
power, "a certain mode of detailed political investment of the body" (1977: 139) 
which became commonplace from the Eighteenth century o~wards, spreading 
from prisons to factories, schools, barracks, hospitals and vice-versa. Foucault's 
examples are humble but substantial: the "meticulous meshing" of a soldier's 
gestures to the operational specifics of a weapon (1977: 153); the veritable 
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"gymnastics" required for pupils to learn correct handwriting (1977: 152); the 
methodical, uninterrupted order brought to bear on plague-stricken citizens 
(1977: 195-7). All these exemplify an imposition of rhythms from without, ideally 
sustaining upon its imprint an automatic succession of actions from within (1977: 
151-2). Those who dreamed, trumpeted and instituted these disciplines were 
thus guided by a double promise: the promise of a population of useful but 
docile bodies (1977: 138), full of improvable aptitudes yet willing to participate in 
regimes of dressage, hopefully accepting them as beneficial. 
There are three corollaries that are helpful for thinking about market/ 
power. Firstly, "[ d]iscipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific technique of a 
power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise" 
(1977: 170). Discipline, that is, is a "power [that] passes through individuals" 
([1976] 2003: 29), for which reason the hammer or fist are inappropriate 
metaphors. Electricity is far more apt, connoting a circulation or current that 
shocks subjects into action. Attitudes, dispositions and potentialities are hence 
endogenous to power; they are not nurtured in some sheltered corner of lived 
experience, to be subsequently deployed in pursuit of power or against it. They 
are power's direct effects, forged in the crucible of authority. 
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Secondly, discipline entails organization not simply in the sense of 
authority, but also time (i.e. the intensive use of timetables) and space (i.e. the 
strategic use of architecture). The ideal with respect to the latter is Jeremy 
Bentham's Panopticon, a prison configured as a perfectly lit ring of cells 
surrounding an unlit observation tower. The arrangement maximizes both 11axial 
visibility" and "lateral invisibility" (1977: 200): the gaze from the tower can be as 
macro- or microscopic as needed, while inmates see neither their minders nor, to 
the detriment of sedition, each other. The scheme moreover "automatizes and 
disindividualizes power," for the quantities and qualities of guards are 
superfluous in the final instance. What really counts is the inmate's "anxious 
awareness of being observed. . .. He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and 
who knows it," so the logic goes, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he 
makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he 
inscribes in himself the power relation in which he 
simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the 
principle of his own subjection (1977: 202-3). 
The Panopticon, in short, promises self-normalization entirely by architectural 
means. Prisoners are literally forced to observe and censure themselves, the dark 
infinity of the all-surveying eye reflecting images of their own souls. Taken to its 
logical extreme, the Panopticon is really an Autopticon. 
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Lastly, power is synonymous with knowledge, which is to say disciplinary 
regimes construe the governed as objects of knowledge. Take the examination, 
perhaps the disciplinary institution par excellence, which differentiates and ranks 
all the while establishing a scale of adequacy, a single "normalizing gaze [that] 
makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish" (1977: 184). The examiner, 
be she a doctor or teacher, comes to carve a niche of authority, "a whole field of 
knowledge ... destined and reserved for [her]" (1977: 186-7), while the examinee 
comes to know himself "in his own particularity." This particularity is hardly a 
reflection of the examinee's uniqueness (1977: 191-2), but is, let us not forget, an 
inherently comparative identity implicated in the elaboration of human 
topologies: the tracing, that is, of variations and ranges in 'being' - from 
excellent to poor, good to bad, normal to abnormal - upon which all 
administration is predicated. So goes the maxim, 'Knowledge is power.' 
These three corollaries are nevertheless not entirely unproblematic, the 
second particularly so. Basically, Foucault implied in D&P that the 
organizational potential of discipline is strongest when enclosed: prisons, 
barracks and factories are archetypal sites precisely because they have been 
framed from the outside world. An auto showroom, by contrast, violates this 
condition by a handsome margin, as do a great many other sales environments 
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predicated on freedoms of entry and exit. It is perhaps for this reason that so 
much neo-Foucauldian economic research is located within more or less formal 
organizations, problematizing discipline via accountability (e.g. McKinlay & 
Starkley, 1998; P. Miller, 1994; Winiecki, 2007). This line of research could 
comfortably encompass car sales, where discipline is far more conspicuous with 
respect to salespeople, not customers. Chandler Phillips' (2001: 4) expose of a 
high volume dealership, for instance, paints a picture of hierarchical surveillance 
not unlike a Panopticon: 
We sold new cars on our side of the building, and 
used cars were on the other side. In each of the front 
comers of the building were the new and used car 
'towers.' These glassed-in offices were restricted to 
employees. Inside was a raised platform where the 
sales managers sat. When you went into one of 
[them], you found yourself behind a high counter, 
looking up at your bosses, like being in a courtroom or 
a police station. The sales managers are sometimes 
referred to as 'the desk.' Salespeople would say, 'You 
have to clear that deal with the desk.' Or, 'Who's on 
the desk today?' 
This constant gaze, contrary to popular lore, is all but indifferent to buyers, who 
are generally looked upon as no better than fodder or throughput. The sole 
objects of measurement and motivation, alleges Phillips (2001: 5), are employees, 
who are as weary of the dealer environment as the customers they serve: 
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What the customer didn't realize was that the poor car 
salesman or woman was not really the enemy. The 
real enemy was the manager sitting in the sales tower 
cracking the whip. . .. So that's why the car salespeople 
stick like glue to customers. Their fear of ... managers 
is greater than their fear of offending the customers.1 
How then is an institutionally open analysis of market/power possible? 
How can we speak of buyers - not sellers - as governed if their confinement to 
sales spaces is fleeting at best? The rudiments of the analytical shift from intra- to 
extramurality are plain enough in D&P. Foucault, from the beginning, took an 
expansive view on the disciplines: he expressly noted at one point, "discipline 
sometimes requires enclosure," and spoke elsewhere of their tendency "to become 
'de-institutionalized,"' as when Christian schools started supervising pupils' 
parents, or when the hospital came to be conceived "as a base for the medical 
observation of the population outside ... " (1977: 141, 211-2, emphasis added). 
These scattered references, however, amount to little more than an oblique 
suggestion of a wider framework of power. It was not until the biopower lectures 
of 1978 (2007) and -9 (2008), when Foucault started mentioning government by 
name, that an extramural imperative took shape. Very briefly put, he sought in 
these lectures to problematize the historicity of government, to trace the rise of a 
1 Car dealers in general take surveillance of their assets seriously: as Sandy Liguori (201 lg) notes, 
"it's not uncommon for a modern dealership to have more than 100 surveillance cameras 
monitoring activity inside and outside ... 24 hours, seven days a week, 365 days a year." 
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new art of government circa the Eighteenth century breaking with the principle 
of sovereignty: no longer would the reason of State be intrinsic to itself (i.e. no 
more would its sole purpose be to perpetuate sovereignty); its concern henceforth 
would lie with the maximization of forces of living, productive populations, be 
they students, wage-earners or a nation. One of the chief drivers of this new 
governmentality was the political-economic' discovery' of the irreducibility of 
society itself, which was purported to possesses "a complex and independent 
reality [with] its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as 
its possibilities of disturbance" ([1982] 2000c: 352). The prerogative of a 
governor, as such, is not to penetrate the ontologies of his subjects, but to know 
and frame these ontologies. His artfulness is less a matter of leading subjects 
directly as 'conducting their conducts' or, as alluded to earlier, of "operat[ing] on 
the field of possibilities in which the behaviour of active subjects is able to 
inscribe itself" (2000d: 341). The history of expansion of the modem State is thus 
written not in terms of society's etatization, (2007: 109), but rather the State's own 
governmentalization, the piecemeal but continuous identification of disciplinary 
mechanisms and technologies as its own (2000d: 345; 2008: 77). 
In short, with biopower Foucault finally made good on the promise to 
deliver "a generalizable ... way of defining power relations" (1977: 205). We begin 
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to discern a more or less continuous line of conceptualization from the disciplines 
to biopolitics, the latter's dream of administering life itself breathing fire into the 
extension of regimes of training throughout the modem Western body politic 
(2007: 107). The idea of government is, of course, the analytical lynchpin: it is the 
shuttle linking micro- and macro-physical histories; the door by which to exit or 
re-enter disciplinary enclosures; the archetype of all relations of power. 
Just how successful is Foucault's analytic of power overall? How well 
does it capture a free-floating power exercised through and by mobile subjects? 
Greg Elmer (2003: 234-5) is not totally convinced, feeling the image of the 
enclosure dominates still. This may in tum cast doubt on the sociological 
appropriateness of Foucault's historical approach, something Steven Lukes, 
himself a formidable student of power, strongly believes. Lukes (2005: 93) finds 
that Foucault's image of disciplinary society ~'conveys a one-sided, monolithic 
image of unidirectional control." He goes on to accuse Foucault of overindulging 
in idealized forms of discipline, thereby violating the cardinal Weberian 
injunction to put them to an empirical test (2005: 93, 158n23). Foucault was 
merely "a genealogist," he observes, "concerned with the historical recovery of 
the formation of norms ... and as such ... had no interest in ... examining variation, 
outcomes and effects: he just asserted that there were such effects" (2005: 98). At 
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best, Foucault only "begin[s] to explore subtle forms of the securing of willing 
compliance" (2005: 106). 
Such a critique, though pointlessly pugilistic, points rightly nonetheless to 
the pitfalls of too literal or mechanistic a reading of Foucault in general and D&P 
in particular. If all we do is modify his intramural categories to this or that 
extramural context, we risk routing our efforts in one of two equally 
uninteresting directions: either we strain to find some correspondence between 
intra- and extramurality, a false difference in degree or form, or we end up 
embellishing the tautology that the difference is, in fact, in kind. Take Ashlee 
Humphrey's (2006) translation of the Panopticon to on-line shopping, which 
unfortunately manages to rut itself in both directions: she claims on the one 
hand that prisoners, patients and pupils are "uncannily applicable to the domain 
of consumer behaviour" (2006: 308), yet her analysis is riddled with qualifications 
acknowledging that the consummate judging of disciplinary regimes "is a step 
removed" from the consummate profiling of e-marketing (2006: 301, also cf. 300, 
303, 305). Humphreys perhaps should have taken heed of Foucault's (2000d: 342-
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3) own warning that it is folly to extrapolate from intramural settings armed only 
with the concepts and categories found therein.2 
All of this is to say, rather than judging Foucauldian thought as either 
supremely impotent or full of potential to model the human condition, we should 
see it as an invitation to push or even transcend it, one which Gilles Deleuze 
([1990] 1992) gladly accepted in a short adieu to Foucault. According to Deleuze, 
we have passed into an era of socio-political order characterized no longer by 
discipline, but control. The difference being, whereas disciplinary spaces are 
analogical, veritably moulds of each other, control implies /1 a modulation, like a 
self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other, 
or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to point" (1992: 4, italics in 
original). In Deleuze's pithy articulation of control- a term which, Alain 
Beaulieu (2005: xiii) rightly notes, Foucault used infrequently - we finally have a 
way of thinking about power that breaks the constraints of architecture (Elmer, 
2003: 239, 241-2; Marks, 1994: 98). The disciplines enclosed subjects for a lifetime, 
but discontinuously so (1992: 6), requiring them always to begin again, "from 
2 This sort of re-working of the Panopticon is not without precedent in the neo-Foucauldian 
literature (e.g. Fiske, 1993: 85). Quite aside from intra-/ extramural quagmire I raise, Elmer (2003: 
232-3, emphasis in original) takes these revisions to task for misreading the importance of 
Panopticon, which derives its effects not from observation - Humphreys (2006: 302, 304) claims 
that "scopophilia" sustains the e-Panopticon - but "from the architectural arrangement of light 
which suggests panoptic surveillance" (also cl. Foucault, [1977] 1980b: 148). 
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school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory" (1992: 5). Thanks 
however to the computerized metrology- autopoietic and ceaseless - regimes of 
control put the onus on subjects to subject themselves, providing techniques to 
modulate one's own care, but never turn it off. Thus education is replaced by 
permanent training (1992: 5); the finite gradations of a pay-scale by seemingly 
limitless schemes of bonuses and incentives (1992: 4); physical presence in 
regulated spaces by regulation of debt (1992: 6). If the animal symbolizing the 
disciplines is a mole, it is the serpent that carries the banner of control (1992: 5). 
Deleuze, of course, was not alone to tinker with Foucault's categories of 
power. Right around the same time, Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (1990: 9, 2, 
italics in original) set about revising governmentality to mean "government at a 
distance" - an adaptation and, if I do say so, improvement on Latour's (cf. 1987: 
219-32) "action at a distance" concept3- characterized by "the self-regulating 
capacities of subjects, [who have been] shaped and normalized in large part 
through the powers of expertise." Or as Rose summed it up elsewhere (1999: 
154), the key vectors of advanced liberal governmentality are /1 autonomization 
plus responsibilization." Like Deleuze then, Miller and Rose are trying to blow 
3 Latour (1987: 191) first mentions "action at a distance" in conjunction with the Seventeenth 
century debates on - and really as a metaphor for - gravity. In subsequent writings Latour drops 
the phrase in favour of a single-word term, translation, referring to the process of linking actants 
to form viable networks of action (2005: 108). 
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the 'traditional' Foucauldian limits on power's currency: they envision a 
thoroughly mobilized theatre of power, lodged squarely inside the heads of 
subjects, shoehorned there by a range of techniques and technologies. 
This insight puts us in good stead to advance a political phenomenology 
of markets, setting out, as I see it, two epistemological guidelines. Firstly, we are 
not dealing with the power of indoctrination or ideological discipline, as if 
markets possess some blanket logic determining experiences from the outset. 
Market/ power needs instead to be understood as a rhizomic authority embodied 
in devices and discursivities alike, a "technology of thought" (P. Miller & Rose, 
1990: 5) lending itself to variable justifications of truth and praxis. In essence, all 
the putatively disentangling entanglements described in previous chapters, from 
car reviews to woman-certification, are instances of market/power. These 
devices, I hope I sufficiently demonstrated, do not predispose buyers to think or 
act a certain way, but they do conjure possibilities of action; they organize, that is, 
a context or basis for experience to which buyers seemingly must orient. 
In which case - and this is the second guideline - more than a little care 
needs to be observed specifying the context involved. We are, no doubt, dealing 
with a political context or' theatre,' but in what sense is it political? Government-
. at-a-distance, as a phrase, evokes a master animating puppets by invisible strings 
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and gears, an image raising the spectre of desires and calculativities being 
manufactured by large corporate interests. That sort of political critique, 
implying passive consumers and a penetrative marketing behemoth in the final 
instance, will not do. It fails, as Michael Shaoul (1997: 74) reminds us, "to 
perceive ... power [as] a relational[ly] multidirectional phenomenon," no matter 
how often or eloquently it may be asserted consumers are not dupes. So while 
market/power's political moment may not be 'real' (i.e. consumers are not 
literally controlled by commerce at large) it just might be "irreal," a curious term 
Rose (1999: 32) uses to convey the technical or material sub-structures of lived 
experience (cf. Goodman, 1978; Hacking, 1988). Government is therefore 
rendered present not by the relation between or among actors, but the relation of 
an actor to a device: control "becomes real," to paraphrase Rose (1999: 32), "by 
harnessing itself to a practice of inscription, calculation and action." This does 
not imply that flesh-and-blood governors disappear or that devices exercise 
authority autopoietically. It suggests rather an interesting mediation between 
governors and governed, an ambiguous estrangement - but never elision - of one 
from the other. 
It seems to me the more rewarding program of research points towards an 
interrogation of irreality, or basically a problematization of mediation: what are 
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the devices involved, how do they work and how do the governed orient to 
them? And perhaps most importantly, who or what exactly governs this 
process? Allow me then in the remainder of this chapter to begin addressing 
these questions by honing in on the uneven topographies of control wrought by 
calculativity: its strategies, justifications and unanticipated reversals of fortunes. 
What is at stake is nothing less than a form of government that is to market action 
as DNA is to life. 
Games of Irreal Government 
But again, I am getting ahead of myself. All of this may sound nice, but how are 
we to see the government embedded in market devices? What is irreality' s point 
of empirical entry? The answer is oppositionality: if, as I am alleging, the 
proliferation of car-buying devices constitutes an ensemble of control, then we 
should be able to discern in them the thread of some underlying 11 system of 
differentiations;" power, after all, cannot exist otherwise (Foucault, 2000d: 344). 
Decidedly, these are not oppositions characterized by conveniently observable, 
openly antagonistic relations (e.g. over-zealous sellers versus naive buyers), but 
take rather a more subtle, ambiguous operational form: an 11 antagonism of 
strategies" Foucault (2000d: 329) called it, a juxtaposition of latently conflicting 
interests within manifestly unified calculativities. We cannot, as such, take the 
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promise of devices to create 'communities' of calculative affinity at face value; 
declarations of this sort should not merely be met with scepticism, they should 
send us scrambling to trace the fault lines that are likely spreading 
surreptitiously but in plain sight throughout these brave new actor-worlds. 
As luck would have it, the retail car business is rife with such triumphal 
proclamations. "Knowledge is power," writes Terry O'Keefe (2012: 1, italics in 
original) of OMVIC, Ontario's auto sales regulator, "and knowledgeable 
consumers are good for business." Indeed, he continues, a different mindset is 
currently taking root in auto sales: 
[M]ore and more it is understood that a 
knowledgeable customer is the route to a successful 
and positive trans-action. Transparency reduces 
stress. Customers who know what to expect from a 
dealer's advertising and disclosures [and] who have 
realistic ideas about what a vehicle should cost ... may 
actually be the customers who are most forthright and 
who are genuinely seeking a fair deal for both 
themselves and the dealer. 
What O'Keefe is describing here is nothing shy of a paradigm-shift aimed at 
establishing levels of "[t]ransparency" hitherto unknown. Buyers, according to 
this new way, can no longer be considered semi-literate walking chequebooks; a 
successful transaction now demands they be treated as capable commercial 
partners with every right to relevant technico-pecuniary information. "The age 
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of the savvy, well-informed car shopper is here to stay," prophesizes Sandy 
Liguori (2012a), past president of the Toronto area dealers association. "When 
customers are sufficiently informed about their options," he enthuses (201 lb), 
"they make better decisions." GM Canada President Kevin Williams is even more 
bullish: "The customer is the CEO" (quoted in Van Alphen, 2011b). Where, in 
short, marketing was traditionally predicated on differentiable consumers, 
current marketing wisdom sees only pseudo-producers or prosumers (for a critical 
etymology of the term, cf. Zwick et al, 2008: 164-7, 186-7n2-3). 
As far as can be determined in Liguori's editorials and those of his 
successor Frank Romeo, such ebullience is attributable to three market devices. 
The first, not surprisingly, consists of third-party e-utilities: "Thanks to 
technological innovations, consumers now have access to thousands of credible 
sources to help them make informed buying decisions" (Romeo, 2012£). One of 
the more transformative tools, notes Romeo (2012b), is CarProof, a service 
launched in 2000 providing vehicle insurance and registration histories to anyone 
with an internet connection, vehicle ID number {VIN) and credit card. De rigueur 
in second-hand transactions today, such information was in the past privy only 
to dealers in a form that was not nearly as comprehensive. 
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The second corresponds to transformations in sales space and praxis. 
"Today's facilities," Liguori (2011e) opines, "are architectural wonders compared 
to the modest facilities that were built decades ago." Dealerships are becoming 
"state-of-the-art extensions of the brand, complete with natural lighting, in-house 
cafes, boutique-style parts departments and drive-through service bays - all 
geared toward the needs of today's consumers" (Liguori, 201 lf). Alongside these 
changes, dealers have "jacked up the size of [their] workforce and armed them 
with the tools to win customers- and keep them" (Van Alphen, 2011b). Many of 
these tools are as plain as they are precise: a strategic arrangement of well-
stocked umbrella stands can, we are told, win the battle for hearts and minds. 
The third device represents perhaps the grandest of market triumphs: 
dealer self-regulation, which in this province is embodied by the aforementioned 
Ontario Motor Vehicle Industry Council (OMVIC). The council's mandate, 
defined by a provincial act (the MVDA of 2002), reads like a veritable market 
manifesto: OMVIC is to "maintain a fair, safe and informed marketplace in 
Ontario by protecting the rights of consumers, enhancing industry 
professionalism and ensuring fair, honest and open competition for registered 
motor vehicle dealers" (quoted in Romeo, 2012d). And as we saw in the 
Orangeville Mazda fiasco in Chapter Five, OMVIC has real juridical teeth, a fact 
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which, according to Liguori (2011a), has made "the retail automobile sector ... one 
of the most heavily regulated industries in Canada" (also cf. 201ld; 2012c; 2012b; 
2012e). 
Taken as a whole, these devices have made possible an era of post-
antagonistic sales, an attenuation of market power itself as harder, narrower 
limits now exist on sellers' agencies. The "pushy deal-making" of yesteryear has 
been finally transcended (Liguori, 2011a; 2012e), along with all those attitudes 
and practices responsible for "creat[ing] more than one generation of cynical 
customers looking for trust anywhere" (Van Alphen, 201 lb). To this still-weary 
public, Liguori (2011e) offers the following "straight advice: Get to know your 
dealership and its staff. After all," he adds, 
these folks are your mothers, fathers, siblings, 
neighbours and friends. These trained professionals 
know your vehicle better than anyone, and their 
primary mandate is to look after you, the customer . 
. . . The automotive expertise found within a dealership 
is aimed squarely at making your car-buying 
experience as pleasant as possible. 
"Relationships," that is to say, "are the heart and soul of most successful 
businesses and dealerships are no exception" (Liguori, 2012d; also 201 lb, in 
which the more telling phrase, "a trusting relationship," is used). Relationship-
formation is as critical a factor as pricing, if not more, for how are buyers to make 
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informed decisions without personalized guidance in the first place (Liguori, 
2011c)? Romeo (2012e) makes a similar observation: salespeople have become 
"vital" allies for buyers, who today risk "information overload." Salespeople 
mitigate "paralysis and confusion" by "help[ing] analyze the facts and reviews 
and explain the incentives, options and features that are available." 
Put otherwise, outright buyer-seller antinomy has given way to pseudo-
pedagogy, something I experienced firsthand when a salesman I was hoping to 
interview informed me, with pride no less, he is actually a consultant (Romeo 
[2012c] calls salespeople "facilitator[s]"). In that regard, the spirit of openness 
fostered by the above-mentioned devices goes further than simply compelling 
sellers to disclose pertinent information. They work also to make buyers 
themselves 'open,' rendering their experiences knowable and actionable in their 
entirety. As Romeo (2012a, italics added) explains, every moment of buyer-seller 
interaction is a teachable moment, an invaluable opportunity to imprint or 
embody a buyer's experience: "In my opinion, a great dealership experience 
encompasses all points of contact between dealership personnel and the customer, 
including the initial greeting ... the sales process, vehicle delivery experience, 
complaint handling, and after delivery follow-up." In addition to this intensive 
attention to experience, there is, of course, the entire metrological dimension of 
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the transaction: buyers' opinions are solicited, tabulated and interpreted in ever 
finer detail, the ultimate goal of which is, quite literally, to capture these opinions 
as strategic assets. The Ford Flex crossover, for example, may sell comparatively 
few exemplars, but it is valuable nonetheless, representing, in Ford marketing-
speak, a top "'conquest' model" boasting the highest proportion of first-time 
Ford owners across the sales line-up (Kenzie, 2012b). The message I think is 
clear: moving cars off the sales lot is merely a means to an end, namely, the 
immersion of buyers in metrologically mediated relationships, be they with the 
dealer or brand, which come to impose a kind of infrastructure on their sovereign 
choices. 
So while antagonism may no longer characterize buyer-car-seller nexus, 
agonism is alive and well: sellers may not be looking to fleece buyers, but there 
remains an irreconcilability of interests belying the rhetorical implication of 
collaboration (on agonism as constitutive of political action, cf. Foucault, 2000d: 
342-3, 348n3; Mouffe, 2005: 19-21). The interviews are full of invocations of 
games, dances and the like, all of which speak to the agonistic nature of the 
purchasing experience. These are not games, to be clear, in the game-theoretical 
sense of the term: they do not refer to situations of mutually oriented, but always 
economizing courses of action yielding statistical models of outcomes. 'Game' 
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denotes instead an instrumentality of performance, a tacit understanding the 
encounter consists of a play of malleable, if not artificial representations. SN and 
WH obviously treated the whole of their acquisition as a game - audaciously at 
that. But for the most part, the game is perpetrated against the buyer, 
engendering in her an uneasy but unverifiable sensation that something is 
happening to her, not for her. 
These games, I want to emphasize, correspond to techniques of 
government, one of the more important of which was already flagged by Liguori: 
his much touted "trusting relationship." HR, whose latest car is an Audi 54 sport 
sedan, used to have a relationship with his local GM dealer, but eventually came 
to see his loyalty for what it truly was: an uncomfortable "game" to serialize his 
business: 
HR: [My last GM vehicle] went off-lease, and every 
time it had gone off-lease before, General Motors had 
this really nice way of telling you that, you know, 
uh, 'We'll do lots for you!' 'We will give you $1000 
against - because you've been such a great customer 
-$1000 off the new vehicle.' 'We'll give you this, 
we'll give you that;' and uh, 'We'll make it painless 
for you, because you' re already our customer; you 
already have a lease with GMC.' And it's very simple 
to just switch it over and carry on with a brand new 
car. Well, the last time this happened, and it got me 
into a Trailblazer. Um, I had no intention of buying 
a SUV, but once I drove it, I thought, 'OK,' and 
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depending upon one's circumstances, you sort of -
this was the least painless way of getting into a new 
car at the time. I then made the decision I wanted to 
break with General Motors, and I ended up buying 
[the Trail-blazer] off the lease at the end, at great 
expense-
MV: OK, yeah I can imagine-
HR: Because everything had to be fixed to the point 
where, you know, it was like a pristine automobile 
again. And on top of that, when I bought the 
Audi .. .I traded [the Trailblazer] in ... so I was willing 
to, sort of, accept less than what the car was worth to 
me, just to get away from this constant - what do 
you do call it - like a turnover of lease, from lease to 
lease to lease. This is why I ended up buying the 
[Trailblazer] and financing it for a short time .. .I did 
it to get freedom! [Laughs, along with MV.] ... But [for 
sure] the biggest thing that I noticed over the last few 
years ... was this little game they play ... to make it so 
encouraging- so convenient to simply roll [the lease] 
over to another one. And it shouldn't be that way! 
For HR trust has scarcely anything to do with "longstanding friendships, similar 
experiences, common dependencies ... [or] active creation of new social relations" 
(Granovetter & McGuire, 1998: 166-7). Trust feels rather like, in a word, 
unfreedom, a distinctly demeaning deference to the familiar chiefly to the 
dealer's benefit. And though only an implicit dependence, breaking it 
nevertheless required very explicit effort at, HR reminds us, "great expense." 
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The other anthroponomic game I heard lots about was the annoying ritual 
at the transaction's climax whereby the salesman shuffles to and fro between the 
buyer and his superior(s). What is so galling about this game is its patent 
absurdity, coming across as a cheap, transparent trick to dictate the financial 
negotiation: the salesman leaves periodically, only to return with new conditions 
to which the buyer must respond (choice sales phrases like, "I have to go in and 
talk to my manager" or "Oh yeah, let me just go upstairs" are, according to BJ and 
DG, common opening gambits in this game). Yet this "dance," which DG says is 
the root of so much distrust, was oddly recounted as empowering by others: the 
cynicism with which they spoke of its artificiality strongly implies, it seems to 
me, pride at having seen through it, a minor but thoroughly gratifying victory 
against a well-tuned sales machine. In MP' s words: 
And so [at the end], you know, he did his typical thing 
- 'I'll have to see' - and he goes in, and it's all glass 
offices so I can see to the third room down and, you 
know, he's just BS-ing the appearance he's talking with 
the guy. And he comes back and he says, 'Well, 
something, something' and he, you know, he made it 
look like it didn't work and he put out his hand and he 
said, [In a hoarse voice.] 'You got yourself a car!' ... And 
they do that thing. Nothing surprised me and, you 
know, he said, 'It's because you' re the first [sale] of the 
day' or something ... ! [T]he first sale of the day at one 
in the afternoon? That seemed odd. 
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DW likewise read her salesman's antics like a book: 
DW: [The salesman] basically said, 'I'll need to go talk 
to' whoever it is they go talk to when he leaves. I'm 
pretty sure they just walk around the comer and just 
stand there for a few minutes by themselves-
MV: [Laughs.] 
vw: [They] play with their phone or something. So, 
he came and he said, 'Well, we looked at your car 
[i.e. vw's trade-in] and we can offer you' - I think it 
was, they ended up offering me, initially, $2000 for 
it, and I was like,' Are you kidding me?' ... So I did 
talk them up; they gave me three-grand as a trade-in 
for it. 
MV: OK, so did they, did they relent after you-
vw: There was negotiation! [She chuckles.] There was a 
lot of, 'Oh I have to go back now and talk to that guy.' 
... Um, I would say that happened maybe three 
times. 
CV and his partner AA were subjected to the same treatment when they 
acquired a new Fiat 500 subcompact. In the transcript below CV, himself a 
salesperson (but not automotive), admits the game really is poppycock. But he 
also points out that it serves a purpose beyond insulting the buyer's intelligence. 
It is meant, confirms AA, to keep the buyer "realistic:" 
cv: Now that I'm doing sales myself, like when I'm 
talking to a customer, I'm like, 'Yeah, yeah, just give 
me your number, you know, of what you want to 
pay, and I'll take this to finance and I'm going battle 
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on your behalf' - type-thing - 'and I'll come back.' I 
hang up the phone, I crunch the numbers - we don't 
have a finance department-
MV: [Laughs heartedly.] 
cv: I crunch the numbers myself ... and I know what'll 
win the deal. So I'm talking to the customer directly; 
[the bosses] don't know who the customer is, and the 
rapport you have with them and stuff, so what will 
actually win the deal. And I think maybe that might 
have been going on [with our Chrysler salesman]. 
Like, he's given a range; he goes around the corner 
to the coffee room for a second, writes down another 
number and comes back. So I'm kind of sceptical of 
the whole process. 
AA: [The salesman] makes it seem like he's not making 
the decisions; he's just the go-between. 
MV: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, y-yeah-
AA: Yeah. Whether or not that's the case, we don't 
really know. But he's saying, you know, he's being 
realistic, he's saying,' You know what, I think you 
have to move this amount in order for them to say 
yes. You know, I'll take this back to them, but 
they're probably going to come back with this.' So 
he's like, he's like being as realistic as-
cv: Either it's a really, like, shady process or it's a 
really-
AA: Upfront?-
cv: Black-and-white process. Yeah. 
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I like AA and cv's allusion to the game's duality, this inability to 
distinguish between its "shady," possibly abusive artifice and its "[ u ]pfront," 
deal-making virtue. It is as if they are saying this: the basis of the transaction 
consists of a relationship whose basic parameter is equality insofar as transactors 
enjoy a "rapport." Of the two however, the salesman possesses the superior 
calculative agency- only he knows "what will actually win the deal" - which 
makes for a precarious situation: the buyer cannot always be counted on to see 
reason (viz. how much "to move" to secure a deal), while the salesman cannot 
openly impose his calculativity, which risks breaking the condition of equality. 
The salesman hence resolves the tension by importing a higher level of authority 
to the relationship- the discretion of the sales manager. In effect, he governs by 
proxy by invoking the distant, but pointed scrutiny of "that guy," who may or 
may not reveal himself in the denouement of the deal. This game, in short, along 
with all the other devices described above, lays bare the central truth that car 
buyers are never beyond the pale of government. 
Entanglement with the Self 
In lieu of a conclusion neatly summarizing the ubiquity and importance of 
government, I want to close by acknowledging I have avoided, purposely I 
admit, one of the central questions posed earlier: across all these instances of 
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irreal, mediated government, who governs the buyer? The answer, if we think hard 
about it, is variable. Sometimes, as just described, it is the salesman who 
furtively creates and seizes the opportunity to demonstrate economic reason. 
Sometimes, if things get complex or go awry, the sales manager may step out of 
the shadows to oversee the buyer's tutelage personally (see L]'s story in the next 
chapter). I suppose there is even an argument to be made that marketers, by 
measuring buyers' courses of action, play an important role governing buyer's 
calculativities. Assuming, however, a smooth transaction free of overt conflict, I 
would like to suggest there is another master whose authority trumps the 
marketer, manager and his minions: the buyer herself. 
Self-government here, to belabour the point, has nothing to do with the 
buyer's liberation from power, as if her invidious technico-pecuniary capacities 
no longer have to stand exposed against a profit-hungry calculative behemoth. 
To the contrary, self-government has everything to do with her attachment to 
power: the first effect of all the facts and figures, techniques and technologies, 
and games and umbrella stands she encounters - devices which coat the walls of 
her calculations like so many layers of uneven paper - is to plunge her deeper 
into the behemoth. Thus the proliferation of devices does not overload her 
calculative capacities so much as amplify her appreciation of the latter in the first 
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place. Increasingly entangled in a relationship with herself, she becomes a 
bifurcated subject, both student and sergeant to the minutiae, intricacies and 
formalities of calculation. This internal bifurcation - this distinctively 
Escheresque form of entanglement - is, I think, evident in HD' s testimony in the 
previous chapter: he does not simply profess inferiority, he does so 
instrumentally, strategically, reasonably. Moving forward to the next chapter, I 
hope to demonstrate that this relation of self-control, -training, -flagellation or 
whatever we wish to call it, is written in largely quasi-formal, disentangling 
logic. Disentanglement, in other words, is borne of this highly powerful - and 
power-full - entanglement, namely that with the self. 
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Chapter Seven 
Disentangled Enlightenment 
SOMEWHERE NEAR THE START OF CHAPTER FIVE I made a rather glib remark to the 
effect that power is the ultimate entanglement because it destroys all memory of 
itself; I called this, 0 amnesia of genesis," borrowing from Bourdieu (2005: 5). 
Then in the last sentence of the preceding chapter I ostensibly qualified this by 
saying only a particular kind of power triggers this amnesic movement - the 
entanglement with the self. I want to connect these two statements in this, the 
final chapter, thereby fulfilling my central promise of demonstrating a different 
conceptual relationship between entanglement and disentanglement. 
We can begin articulating this difference by briefly revisiting the standard 
ANT conceptions of disentanglement and economization. For Callon (cf. 1998a: 
15-9; Callon et al, 2002: 197-8), the former refers to the moment of detachment of a 
thing from its habitual entanglements for the purposes of knowing and acting on 
it as an alienable, fungible object of market activity. Comparison shopping is 
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perhaps the most obvious example: similar goods from different suppliers, each 
an idiosyncratic, potentially unfathomable product of its supplier-world, are 
beheld and evaluated in the buyer's calculative imagination on the basis of a 
handful of criteria, if not one: price. This act of contextual shearing economizes, 
rendering economy present, in a double sense. Firstly from a microsocial 
perspective, it puts into action variable means-ends orientations (viz. minimum 
cost for maximum gain), which vary insofar as calculativities are formatted and 
distributed differentially. Secondly and macrosocially, the sum total of 
calculative interactions helps to establish an entire institutional realm - an 
economy writ large - of market relationships, circulating commodities and 
mobile values. Devices are the lifeblood of this duality, facilitating calculation 
and, by extension, movement of marketable things. In brief, Callon' s portrait of 
economization is of an ongoing, real-time process of socialization dependent on 
the quantities and qualities of the devices and, Bourdieu might have added, 
capitals at hand.1 
Based however on the data here, I would say something is sorely missing 
from this portrait, namely issues of government, an omission begging the larger 
question, how does power change our understanding of economization? Above all, I 
1 I thank Brian Singer for helping me see this duality. 
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want to show in the pages to come that the entanglement with the self revises, 
but does not vitiate disentanglement. That may appear to contradict everything I 
have written until now; have I not, one may ask, sought to belie the vacuity of the 
"Pure Logic of Choice" (Hayek, 1948: 85) implicit in Callon's analysis? Indeed I 
have, but if truth be told, _themes of dispositional purity are prevalent in the 
interviews; something approximating a strictly number-driven logic is, at any 
rate, evident in the cases below and need to be accounted for. In dissecting these 
power-laden paths to disentanglement, I want the reader to see- and this is the 
crux of the difference of I spoke of earlier - that they have nothing to do with 
calculation in the final instance. 
Responsibilization 
But let us not plunge headlong into disentanglement's a-calculative moment. Let 
us instead approach it from another, neo-Foucauldian angle: responsibilization. 
Foucault's (2010) first lecture of 1983, his penultimate year of life, centred 
on Immanuel Kant's 1784 essay, 'What Is Enlightenment?' ('Was Ist Aufklii.rung?'). 
Kant understood the Enlightenment as humanity's exit (Aus gang) from a state of 
self-incurred tutelage (Ummiindigkeit or minorite in French), such that to the 
question, what is distinct about the age of Enlightenment? Kant responded with the 
profound yet equally empty answer, movement towards Enlightenment (cf. 
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Foucault, 2010: 37)! We need not delve too deeply into either Kant's text or 
Foucault's interpretation thereof. I wish simply to pick up on the following 
assertion, something Kant treated as self-evident, concerning the proper balance 
between freedom and obedience, or as Foucault (2010: 37, also 32-3, 39) put it, 
"distribution of government of self and government [by] others." 2 Basically, 
Kant said that under conditions of tutelage there is too much obedience, making 
it impossible for us, inclined as we are to laziness and cowardice (Faulheit und 
Feigheit), to use reason (Riisonnieren) to relate to one another. But even in an 
enlightened society, whereby a public sphere of universal rationality has been 
politically safeguarded, obedience is still unavoidable in the private realm, which 
Kant took to mean the family, factory, military, State and so forth. To wit, Kant 
endorses wholeheartedly the necessity of limits on reason, or rather - and this is 
our point of departure - there can be no reason without some asymmetry of 
relations. 
Is buying a car 'enlightening?' Very much so, but that is not really saying 
much. If, following Foucault's argument, we wish to understand enlightenment 
in the context of major life purchases, we then need specifically to enquire on the 
2 The actual line is, of course, "government of self and .. . of others" ("gouvernement de soi et ... des 
autres"), but I have taken the liberty of replacing the second "of' with 'by' (i.e. 'par les autres') to 
emphasize that others are governing the subject, and not the other way around. 
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buyer's exit from tutelage. To begin with, let us recall that the acquisition, as a 
relational phenomenon, is irreal, which for our purposes means that authority is 
vested in calculation and its attendant devices rather than the persona of the 
knowledgeable seller. This condition is important because the sheer density and 
intensity of car-market devices, coupled with the buyer's relative inexperience 
with them, renders the acquisition principally an encounter between two 
agencements: the buyer who chooses, calculates and commits a pecuniary 
pledge, and- again- the buyer who ratifies everything the former does. Put 
allegorically, car-buying devices raise a screen around the buyer, the effect of 
which is not protection against sellers' potential shell games, but sensitization to 
her own calculativeness. Tutelage, as HD reminded us in Chapter Five, is 
expressed always in terms of calculative 'noise,' which may be indicative of 
uncertainty (i.e. too many unpredictable variables), but which in the accounts 
below is linked, I think, to a deeper discomposure: governmental collapse, or the 
complete superimposition of government of self with government by 
( dispositivistic) others. 
The concrete sign of this confusion is, as I have now contended more than 
once, the self-flagellation to which HD, again, tipped us off. Politically speaking, 
this represents a fascinating twist on agonism as described in Chapter Six, a 
181 
thorough decoupling of angst (e.g. feelings like "waiting to exhale," a pithy 
description courtesy TK) from oppositionality. Now I should say no one to whom 
I spoke remained oblivious, not for a minute, to the irreducibility of his or her 
interests to those of an opposite number; the frequency of references in Chapters 
Four and Six to games and perceived insincerities speaks amply to this 
recognition. Yet for the following informants, it would appear that the game of 
strategies took a backseat to a more complicated game of responsibility: part of 
the effort required to suss their opponents was reflected back onto themselves, 
turning into an introspective expenditure of, as Nietzsche ([1887] 1967: 59) put it, 
"labor ... by man upon himself." Their agony is consequently phrased not as a 
clash, but a growing pain, a seemingly necessary identification with the sales 
imperative as a prerequisite of 'smart' consumption. 
First-time buyer KA' s account succinctly encapsulates this paradoxical 
fusion of strategy and responsibility. When we last left him in Chapter Five, KA, 
flush with cash from a recent inheritance, had just blown off a "doofus" salesman 
who tried to ensnare him in a lease. The silver lining of the experience was that it 
served as a "dress rehearsal" for the next encounter with a far more amicable 
salesman who, KA believes, "had my interests - sort of, well he portrayed that -
that he had my interests at heart. Like, he knew that I had the cash and he wasn't 
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going to screw with me about the leasing and everything." But there was 
something else to this salesman's people-skills, namely an uncanny ability to 
make KA feel like a salesman himself: 
MV: Now, did you ever get the impression that any of 
these [sales] guys- that you were being managed ... ? 
KA: Well, at the time, no. I don't think that way. The 
guy who I dealt with ... was a good guy. Well, he 
was a good guy to talk to because he was - he knew 
what he was doing, in a sense of, if he was playing 
me, he knew how to do it perfect. He was a very 
good, sort of, let-you-talk-yourself-into-buying-the-car 
salesman. You know, but not like, you know, 
pushing you. He just let it happen as opposed to the 
other guy. 
KA is understandably coy with respect to being managed; no one, after all, wants 
to admit they were played. Then again, there is something nonsensically 
authentic about what he is saying: KA knows the salesman is a shark, full of 
cunning, but cannot feel the bite of his cunning; all KA senses is the weight of his 
own decision. It is not so much that the salesman's agency operated as an 
invisible hand (though I like when KA says, "He just let it happen," an opportune 
tum-of-phrase translating into French as, "Il m'a laisse faire"). Rather, I think KA 
looks upon the adroitness of his 'governor' as something to aspire to; something 
with which he must make peace in order to feel good about his choice. 
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For LJ, by contrast, the play of governmental games got so out-of-hand, it 
triggered something like full-blown Stockholm syndrome. Her acquisitional 
odyssey began at a Mazda dealership outside Toronto, where the principal dealer 
is a long-time family acquaintance. LJ had always fancied the idea of a pick-up 
truck, but believed it would prove impractical to ferrying her young nieces about, 
so she "had kind of given up on that dream" in favour of a hatchback. She was 
not taken by the latest-generation Mazda3, which left her contemplating the 
smaller Mazda2 which she liked but did not love. She went away that day 
feeling apathetic, but returned several days later determined to investigate all her 
options. This time around, the owner's son with whom she had previously dealt 
passed her off to a woman sales rep, someone LJ had never met and who clearly 
"didn't know what she was doing." LJ was miffed at first, but then something 
extraordinary happened, thanks in no small part to the saleswoman's ineptitude 
- the dream of a truck was rekindled: 
LJ: I sat down with her and we were going to pull up 
the numbers [on the Mazda2, -3 and -5], and I said, 
'Well you know, what I've always wanted is the little 
truck [i.e. the Mazda B2300.]. I test-drove one, like, 
three years; I used to borrow my old friend's, like 
years ago; I love those little mini-trucks.' And she 
said, [mocking incredulity.] 'Oh yeah, really, really, I 
can't believe you like that!' And then she said, 'Well, 
we' re not making them anymore-' 
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MV: That's right, that's right. They've discontinued 
them haven't they? 
LJ: Yeah! But she said they' re great trucks; they go 
forever .... Anyways, basically she was like, 'Well, 
I'll look into the truck too. This is what I'll do: I'll go 
upstairs and I'll give it to so-and-so and he'll run it 
through a machine, and I'll get you, you know, [She 
sighs, making sure she says the following correctly.] 72-, 
84- and 96-month terms; the run-down on the -3, the 
-5, the -2 as well as [in unison with MV.] the truck.' 
MV: ... Yeah, OK. 
LJ: .. .I said to her, 'Yeah, but I can't get the truck 
because I can't put kids in it.' And then she said, 
'Yeah you can! I have one. Of course you can, it's all 
the same rules as, um, a child seat in the back of a 
car!' ... So, then it was on the table again - the truck; 
that's how that happened. And then I was like, 
[emphatically.] 'Huh! Alright, like, let's do this!' I got 
excited, and then she came downstairs and said, 'Oh 
I'm so sorry, because they' re not making the truck 
anymore, I've checked the entire system, you know-
Canada-wide- and none exist. And I just thought-
MV: [Disappointed, in sympathy.] Oh-
LJ: [Bitterly.] That was bullshit! [Mv laughs.] And I was 
like, 'I think ... you can't access them or don't want to 
because you'd rather sell me this other [car].' 
MV: Did you actually say that? 
LJ: No. 
MV: OK, but that's what you thought. 
LJ: Yup .... So basically, I was like, [As if disappointed.] 
'Really? Are you sure about that?' You know, like, 
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'Hmm, that's really disappointing because that's the 
one I really want.' .. .So she knew she would've had 
a sale, had she, you know, hustled to find it. 
... Essentially that's my take on it. And what 
happened was, she kind of screwed up ... [because] I 
said, 'You know, [LJ giggles slyly.] I'm just going to 
write down these numbers.' And she kind of - like, I 
was writing down the quote she had given me on the 
truck before she found out that one didn't exist. And 
I said, 'Oh I'm just going write down all these 
numbers on my own piece of paper here.' And she 
could tell I was writing it down- there was like this 
subtext - [Slight pause for effect.] because I was going 
to figure it out myself! 
MV: Yeah! 
LJ: ... And then she says, 'You know, I know you' re 
really disappointed' - this is where she screwed up -
'I know you're really disappointed about the truck, 
but you know, I just don't think you're going to find 
it.' And so I smiled to myself and thought, 'Ha, my 
instincts were right. It does exist!' ... And so, because 
I'm stubborn, I was like, 'Am I really doing this just 
because it was a challenge?' And then I'm like, 'No, 
no, I've wanted a truck for over, like, ten years-' 
MV: [Chuckling.] The problem with the truck, though, 
is that the colours aren't as nice. Like, you're 
probably - you probably got a gray or a black or a 
white-
LJ: Oh no, no! 
MV: No? Oh OK, it gets better! 
LJ: It gets better! Sorry, this is a long story-
MV: [Laughs.] I love long stories! 
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To cut her long story shorter, LJ went home-this was a Thursday evening 
- to tackle her task with a level of gusto few of us will ever know: she printed a 
list of some 80 Mazda dealers, and over the course of the next day she contacted 
each and every one of them. At first she would simply ask about the truck, but 
soon she had gleaned so much information (e.g. dealership x was offering a 
'"loyalty"' top-up ·on trade-in values for desirable vehicles; near-zero-percent 
financing at dealership y; an electric-blue-coloured model at dealership z), her 
inquiries turned into demands (i.e. she wanted blue, the loyalty rebate and 
$x/month for 84 months). She squeezed her interlocutors for increasingly 
advantageous terms and to her surprise, they were acquiescing: to a sales 
manager in Toronto, she made an off-the-cuff reduction of the term to 72 months 
(at the same monthly payment of course), which he accepted without flinching. 
LJ had effectively improvised a wicked variation on, the reader might recall, 
James Bragg's (2004: 144-57) "fax attack:" she literally had every Mazda dealer in 
the province chasing for her one of the two last remaining new, blue B2300s in 
existence. She knew, moreover, she had hit rock-bottom price-wise, since no one 
else was willing to match the 72-month term agreed to by the Toronto manager. 
She was even advised by more than one Mazda rep to accept Toronto deal, 
because the dealership in question was sure to lose money on it. 
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LJ felt "empowered" by all this, so when the Toronto manager phoned 
Saturday morning to ask, "Listen, if I find this [truck] for you today, are you 
going to come in today [to sign]?" she committed without hesitating. But on her 
way to the city that afternoon, the gravity of her unplanned pointedness began to 
dawn on her: she was about to make a deposit and sign over ownership of her 
current car, all without ever laying eyes on her prize nor, more importantly, test-
driving it. Despite how enviable the numbers looked on paper, she realized she 
had no grounds to trust the manager. "Suddenly," she admits, "I had a pit in my 
stomach. 'Oh God,' [I thought], 'is he going to screw [me]?"' 
L]'s fall from strategic grace was swift. Upon inspection of her trade-in, 
the manager deemed its condition ineligible for loyalty, a blow which would 
adjust L]'s monthly burden in the dealer's favour. She did not agree with the 
manager's math - she believed the new, readjusted payment should have been $5 
less per month - but her attempt to negotiate this point was stonewalled. Yet 
even at this higher amount, LJ left Toronto that night knowing she had still scored 
the best deal possible, by a comfortable margin to boot. This comfort 
unfortunately evaporated the following Monday when the manager announced 
to her the truck had been sold from under him. Apparently, he was only in a 
position to "lock" the truck in when he received the necessary funds from the 
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financing company, which, because they are closed Sundays, did not process L/' s 
credit until Monday. In the intervening period someone else claimed the truck, 
presumably with a cash offer. 
To say LJ was "freaked out" by this news would be an understatement. 
For the next few days she felt "pretty sick" and suffered from "anxiety dreams." 
Her initial, heated response was to hold the manager "ethically responsible" for 
the debacle, since she had signed an agreement of purchase. She demanded he 
procure for her at no extra cost the very last blue specimen, located in Hamilton 
some 80 km away, identical to the one she had lost in every respect save one: it 
had air conditioning. The manager promised to contact his equal in Hamilton to 
inquire on their truck, but so distrustful had LJ become, she actually phoned 
Hamilton herself to verify he had phoned (apparently he did not)! 
Wallowing in distress and suspicion, she nevertheless "thought about it 
rationally," at which point she experienced something of an epiphany that 
diametrically changed her interpretation of events: 
LJ: At the end of the day, I was like, 'Well, I could just 
say he's lying and he's playing me and just go get 
my deposit back' .... But then I don't have this truck 
that I want, and the colour I want and the price I 
want. So .. .I kind of got my head together and was 
like, 'Well hold on a minute,' and I heard him out. 
Like, he let me rant and scream and say, like, 'Listen, 
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you already made that extra four bucks off of me! 
[She makes barking noises.] I did the math! [She 
chuckles.] [But then] I just said, like, 'Tell me what's 
up?' And he was good, he was very good actually. 
He was really-he's like, very diplomatic, well 
educated .... We had a good rapport when I met 
him. I was like, 'OK, he doesn't seem shifty.' I want 
to think he is, but I actually think he's telling the 
truth .... So, you know, like, I trusted him. Like I 
say, [at the first visit] I kind of d[id]n't want to; your 
instinct is to think that they' re, you know, screwing 
you. But [I] left going, 'I kind of believe him!' 
MV: What was his story then? What was he saying? 
LJ: He was like, 'Listen, I completely agree with you. 
This is brutal. Absolutely I will refund you 
everything. Like, I can't get the car; they say they 
don't have it there.' He was like, 'The deal is ... how 
does this benefit me? I wanted to sell you the truck. 
I stayed late for two-and-a-half hours. Like, I'm not 
lying to you here!' ... Which logically, I was like, 
'Well, that makes sense and he could be telling the 
truth, because why wouldn't he want to make the 
sale with me?' Basically ... he knows I've got all these 
other dealerships offering me trucks-
MV: [Slightly incredulous.] Yeah but at the same time, 
you'd think that they would - that that's not the way 
it would work. Like, if [the truck] was ... within their 
own network, [he could simply say] 'OK, I'm 
reserving this one-' 
LJ: Yup! ... You would think that, but he said the same 
thing. He's like, 'this is the way it works-' 
MV: OK, alright, alright. Alright, so I guess you just 
have to accept it at some point. 
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LJ: Well at the end of the day I could say he's lying, 
and he's screwed me over and I should just go get 
my money back.... Or I could, you know, trust him. 
And we sat there and, like, we yelled - we had it out 
- and then we sat, we talked calmly, and I was like, 
'Well that's possible.' And he said, 'Basically, you 
have to relent on either the colour or [A/C].' 
In the end LJ made the only reasonable choice possible under the circumstances: 
she paid more for air conditioning. 
What LJ is describing is nothing short of a minor, yet seemingly necessary 
miracle: no longer ambivalent about the derailment of the deal, she came to 
accept and even represent the manager's position without reservation. At peace 
with the force of his logic, she was able to understand the perspicacity of 
concession, learning in the process the meaning of Emile Durkheim's ([1893] 
1984: 158) famous maxim, "[I]n a contract not everything is contractual:" she 
came to see that despite her signed agreement, it was her responsibility- not his -
to bend to save the sale. 
None of this, however, came automatically or easily. Her catharsis, as 
revealed below, required cultivation by intense self-work: 
LJ: I kept thinking [for some days later], somehow, 
[She laughs sheepishly.] um, somehow I could - I could 
have gotten him down lower. And I knew logically 
and rationally I was being kind of neurotic, like I 
was-
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MV: [Excited, as if LJ had confirmed a hypothesis.] You 
know what? Thank you! ·I always feel that, not just 
for cars-
LJ: Really? 
MV: Yes! 
LJ: OK, because I was like, 'I've got to let it go, man!' 
Like, everyone I talked to was like, 'You got an 
amazing deal!' But I was still like, 'he screwed me-' 
MV: It's never enough-
LJ: 'I know he screwed me!' You know? I had this 
feeling. . .. And I was like, 'What is this about?' .. .In 
the end, when I look back ... when I really did the 
numbers and compared it to everything else every 
other dealer offered me, I still got a great deal. But I 
was still like, 'I still feel I could have gotten him 
down, like, five dollars!' [She giggles.] Which is like, 
'Let it go, right? Chill out!' 
MV: ... Now were you, like, constantly redoing-
LJ: [Totally anticipating the question.] Yes-
MV: The numbers? 
LJ: Yes, but I'm, you know, obsessive about numbers. 
[Pause.] I don't know, it was interesting, psycho-
logically .... [A]ll week, I was like, 'Wow, this has 
really rocked me.' You know, like, I'm really 
fighting to trust and not be taken advantage of. So I 
was really, like, 'What is this about? ... Why is it so 
. f ?' important or me .... 
LJ is reminding us that strict calculation is of little calculative comfort. Unlike 
those chronicled in Chapter Three for instance, people whose deliberations were 
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fixed by extra-calculative considerations (e.g. PP or WB's social sight; MP's familial 
reason), LJ had no such luxury. Free of these social qualifications, her calculus 
was for all intents and purposes infinite, irresolvable and anxiety-inducing. Her 
experience conforms to and confirms Daniel Miller's (2002: 231; 2005: 6) assertion 
that in the thick of market action, a dedication to disentanglement a la Callon 
(viz. elaborating a frame conducive to numbers and numbers only) is more likely 
to complicate, not simplify, matters. Such a frame, LJ struggled to learn, left 
intact perhaps the most damning of entanglements - her own approbation, which 
she would have to appease, if not by crunching numbers then some other means. 
"Individual Enrichment" 
I have lingered on L/'s heady rise and fall from 'sharkdom' because it lays bare a 
particularly telling duality: hers is a story of anguished, seemingly inevitable 
self-entanglement, but of self-awakening and -awareness too, a narrative of 
metamorphosis turning on her appreciation and subsequent acceptance of 
futility. Only when, in other words, she assumed responsibility for her 
inferiority could she gain a measure of certainty. Futility proved revelatory-
liberating even-because it gave her leave to stop calculating. This theme of wilful 
calculative atony is not unheard of; it was presaged in Chapter Five by the 
'economicists,' the interviewees with the keenest and longest-trained market 
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instincts, who collectively alluded to the importance of recognizing when one has 
no calculative leg to stand on. There is very much then, it seems to me, a moment 
of futility-filled disentanglement here, specifically from calculation, which 
becomes the basis by which to know oneself as a 'truly' economizing subject. 
Disentanglement is therefore not the process of framing by which the buyer "can 
be quits" of her seller (Callon, 1998a: 19), but rather the moment when, 
principally for the sake of attaining some quantum of dispassion, she calls it quits 
from calculation. Phenomenologically speaking, she does not simply register 
feelings of uncertainty or inferiority in this moment, she takes ownership of 
them. She grasps the pointlessness of begrudging her lot, swallows wounded 
pride and begins a program of illumination of the order of (market) things. She 
embarks on a path Bourdieu (2005: 8) dubbed, with just a hint of sarcasm, 
"individual enrichment." 
Interpreting disentanglement as calculative disengagement naturally has 
implications for what we mean by economization. Most importantly, we begin to 
see that the irreality of calculation, in all its lush socio-technicality, is but the 
proximate ground of economization. To be or become quintessentially economic 
- to impress upon oneself, that is, a more-or-less formal econo-mentality-hinges 
instead upon justifications, reasons or silver-linings for one's futility that makes 
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excessive deliberation superfluous. Such a disposition, which is only implicit in 
L/' s narrative but explicit in OM' s below, involves not simply facility with quasi-
formal conceptualization, but above all strategic reflexivity with respect to time: 
the buyer hedges her definite, but unmanageable feelings of inferiority with an 
indefinite, but far more malleable logic of expectation. In essence, a truly 
disentangled orientation temporalizes the transaction, stretching its moment of 
vindication forward - the cliche, 1 a marathon, not a race,' is apt here - and giving 
rise to the anticipation that today's folly will be tomorrow's good sense. 
I qualify econo-mentality with descriptors like "more-or-less" because, as 
we shall shortly see, its formality need not necessarily be articulated precisely nor 
stand up to logical scrutiny; what counts is not the elaboration of the truth, but a 
truth. We are hence not dealing with rational discourses so much as reasonable 
ones (cf. Bourdieu, 2005: 9): that is to say, disentangled commonsense is less a 
series of positive statements rendering reality falsifiable - though it may be 
deployed that way - than an attempt to formalize one's intuitions and hunches, 
incorporating them into some putatively grander plan. Reason, in short, serves 
as a micro-history of the future, a narrative by which to interrogate possibilities 
of self. 
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Interrogation of the future was precisely what OM was forced to do when 
he, much like LJ, hit the limits of his quite intricate calculativity. An up-and-
coming financial worker and self-proclaimed "economics guy" who strives "to 
reduce borrowing costs at all costs," OM and his partner devised a bold plan to 
finance their major life purchases: they would meet their car and mortgage 
obligations with a single, low-interest (perhaps 2% ), house-secured line-of-credit 
(LOC). The scheme undeniably rations their monthly burden: it means that 
instead of forking over their full, $x-mortgage- and $y-car-payments, they can get 
away with any portion thereof, starting at, if they really want, $0.02x and $0.02y. 
Basically, the scheme is a device mediating them from their obligations, allowing 
them to wrack up debt on their existing debts.3 
After test-driving Subarus, Hyundais and Volkswagens, OM and his 
partner set their sights on the prize-jewel of the Canadian vw fleet, the Golf 
diesel wagon, which is longer than its hatch-backed cousin but with a vastly 
cleaner engine. Still, the wagon was prohibitively expensive, even with their 
LOC-'screen' in place. To make it palatable they would need to score 0%-
3 OM claimed he had difficulty getting salespeople to understand his regime, and I must admit I 
too needed clarification. What puzzles me, though I did not press him about it, is their plan to 
pay down the LOC. I suspect they are counting on future windfalls, perhaps OM' s annual 
bonuses or, assuming that Toronto's seemingly ever-appreciating real estate market does not 
falter, a tidy gain on the sale of their residence. Whatever the expectation, I think it is clear OM 
has a higher risk-tolerance than most. 
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financing as opposed to 1.9% (0% was only offered on the gasoline wagon), as 
well as a discount on the purchase price. A sales rep at the downtown Toronto 
dealership was taciturn - he apparently "wasn't showing his cards" at all - and 
though a salesman at another Toronto dealer was more accommodating, he 
ultimately balked at OM's offer. Undaunted, OM's partner, tearing a page from 
L/' s playbook, phoned every VW dealer from Oshawa to Niagara. She hit pay-dirt 
when someone in Hamilton 11was willing to give a substantially better deal." 
Wielding this new offer like a bludgeon, they went back to the taciturn salesman 
to cajole him into negotiation, as if to say to him, 110K, you made us do our 
homework ... why do we have to go to Hamilton to make this happen?" And 
while the salesman was now decidedly more gracious, he was not gracious 
enough. But rather than walk away yet again, OM and his partner acquiesced: 
At the last little bit, um, we weren't quite at what we 
wanted. And so there was a little bit of, like, basically 
going back and forth with numbers written down on a 
piece of paper, um, that in the end, we just said, 'Fine, 
we'll just end this now!' [He chuckles lightly.] ... We 
said, 'Let's go with it' because the amount of money 
we were actually going back and forth over was not 
particularly substantial in the grand scheme of things. 
As then with LJ, OM clinched a deal only by surrendering calculative 
control in the final instant, justified by recourse to that great arbiter of reason, 
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"the grand scheme of thlngs." I can only assume OM appreciates the finality 
brought about by their sensible act of genuflection. But finality does not 
necessarily mean certainty, for OM appears to be quite ambivalent about how 
things transpired: 
MV: Now what was the overriding emotion that you 
felt during this entire process? 
OM: Mm, [Four seconds of silence.] hmm, uh, [Seven 
more seconds.] I don't know. Um-
MV: Like, was it exciting? Was it, sort of, anxious? 
OM: ... So I would say, probably, uh, it was by and 
large a little bit more exciting from my wife's point 
of view. 
MV: OK. 
OM: Uh, I was a little bit more Mr. Scrooge-
MV: [Chuckles.] OK-
OM: For awhlle, but when I started realizing that we 
were actually going to get thls car, I was pretty 
excited. Um, [Pause.] and then-
MV: So the fact that you - I mean, because I guess, 
when you started to realize that you were going to 
be paying a bit more than what you wanted, like I 
guess that was-
OM: A lot more, yeah! [He chuckles; MV chuckles hard.] 
MV: I guess that was, sort of, for you - I mean, I guess, 
was that a bitter pill to swallow or, you know? 
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OM: Well, it just was like, 'OK, where do we stop then 
if we're just going to blow our budget out of the 
water?' 
MV: Yeah, OK, alright. Now, do you feel in the end 
that you paid a fair price, and you can think of 'fair' 
anyway you want to? 
OM: Yeah, uh, [Pause.] I-we don't regret the 
purchase. 
MV: ... God, I mean, considering how little that thing 
consumes, yeah, I wouldn't regret it either!-
OM: Yeah-
MV: [Laughing through the words.] Have you even filled 
up the tank since you've gotten it? 
OM: Yeah, not very often. So yeah, like, we' re very 
happy with the car. Uh, the cost does seem, like, a 
little steep, but if this car lasts as long as they say it 
will last, then it should be a good purchase. 
MV: [Seeing an opportunity to play Devil's Advocate.] 
Yeah, I've got to [say]- not to be a downer though, 
VWs and Audis can be, depending on the actual car 
that you get, they can be glitchy. 
OM: [Not sure what to make of the comment.] Right, 
yeah. 
MV: [Realizing how condescending it all sounds.] Yeah, 
like I mean, anyways-
OM: That's the, uh - time will tell. 
MV: [Trying, but failing to extract foot from mouth.] 
Yeah, time will tell. And I guess you've got -
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Volkswagen's got a pretty good warranty these days, 
I'd imagine. 
OM' s self-effacing hesitancy is to be expected: given the intricacy and intensity of 
his financial regime, he is the kind of person who absolutely needs the objectivity 
of facts and calculations, a point reinforced by his tongue-in-cheek identification 
with Scrooge. Through this experience though, OM has been made to come face-
to-face with another economic fact: one cannot calculate oneself out of a position 
of inferiority (a lesson coincidently not dissimilar to Scrooge's epiphany that 
slavishness to calculation cannot expunge karmic debts). So in the wake of OM's 
reasonable abandonment of calculation, he has had to adopt a different, perhaps 
more uncertain but assuredly incontrovertible, measure of value - the future. 
"Economics guy" or not, OM now understands what it feels like to stand exposed 
and disentangled, with no calculative prostheses, before that horizon. 
Calculatively 'light' as this journey into the future may be, there is 
weightiness to it nonetheless, namely the persistent reminder that one's car 
constitutes a crucial marker of powerlessness over one's financial destiny. The 
automobile - any automobile - by virtue of its technical complexity and 
propensity for pecuniary 'absorption' threatens always to twist one's fiscal 
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trajectory, proving positive, most of all to oneself, that one is a slave to 
circumstance. 
This is the burden currently weighing on HH and his partner as they 
soldier forward in their red vw Rabbit (i.e. a fifth-generation Golf), a car they 
leased new in 2007, a few years into their relationship. The acquisition was an 
important milestone financially, downsizing their collective burden from two 
cars to one, as well as symbolically, signalling a definite "evolution of the 
relationship." HH' s business-savvy father was "the silent partner" of the 
transaction, steering them to a VW dealer with whom he enjoyed an "on-going 
relationship," and scoring a partial tax write-off by assuming title of the lease in 
his company's name. HH felt a little sidelined by his father's involvement, as if 
the deal was "a foregone arrangement," but he ultimately did not mind: he now 
had a brand-new, well-equipped, "peppy" car for essentially half the monthly 
cost. 
Flash forward four years to the end of the lease, and much has changed in 
their circumstances. They have moved, for starters, to a bigger house, raising 
their carrying costs across the board (i.e. mortgage, taxes, insurance, etc.). More 
ominous to their financial prospects though, they have a child with another on 
the way. Given these realities, the Rabbit's non-negotiable buy-out price of 
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$15,800 strikes them as a king's ransom. They knew in 2007 they were "paying a 
premium" for the Rabbit, but now they are realizing ju.st what that means. 
The lease anniversary fast approaching, they tried to take stock of their 
options, pondering the question, "What's the best way to spend that money?" It 
quickly dawned on them however, they had no options apart from their Rabbit, 
for to spend less - even a little less - would entail unacceptable sacrifices: either 
they would have to downsize to a sub-compact (and even the compact Rabbit, 
HH concedes, is less than ideal for transporting their proliferating parenting 
paraphernalia) or upsize to a used, but mechanically uncertain and ethically 
questionable cuv. They decided to proceed with the buy-out, financing it, like 
OM, through a LOC. This uncomfortable choice now taken, HH was next faced 
with yet more irksome choices, notably an $800-brake-job without which the 
Rabbit would not pass its safety inspection. HH could have shopped around for a 
more reasonably priced mechanic, but dealing with the regulatory and financial 
minutiae of the takeover was becoming so time-consuming, he simply and 
sensibly thought, "God, let's just get this over with!" 
It was only after the paperwork was signed, delivered and registered that 
HH really took stock. The parameters of his deliberations, similarly again to OM, 
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had less to do with present-day concessions and impositions as with, he says, "a 
long game" of expectations: 
uu: The financing [of] it-you know, [that's] another 
storyline .... I think we-
MV: Is it a bit stressful? 
uu: [Circumspect.] Ah, a little bit. I mean we' re - I 
think this is kind of the high watermark of our debt 
load-
MV: Mm, uh-hmm-
HH: $16,000 is kind of like [a lot] .. . [Playback is garbled.] 
and hopefully [we] won't be spending any [more] 
money, you know. . .. And uh, in the past I think we 
were playing fast and [loose] with [our] finances, 
you know? ... But it just kind of now added up, and 
now we're like, 'Hey, wait a minute!' We really need 
to keep our eye on the ball because, you know, the 
short game has turned into a long game [in the sense 
that] we have a child and are expecting another. 
MV: Uh-hmm, uh-hmm .... Now, uh, so then what 
would you say - OK, I'm piggy-backing on what you 
just said - what was the overriding emotion you felt 
during- [Pauses to reconsider the question.] well let's 
take both: was what, if you can remember back in 
2007, what was the overriding emotion then [as] 
compared to now? 
HH: Uh, I - you know, back in 2007, I was like, 'Sweet! 
New ride! [Mv chuckles.] Oh it drives great!' You 
know, everything worked and, you know, [it had] 
heated seats and it was very - the car's shiny red! 
You know, it was, like, a bit campy [Mv chuckles 
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again.] .. .It's pretty luxurious in its own kind of 
way-
MV: Sure, no! Yeah, yeah, definitively, definitively! 
nu: ... And this time around there's really none of 
that. You know, it's like, [Deliberately flatly.] 'OK, 
I've got a car that works [and] I'll be paying for it for 
a long time.' And after all the contemplation .. .I've 
found out how much the car will cost over the next 
two-and-a-half years with regards to servicing and_ 
scheduled- [Searching for the right phrase.] whatever-
check-ins? 
MV: Yeah, yeah, yeah-
HH: To find out, you know, 'OK, so the car's going to 
cost this much [in maintenance and] it's only the 
things that go wrong that [we'll] get serviced' .... 
And the idea [is] that we'll sell the car in two-and-a-
half-year' s time, uh, because at that point .. .I project 
it'll have [about] 100,000 km, and I figure that, you 
know, psychologically a buyer is more interested in a 
car that hasn't [reached 100,000] - better at 95 than 
105. . .. Until that time, you know, I think we can sell 
it for about 10,000-bucks, you know, and uh, that's 
not a bad value because it will depreciate, whatever, 
two-and-a-half-grand a year, and you know, that 
seems appropriate. So there's all these calculations 
and permutations that kind of worked out. 
MV: Yeah, now when would you-
nu: [The thing] about that, right now, it's like, 'OK, 
we've got a car; it's fine and, you know, we don't 
have to make a decision ... for a little while.' 
MV: Yeah, now when would you say you, kind of -
uh, you developed this sense of, like, time-horizon? 
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Like, was it, you know, when it came time to buy out 
this car, or were you kind of thinking like that back 
in 2007, or just after you leased the car? 
HH: No, it was only now. . . .It was only now when we 
were kind of number-crunching, going, 'OK, what -
at 16-grand, you know, what kind of condition is it 
in?' ... [But] my projections are only good as long as 
we don't damage the car during that time. Like, if 
there's no accident we' re paying for or excruciating 
interior damage ... the car will be worth roughly 10-
grand. 
At first glance HH' s appreciation of the future, full of "calculations and 
permutations," appears to contradict my contention that disentanglement is 
necessarily post-calculative. Yet his calculus is not actually calculative, odd as 
this may sound. What I mean, his detailed number-crunching is not 
comparative; he makes no attempt, put otherwise, to evaluate the technico-
pecuniary essence of his Rabbit against an ontological backdrop of like-cars. His 
newly-acquired quantitative outlook is instead oriented solely to interrogating 
himself and his lot as a constrained, reactive actor. What he is crunching are not 
numbers rooted in hard, present realities, but in malleable anticipations that 
justify the frustration of unexpectedly finding himself in a financial marathon 
seemingly without end. In that sense, whether HH actually does some day fetch 
$10,000 is immaterial. What is far more consequential to his sense of market-self 
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is the ability to articulate a reasoned, rationing assessment of an agony directed 
at nobody but himself. 
Neither HH nor OM, as the latter expressly points out, "regret the 
purchase." For cc however, remorse proved a fateful route to disentanglement. 
A life-long all-wheel-drive {AWD) enthusiast with two teenaged children, large 
dog and penchant for outdoor recreation, he came to realize the practicality of a 
minivan capable of accommodating humans, dog and gear comfortably. At the 
time only Toyota offered an all-wheel minivan, the Sienna, but only at its top-
most, 'Limited Edition' trim level - a $50,000 proposition. He and his partner 
spent three or four weeks "soul searching," trying to decide if a top-of-the-line 
Sienna was what they wanted or needed. The Honda Odyssey was comparably 
priced, but not only did it lack AWD (this has since become an option in the 
current generation, introduced six months later), it was not nearly as nicely 
finished. What the Odyssey did have going for it however, was a $6,000 rebate, 
which focused cc' s calculation to the following question: "OK, over the eight or 
nine or ten years that I own [a Sienna], is it worth $6,000 to me, and in the end I 
decided it was." 
To lend this decision confidence, cc took the added precaution of 
becoming a member of the Automobile Protection Association {APA), an 
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organization which, beyond its consumer advocacy efforts, allows members to 
buy cars at select dealers at set prices with the marginal costs fully disclosed (a 
bit like websites like CarCostCanada.com or unhaggle.com). cc took full 
advantage of this service, going so far as to arrange test-drives at his house, 
thereby avoiding the pressures of the dealer environment. Yet for all his due 
diligence, cc has gotten precious little from driving "the tank," as he now calls it, 
save the important self-discovery he is not really into cars: 
I've realized that, um, that I'm not a car guy, that the 
next vehicle I own I'm not going to go top-of-the-line 
and I'm not going to go -I'm never going to be a guy 
who buys Audis. I'm never going to a guy who buys 
BMWs. I just simply don't get enough pleasure out of 
that, [and] that when I sort of think about other things 
that I've purchased where a year later I still think, 'Oh 
yeah, that was worth absolutely every penny,' I don't 
feel that way about my car. I feel that way about my 
espresso machine! [Mv guffaws.] Every time I turn that 
on every morning, I think, 'That was worth every 
penny that I paid for!' But when I think about my car, 
when I get into it, I thought, [With a chuckle.] 'There's 
50-grand down the tube that I could have much rather 
have spent on holidays or another espresso machine!' 
While it may be tempting to dismiss cc' s sudden indifference to cars as the sour 
grapes of an upwardly-mobile coffee addict, there is more to his story. Notably, 
cc couches his epiphany in quasi-formal terms, allowing him to see that used 
cars will always represent for him the more prudent choice: 
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cc: In retrospect, I probably should have gone second-
hand, and I'm kind of kicking myself a bit now that I 
didn't just save myself a bunch of money, uh, and 
find a low-mileage 2010 Toyota Sienna that was all-
wheel drive. Um, and, yeah, so I've sort of learned 
that lesson; it was an expensive lesson to learn. But 
it's interesting, I was having a chat just the other 
week with a friend of mine who has a Land Rover -
pretty much went through exactly the same kind of 
thought process that I did. You know ... he's a guy 
like me; he's very, very physically active .... But 
what he decided to do, he said, 'You know what, I 
don't drive it very much,' which is the same with us, 
we're actually very low-mileage drivers. And he 
said, 'So, I didn't want all of the depreciation to be 
on my wallet, I want it to be on someone else's 
wallet.' So he went out and he bought himself a 
Land Rover with 200,000 km on it for $5,000, and he 
loves it. He thinks it's a great vehicle, and he doesn't 
worry about it; he doesn't - he lets his dogs go in the 
back and doesn't worry if they get it muddy or 
anything else, because all the depreciation that's 
happened on that vehicle-
MV: Has happened-
cc: Has already happened. You know, he's probably 
going to be able to sell it in five years for 3- or 4,000. 
It's going to have cost him a couple thousand dollars 
to own that vehicle. Versus me, where it's going to 
have cost me 30- or 40,000 to own that vehicle. So, he 
made the smarter decision, and I kind of realize that. 
The moral of cc' s story is this: his calculations amounted to nothing more 
than a necessary, but insubstantial prologue; the far more valuable economic 
work (viz. his appreciation of depreciation) was undertaken only afterwards, 
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when he came to regret his calculativity. The key transformational moment was, 
of course, when he swapped stories with his Rover-er friend: hearing about his 
financial acumen, cc learned to place a monetary value on the hollowness and 
shame he felt about his Sienna and, more importantly, to convert his gnawing 
lack of savoir-faire into a future program. Will this newfound, quasi-formal 
sensibility guarantee satisfaction the next time around? Not necessarily. 
Formalized justifications are seldom foolproof, a fact cc' s reasoning 
demonstrates in spades: at 200,000 km, his friend's Rover is entering a period of 
use-life requiring mechanical attention that will likely far exceed "a couple 
thousand dollars," not to mention the added time and stress dealing with such 
potentialities.4 But that is not really the point. What counts here is cc' s capacity 
to deconstruct subjective qualities through the prism of' objective' concepts. In 
the end, only by regretting but accepting the ignominy to which he was led by 
his calculus was cc able to begin understanding himself as a consumer - to 
apprehend, that is, the ebb and flow of his preferences or opportunity costs -
4 These potentialities must be taken seriously, since the Rover brand routinely scores last in J.D. 
Power and Associates' Vehicle Dependability studies (Toljagic, 2013), an all-important metric of 
reported customer problems. Car journalist Mark Toljagic (2012a) does not mince words: /1 An 
editor once asked me to name the worst vehicle of the past decade. It took all of 20 milliseconds 
to reply: Range Rover's Freelander" (known today as the Land Rover LR2). MG Rover used to 
make engines of such legendary poor quality, Toljagic quips, the company /1 almost single-
handedly led to England's de-industrialization." Similarly, when another of my informants, WB, 
mused to his mechanic brother he was considering a used Range Rover, his brother informed him 
flat-out he would "never, ever" service it! 
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divining in the process the logical rudiments of another history of another, future 
transaction. 
Above all, what links the interviewees recounted in this chapter - though 
KA perhaps expresses this commonality less obviously - is the beautiful paradox 
that in their attempts to affirm a purely disentangled, quantitative calculativity, 
they were all driven by epiphany to leave calculation behind, adopting in its 
stead a forward-looking, quasi-formal and thoroughly justificatory mode of 
reflection. The epiphany in question, moreover, was always the same: in all 
these accounts the catalyst for formal economic reason was internalization of the 
asymmetry of the encounter - an act of inward inflection of the agonistic impulse 
- coupled with transcendental-like acceptance of calculative impotence. In short, 
there can be no appreciation of what it means to economize a major life purchase 
without a prior appreciation of one's inferiority; without, that is to say, first 
assuming responsibility for one's own tutelage. In which case (and not unlike 
Kant), I am afraid I can only offer a tautological (yet hopefully profound) answer 
to the question of economic enlightenment. How does the car buyer become 
economic? What is the way out of her structural position of tutelage? Simply: 
she accepts the necessity of tutelage. Or as 'economicist' PH so wisely remarked 
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back in Chapter Five, "[Y]ou never really know if you're getting a lemon or not, 
. . I" so ... en1oy 1t .... 
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Conclusion 
Death of the Dicker ? 
The Buzz Saw of Embeddedness 
IF 1HERE HAS BEEN AN OVERARCHING THEME TO THIS DISSERTATION, it is that 
economic reason, as anticipated by legions of heterodox scholars, is "an 
'emergent, interpretive and performance process' rather than an objectively 
calculating exercise" (Spotton Visano, 2006: 29; also cf. Biggart & Beamish, 2003: 
456). This notion that actual reason is animated by something other than 
objective, ahistorical reason is, let us not forget, what links all non-economistic 
economic epistemologies. This is the embeddedness thesis. Car purchases, given 
the complexities and intensities of the 'something else' involved, provide a near-
perfect illustration of embeddedness: the machinations and deliberations 
required to drive away with an automobile of one's own, as we saw in Chapters 
Three and Four, are so indissocible from intersubjective concerns, there are no 
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grounds to speak of a purely economizing, truly dispassionate disposition to 
major life purchases. 
Yet as intellectually satisfying embeddedness is as a foil to the 
experientially shallow, disentangled logic of economism, we would do well not 
to let embeddedness spoil our critical faculties. To wit, demonstrating the 
conceptual superiority of embeddedness is comparatively easy; what is decidedly 
less easy is using embeddedness to explain the reality - or irreality, as the case 
may be - of disembeddedness. Such an apparently contradictory exercise is 
critically indispensable if polemically thankless insofar as it exposes oneself to 
the ludicrous charge one has mistaken an ideological construct for something 
solid or essential. Arguably Polanyi, the belatedly original champion of 
embeddedness, attempted this in the fifth and sixth chapters of The Great 
Transformation ([1944] 2001), only to be wrongly convicted in retrospect of 
"leav[ing] the core of the market unchallenged" (Lie, 1999: 219; for a more 
nuanced take on Polanyi's treatment of disembeddedness, cf. Jessop, 2001: 214-5; 
Block, 2003: 294-6). Callon, I suppose, is up to something analytically similar, 
raising the hackles of critics like Miller and, least of all, me. If the history of the 
embeddedness concept teaches us - or condemns us to - anything, it is that there 
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is no polemical high-ground to be won by it. Embeddedness is a fool's concept, 
but it is vital concept nonetheless. 
I fully applaud, in which case, Callon' s attempt to recover 
disentanglement by rearticulating embeddedness. What I disagree with -
specifically when it comes to car purchases, a domain he mentions by name 
(1998a: 18-9) - is the bed he posits for it: economics writ large (1998a: 30), by 
which he means calculative framing. Framing, of course, is hardly unimportant 
when it comes to buying a car, evinced by the fact pretty much everyone 
chronicled herein engaged in some variation thereof: they compared cars, 
crunched numbers and turned to one or more devices to arrive at a decision. 
These calculative experiences, however, were only rarely undertaken in the spirit 
of truly value-oriented calculativity. I would argue rather that the economizing 
performativity of which Callon speaks comes only to the fore after calculation, 
when the buyer realizes that the lopsidedness of the encounter makes any more 
calculating pointless. Phrased differently, if we want to get at the performative 
foundations of a purely numbers-driven disposition, we ultimately need not 
expend too much effort rooting about the vicinity of calculativity. What we 
should be excavating instead are the means, truths and histories by which a 
buyer comes to take responsibility for the asymmetrical oppositionality of the 
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market. Learning to balance this oppositionality within oneself- making of it a 
series of quasi-formal principles by which to conduct one's conduct - this is 
economization writ perfect. 
So with what then is disentanglement entangled? What is the bed of 
disembedded action? The short answer is market/power, an incitation to self-
government which, I have tried to specify, is hardly repressive, but not 
empowering either. What this means, though the buyer comes to know a sense 
of constructive agony in the hunt for a car - an irreconcilability of interests 
sharpening her propensity for strategy and tactics - this petty pathos, given 
enough calculative 'rope,' becomes autopetal or self-seeking: her strategic 
faculties cease to suss the seller, only to be redirected themselves back onto her 
own subjectivity. The automobile then, which in the lead-up to its acquisition 
consumes so much cognitive fuel, serves a reflexive function: a market actant if 
there ever was one, the car ends up converting all the intersubjectivities swirling 
around her choice into an intra-intersubjectivity, awkward as that may sound. 
'Real' entanglements lose their semblance of exteriority but not their 
consequentiality; they become virtual entanglements, beholden only to a 
seemingly objective logic of inevitability and necessity one has the duty to 
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impress upon oneself. The end-game of market/power, if we really think about 
it, is to govern oneself in accordance with market power. 
The Buzz Saw of Negotiation 
I want to close with a few thoughts on a theme I touched upon but did not take 
up: the art and science of haggling. Of the 35 interviewees I asked, are you the 
kind of person who enjoys haggling? 21 said they unequivocally dislike it, which is 
more than twice as many - nine - who purported liking to haggle, with the 
remaining five expressing some form of ambivalence. The vagaries of sample 
size notwithstanding, my informants' decided distaste for negotiation flies in the 
face of recent American market research suggesting otherwise (cf. Zak, 2010): we 
are apparently living in a golden age of car-haggling, with over 44% of new car 
buyers now negotiating against initial offers. Those paying outright demonstrate 
the greatest proclivity to haggle, followed by those who finance and lessees 
(66.1%, 48.2% and 17.8% respectively; the former two are all-time highs).1 The 
1 My cohort contains another, perhaps greater statistical surprise: among the hagglers, women 
outnumber men five to four, which contradicts the widely reported feminine aversion to car-
negotiation (cf. Bragg, 2004: 10; Dr. Phil, 2004; Lazarony, n.d.; Tuttle, 2012) first confirmed by 
Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever (2003: 115-6; see Chapter Four above). Then again, scratch the 
surface of their proof and we see it is far from valid: Babcock and Laschever mention only a 
study which to this day remains unpublished (lead researcher Devavrat Purohit' s 2011 CV 
confirms as much); worse still, they admit in an endnote (2003: 196n4) that the lopsided gender 
differential of which they speak is "not in the paper but came to us in a personal communication" 
with a secondary author. 
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research goes on to attribute the rise of assertive buyers- echoing Liguori and 
Romeo's editorials in Chapter Six - to the internet and social media, which have 
made car pricing transparent, all the while miraculously deescalating buyer-
seller hostilities. 
Whatever the statistics involved, trying to understand the reality of 
haggling by tallying numbers is, I am afraid, a wasted effort. The question, how 
many people ask for a discount? does nothing to get at the fragility and, dare I say, 
symbolic impossibility of car-haggling. The question pales, moreover, in 
comparison to questions about the making and staking of discount-claims in the 
first place. What are the parameters of these claims, who governs the parameters 
and how do actors orient to them? These are the sorts of mundane but 
consequential problems with which my informants grappled, each from a 
different perspective and in a decidedly different way. 
"Canadians do not know how to haggle. They've got no freaking clue!" 
This is the opinion of DB, a man whose lack of knowledge about cars is more than 
compensated by a preternatural instinct for turning a quick buck. One night at a 
party someone happened to mention a gentleman - an acquaintance of an 
acquaintance of an acquaintance - desperate to unload his recently departed 
mother's barely driven Mazda3 sedan, a 'Touring Edition' model containing 
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amenities over and above the top-most GT trim-level. DB salivated at the 
opportunity to flip the vehicle, towards which end he secured a hastily approved, 
but ridiculously usurious-30%! - LOC at HSBC (DB in fact devoted a good chunk 
of interview-time railing against the bank's ethical bankruptcy). He next wasted 
no time tracing the trail of connections back to the gentleman, himself elderly and 
who, DB immediately understood, was a "sitting duck" with "no game" - a so-
called 'easy mark.' DB was thoroughly opaque from the get-go, misrepresenting 
himself and his interest in the -3, plying the old man with niceties and taking him 
on "emotional odyssey" designed to convince him to drop the price from $6- to 
$5,000. It worked. 
Because DB knew interest on the LOC would accrue as quickly as cab fare, 
he took the liberty of listing the -3 for sale even before visiting the old man. 
There was an unexpected problem though: the gentleman's mother may not 
have driven much, but she had sliced noticeable gashes into the car's body which 
would require repairs. So began "a whole education" for DB by a cadre of 
morally dubious but trustworthy mechanics, body specialists and used car 
salesmen. The most important lesson he learned - veritably the first rule of 
'curb siding' or illegal motor vending - is not to sign the transfer portion of a car's 
ownership card. That way when DB later sold the Mazda to the sister of his 
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brother-in-law, it appeared that she had bought it for $5,000 from the old 
woman's son, a move saving her some $1,200 in HST (Canada's VAT). 
As for DB's interaction with his sister-in-law-removed, he thinks he may 
initially have mentioned $13,500 as a price, an "utterance" that was hardly 
"contractual" but most definitely strategic, for the next time they spoke, he 
demanded $16,500 on the grounds the car was listed for that amount on-line and 
generating interest. The first part was true, the second not as much: serious 
interest in the car had in fact started to wane, since at that point it had been on 
the market for a couple of weeks. Wanting however to put the transaction to rest, 
he gave her an firm offer: "I'll give it to you for $14,000," a de facto fictitious 
$2,500 discount that "made me look good with the family" to boot. A few days 
later, standing together at a bank teller's wicket to finalize the deal, she pulled a 
cheque out of her purse with DB's name already written on it, but not the final 
amount. "14,000?" she asked. "She was looking for a dicker," DB opines, but 
unfortunately for her, his understanding of closure clearly does not include 
concession. 
DB is ultimately wrong to belittle the lack of negotiating savvy of his 
opposite numbers and Canadians in general. If anything, his story merely 
confirms the structural truth that representations inside a buyer-car-seller nexus 
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are so very hard to interrogate and even harder to reverse. So while DB's sister-
in-law-removed nominally scored a sizeable discount, some of it was debatable, 
some of it punishable by law, and none of it of her own making. In which case 
DB, the supremely self-serving gatekeeper of discounts that he is, is in some 
perverse sense a harbinger of the "new' sales paradigm lauded in Chapter Six, the 
one which basically assumes agency is strictly a function of the rather passive 
task of seeking pricing transparency. Yet once this transparency has been duly 
'inculcated,' it becomes, much like DB's firm offer, a rigid script requiring no 
further agential effort insofar as it specifies precisely the point to which discounts 
can be claimed. I obviously would have liked to have interviewed DB's sister-in-
law-removed - harbinger of 'brave new buyers' - but in her absence a comment 
by DG more than sums up the spirit of the age: "My form of negotiation is 
research." 
Even when a buyer does author her own discounts, she is almost never in a 
position to divine fully the play of technical, financial and regulatory frames that 
may or may not re-justify her hard-won fruits. I think of IS and her partner, who 
were forced to haggle with a Ford saleswoman over a number of issues vis-a-vis 
a used Focus wagon, namely rust - here IS was able to knock $100 off the price -
as well as an excessive '"admin fee.'" The dealership in question was demanding 
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$300, which to IS did not "sound reasonable," particularly when someone at a 
prior Ford dealer informed her - and this was the first she heard of it- that he 
would waive the fee, which is commonly $150. The saleswoman ultimately 
agreed to $150 and the sale proceeded (all of IS' dickering occasioned the quip, 
"Some people want a Caddy for motorcycle prices!" from the principal dealer's 
father, a retired man who apparently has nothing better to do with his Saturdays 
then hang about his old workplace). 
As IS recounted the admin-fee-fiasco, I kept tight-lipped-which was 
difficult for me - because I knew there was an official regulation concerning this, 
but could not remember exactly what. I subsequently learned that car dealers in 
Ontario must communicate 'all-in' pricing, above and beyond which they are 
forbidden to add anything except taxes (cf. Toljagic, 2011b). Was the original 
$300 admin charge part of the all-in price, which is fine and legal, or was it an 
add-on? If the former, IS rightly saved $150; if the latter, she was fleeced $150. 
The truth can only be found - and I suspect IS is oblivious to this, as would be 
practically everyone else - in the minutiae of ordering of line-items on the bill-of-
sale. My point is, assuming one is not prepared to go to the deceptive lengths of 
DB, SN or WH, truly successful car-haggling requires the foresight and 
fastidiousness of a forensic auditor. IS may say, "when it comes to finances .. .it's 
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more [about] the big picture as opposed to, 'I just like negotiating,"' but really, 
what the big picture looks like is anybody's guess. 
And that, indeed, is the rub of car-haggling: we may want and try to get 
the best deal possible, but most of us are painfully and ambivalently aware we 
cannot know what this mythical deal is. As CD nicely sums it up, car deals are 
necessarily win-lose propositions for buyers: 
MV: So then in the end ... do you feel that you got a 
deal? 
CD: I think it wasn't a great deal, but I didn't get- I 
didn't feel ripped off at the end of it. .. .I felt that I 
haggled my way up slightly, like, in terms of the 
trade-in and ... (window] tints .... Like, I felt like I 
was [Pause.] - it was an OK deal, it wasn't great. But 
I felt kind of satisfied afterwards. 
MV: Well OK, [Chuckles.] OK so, it's-what I'm 
hearing from you, it's a bit of both, like-
CD: Yeah!-
MV: You're happy but, I don't know, you're not! I'm, 
I'm kind of getting mixed messages - well not 
mixed! I mean, that's normal I guess; mixed message 
are normal, but [Trails off.] 
CD: Uh I guess, [Pause.] I don't know, like, what's a 
great deal though? Like, how do you know you've 
gotten a great deal on a car? 
MV: Yeah, that's actually one of my questions, 
[Laughing through the words.] how do you figure out 
what's a good deal? 
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CD: Exactly! ... But how do you know? Like you don't 
know, and you just-you go in [and] you're 
expecting to be- [Pause.] you're expecting to get the 
shit-end of the deal! 
The only certainty about a car negotiation, CD is saying, is its inherent 
uncertainty. And even when one does know about cars, as does LT, the lone 
interviewee one could call a car aficionado, ambivalence can never be dispelled. 
LT, who lives in Toronto, arranged to meet with the seller of a 1990 BMW 318- a 
E30 in Bimmer-babble - who drove all the way from Ottawa, some 450 km away. 
LT' s negotiating problem was obviously not one of technical or mechanical 
illiteracy - immediately upon inspecting the car he could tell it was a well-loved 
specimen. His handicap was ironically the exact opposite: LT quickly realized -
and no doubt the seller too - that their shared literacy and enthusiasm for BMWs 
constituted a tacit obligation between them. LT truly did want the car - after all, 
the pool of quality E30s from that generation is dwindling fast - and they truly 
did haggle, finding a mutually acceptable price. And yet, LT still feels something 
about the negotiation was forced, as if it was not truly a negotiation: "It's almost 
like, [true] haggling is like, 'I don't really need this car; I really don't want this car 
or care if I get it. So you better give it to me for a good price or I'm leaving.' But 
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this one was harder to do just because of the circumstances. . .. When you' re 
invested in it, it's harder to [haggle]." 
So if haggling for a car is symbolically impossible for those occupying 
positions of minority, what is the solution? What links, put another way, my 
observation that so many people hate car-haggling to the more general finding 
haggling has never been healthier? It is, if I may say one last time, 
economization, that moment of disentanglement or release from all calculative 
worries and concerns. HD, commenting on haggling in general, said something 
very insightful: "to pay full price is to have no regrets." Extending this line of 
reasoning, I would say that the purpose of becoming economic is always to take 
the sting out of our choices, not just at full price, but any price really. This is 
obviously not to say that car buyers, as if risibly vain, need discursively to deny 
or conceal the uncomfortable truth they are incapable of making smart choices. 
Rather, the exhortation to economy springs from a very different, yet very human 
motivation all the same: hope - Pandoric hope at that - or the promise of 
perfectibility in an ocean of imperfection. As Bourdieu (2005: 6) so rightly noted, 
the field of economy is not so much a world of calculations as "a universe of 
belief" requiring its newcomers, like any religion, to submit to "enforced 
conversions." 
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Appendix: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
How many times in your life have you acquired a car? 
Was the vehicle you most recently acquired new or used? 
Did you lease, finance or buy it outright? 
How long did the process take (i.e. from the moment you realized you needed or 
wanted a new vehicle to its delivery)? 
What research did you do? How did you know what vehicle you wanted? 
Tell me about the process of acquiring your latest vehicle. How did it happen? 
What was the final deal, and how did you arrive at it? 
What was your greatest concern or obstacle with respect to making a choice? In 
other words, what was the greatest unknown in your mind? 
Do you enjoy haggling or negotiating? 
What was the overriding emotion you felt during the transaction process? 
How satisfied were you with the deal? Was it fair? What constitutes a fair deal? 
Fairness notwithstanding, could or should you have paid less? 
Who do you think benefited more in the transaction? 
Did you have a more or less defined 'game' or strategy? If so, what was it? How 
successful was it? 
Did you ever mentally rehearsing conversations with sellers beforehand? 
Did you ever get the impression a seller was trying to manage you? If so, how? 
Did you feel at any point like you were losing control of the transaction or 
negotiation? How so? 
Is there anything else about the transaction you would like to add? 
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